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No Ground to Refuse Summons Under DV Act Based Solely on DIR:
In a significant ruling that clarifies the interplay between a and an original complaint under the (DV Act), the has held that the mere absence of specific allegations in the DIR cannot justify the refusal to issue summons. Justice Saurabh Banerjee, sitting in a single bench, categorically stated that the DIR is a facilitative document and can never override or replace the substantive allegations made in a Section 12 application.
The judgment came in a petition filed by a woman whose in-laws were deleted from the by the lower courts solely because the DIR did not contain specific allegations against them — despite the original complaint being replete with detailed instances of verbal and emotional abuse, dowry harassment, and humiliation.
A Fractured Matrimony and a Truncated Party List
The petitioner’s marriage was solemnised in . Alleging that she was forced out of her matrimonial home in , she approached the , with a comprehensive complaint under , seeking protection, residence, and maintenance orders. The Magistrate, however, while examining the matter, relied heavily on the DIR prepared by the protection officer and deleted two relatives (respondent nos. 1 and 2) from the proceedings, noting that there were “no specific allegations” against them in that report. Summons were issued only against the husband and the mother-in-law.
Her appeal under was dismissed by the , which echoed the same reasoning. This prompted the petitioner to move the High Court under read with .
When a Protective Shield Becomes a Technical Barrier
The core argument for the petitioner, advanced by and , was that both courts below had acted mechanically. They contended that the DIR is a standard-format, cyclostyled document designed to capture answers to specific questions; it cannot serve as an exhaustive encyclopaedia of a complainant’s suffering. Moreover, they pointed to paragraph no. 4(ii) of the DIR itself, which did mention “insult for not having brought dowry” and “ridicule”—allegations directed against all respondents. The real gravamen, however, lay in the original complaint, which devoted multiple paragraphs to the actions of the deleted respondents, including comments on the petitioner’s complexion, demands for money, and threats of physical violence.
On the other hand, respondents’ counsel supported the , arguing that the complaint was vague, omnibus, and a counterblast to a divorce petition filed by the husband. They insisted that the absence of specific instances against the deleted parties in the DIR justified their removal.
The Primacy of the Complaint Over the Report
Justice Banerjee’s reasoning dismantles the approach of the lower courts. Observing that the DV Act is a with an avowed objective of protecting women against violence within the domestic sphere, the court underscored that , mandates a holistic assessment of the “overall facts and circumstances” to determine whether domestic violence is made out.
The pivotal passage in the judgment states:
“The DIR, no doubt, is a relevant document, prepared to facilitate/ assist the Magistrate, however, it can neither substitute nor supersede the original complaint/application filed under ... both, the complaint and the DIR, have to be cumulatively taken/read in conjunction with each other and not in isolation.”
The court further clarified the subordinate status of the DIR, remarking that “at the end of the day, a DIR is only required to be filed in a pending complaint. It can have no independent legs to stand on.” This means that even if the DIR is silent or deficient on certain points, the complaint itself can independently supply the necessary factual foundation for issuing summons.
Reviewing the complaint, the High Court found detailed, specific allegations against the deleted respondents—from mocking the petitioner’s appearance and denying her access to basic amenities, to demanding money for property purchases and hurling casteist slurs. These , the court held, undisputedly fell within the ambit of “domestic violence” under .
A Reminder: DV Proceedings Are Not Strictly Criminal
An important nuance highlighted by Justice Banerjee is that proceedings under are, , not criminal in nature. Therefore, the issuance of summons does not carry the same irreversible stigma as it might in a purely criminal case. The court observed:
“It cannot be ignored that the proceedings initiated under … are not criminal in nature, the learned Magistrate, even after issuance of summons and after going through the response of the respondents, if it appears that no case is ultimately made out against any of the respondent(s), then appropriate orders in accordance with law can always be passed.”
This ensures that a cautious magistrate always retains the power to drop a respondent later if the evidence fails to support the allegations.
Decision and Consequences
Consequently, the High Court set aside the judgment of the dated and the Metropolitan Magistrate’s order dated to the extent that they deleted respondent nos. 1 and 2 from the . The Magistrate was directed to issue summons to those respondents upon the petitioner taking requisite steps.
The ruling reinforces that the DV Act’s procedural architecture cannot be used to throttle a genuine complaint through hyper-technical readings of a single form. By confirming that the DIR is merely a handmaiden to the complaint—and not its master—the has preserved the protective sweep of the legislation and ensured that victims are not denied a hearing at the threshold for want of a line in a summary report.
