No Prima Facie Case Against Vygon India in Medical Consumables Antitrust Dispute: CCI

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has closed an antitrust complaint against medical device company Vygon India Pvt. Ltd., ruling that the allegations of abuse of dominance and vertical restraints did not make out a prima facie case. The order, passed by a bench comprising Chairperson Ravneet Kaur and Members Sweta Kakkad and Deepak Anurag, concludes that the informant failed to establish that Vygon holds a dominant position or that its distribution agreement causes an appreciable adverse effect on competition.

The Dealership Dispute

The case was initiated by Vibrant Enterprise, a Gujarat-based partnership firm that served as Vygon’s non-exclusive dealer from 2012 until it voluntarily terminated the dealership in July 2025. Vibrant had previously been an employee of Vygon between 2005 and 2012.

Vibrant alleged that Vygon’s Master Dealership Agreement (MDA) contained coercive and restrictive clauses, including unilateral termination rights, prohibitions on participating in certain tenders, market allocation, non-compete obligations, mandatory 45-day stocking requirements, intrusive audit powers, and the supply of expired or about-to-expire products. The informant claimed these practices violated Section 3(4) (vertical restraints) and Section 4 (abuse of dominance) of the Competition Act, 2002.

The Battle Over Relevant Market

A critical point of contention was how to define the relevant market. Vibrant argued that the market should be limited to neonatal and paediatric vascular access devices and specialty critical-care catheters used in tertiary care hospitals, where it claimed Vygon enjoyed a 40-70% market share and was often the sole bidder in tenders.

Vygon countered that the MDA covered over 800 products, making it inappropriate to focus narrowly on catheters. It proposed a broader market for supply of medical consumables to institutional buyers, or, alternatively, the market for sale and distribution of catheters. Citing an Ernst & Young report, Vygon argued that its market share was negligible in both scenarios, with numerous domestic and international competitors such as Polymed, HMD, Romsons, Medtronic, and Becton Dickinson operating in the space.

No Dominance, No Adverse Effect

The Commission sided with Vygon on the market definition issue, noting that the allegations extended across Vygon’s entire product portfolio, warranting a cluster market approach. It observed that “it would not be appropriate to assess the entire impugned distribution arrangement solely in the market for neonatal PICCs, as suggested by the Informant.”

On dominance, the CCI found that Vibrant had not produced evidence of Vygon’s market share. The information available in the public domain, including the EY report, indicated that competitors possessed substantial financial and production capabilities, undermining any claim of dominance. “The competitive position of rival suppliers does not suggest that the OP enjoys a dominant position in any of these markets,” the Commission stated.

Turning to vertical restraints, the CCI emphasised that for an agreement to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition, the entity must hold some degree of market power. The absence of such power made foreclosure of competing suppliers or dealers unlikely. Crucially, the Commission noted that after its relationship with Vygon ended, Vibrant had obtained a dealership with Polymed, demonstrating that switching to an alternative supplier was not prohibitive.

The Final Order

Based on the available material, the Commission concluded: “It can neither be said that the OP enjoys a dominant position for the purposes of Section 4 of the Act nor that the impugned vertical restrictions have caused, or are capable of causing, appreciable adverse effect on competition under Section 3(4) of the Act.”

The information was closed forthwith under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act. The CCI also granted confidentiality to certain documents filed by Vygon under Regulation 36, for a period of three years.

Key Observations from the Judgment

  • “For an assessment under Section 3(4) of the Act, the impugned conduct is required to be examined with reference to the market in which the alleged vertical agreement or restraint operates along with its likely or actual effect on competition therein.”
  • “A vertical restriction may contravene Section 3(4) of the Act, if it causes or is likely to cause appreciable adverse effect on competition as per Section 19(3) of the Act. The entity concerned must enjoy some degree of market power for vertical restraints to materially foreclose the competition.”
  • “In the instant matter, absence of the market power of the OP, as examined above, makes foreclosure of competing suppliers or dealers unlikely.”

Broader CCI Context

The decision comes amid a period of active antitrust scrutiny in India. In a separate matter, the CCI recently closed its inquiry against Google following a complaint by WinZO Games, after the enactment of the Promotion and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2025 fundamentally altered the regulatory landscape. While that case turned on supervening legislation, the Vygon order reaffirms the Commission’s insistence on rigorous evidentiary standards for establishing dominance and competitive harm.