's Interim Relief Closure for Fee Non-Payment Not Appealable: Delhi HC
The , in a significant ruling under the , held that an arbitral tribunal’s order closing a party’s and counterclaim for non-payment of arbitral fees is a and does not constitute an under .
Justice Om Prakash Shukla dismissed as the appeal filed by against , while granting the appellant of the closure order before the arbitral tribunal.
Dispute Over Fit-Out Works Leads to Arbitration
The dispute arose out of a Fit-Out Agreement dated , under which Orbit was to supply and install fit-outs, fixtures and related works at American Epay’s commercial premises, retaining ownership while receiving monthly lease charges. American Epay terminated the agreement on , alleging deficiencies and seeking approximately ₹15 crore in reimbursement and damages. Orbit disputed the allegations, contending that substantial work had been completed and its fit-outs remained in use without payment.
After pre-arbitration interim proceedings under , a sole arbitrator was appointed on . Orbit then filed two applications seeking disclosure and protection of assets and deposit of rent arrears, along with a counterclaim of approximately ₹16.78 crore. American Epay had raised claims of approximately ₹11.71 crore.
Leads to Closure of
On , the sole arbitrator directed Orbit to deposit its entire share of the arbitral fee before its applications and counterclaim would be heard. Orbit deposited ₹14 lakh out of the assessed amount of approximately ₹39.03 lakh but failed to pay the balance.
Consequently, on , the tribunal closed Orbit’s right to pursue the applications and counterclaim, stating: “In view of the admitted non-payment/deposit of the requisite arbitral fee despite sufficient opportunity, the right of the Respondent to pursue the said applications and the Counter Claim stands closed.”
Orbit challenged this closure under Section 37(2)(b), arguing that the order effectively refused and that the arbitrator lacked power to close pending applications for non-payment of fees, relying on of the Act and the Rules.
Procedural Order Without Substantive Adjudication
The High Court found that the impugned order did not adjudicate the merits of the applications. The court observed: “The learned Sole Arbitrator neither granted nor rejected the . It merely closed Appellant’s right to pursue the applications and counterclaim because of non-compliance with the direction to deposit arbitral fees.”
Drawing on the principle established in , the court noted that an order remains procedural unless it finally determines a substantive component of the reference. Since the tribunal never examined the , the closure order could not be characterised as one “granting or refusing to grant an interim measure” under .
The court also relied on the ’s decision in , where non-payment of fees led to termination of claims and the apex court held that the appropriate first remedy is to seek before the tribunal. The High Court stated: “The proper course, therefore, was to first seek or restoration before the Tribunal, rather than invoking this Court’s jurisdiction under Section 37 by erroneously treating a as a .”
No Under Section 37(2)(b)
The court clarified that Section 37(2) does not confer a general appellate remedy against every order passed during arbitration. It permits appeals only from an order accepting a plea under or an order granting or refusing under . The impugned closure, being a consequence of non-compliance with a fee-deposit direction, fell outside this ambit.
The court also addressed the appellant’s reliance on and the Rules, holding that those arguments could be raised before the tribunal in a application but did not transform the procedural order into an appealable refusal.
Decision and
The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. The court clarified that the closure of Orbit’s counterclaim and applications did not prevent it from otherwise participating in the arbitration. It granted liberty to Orbit to file an appropriate application seeking of the impugned order before the arbitral tribunal.
The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural defaults in arbitration must first be remedied through the arbitral process, and that under Section 37 is reserved for orders that substantively determine interim relief under .