Rules Participation '' Doesn't Justify Challenge After Bid Rejection
The has firmly held that a bidder who participates in a tender process "" cannot later challenge the very conditions it objected to after its bid is rejected. A Division Bench comprising Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma dismissed a writ petition by , which sought to invalidate an eligibility condition in tenders floated by the for constructing rail over bridges.
The Challenge to Tender Conditions
The dispute arose from three tenders issued on , which prescribed different financial periods for assessing eligibility: the annual financial turnover was to be evaluated for 2019-20 to 2023-24, while the experience in completing similar works was limited to 2020-21 to 2024-25. Adyaraj Developers argued that this inconsistency violated the Standard Bidding Document, which required a uniform "last five years" period, and was arbitrary under .
Before bidding, the petitioner submitted a representation on , challenging the condition. When no decision was forthcoming, it participated in the tender "." Its technical bid was subsequently rejected for failing to meet the prescribed experience criteria, prompting the petition.
Participation '': No Legal Shield
The Court decisively rejected the petitioner's attempt to salvage its challenge through the "" label. It observed that the petitioner was fully aware of the eligibility conditions before bidding and had voluntarily subjected itself to the evaluation process.
"Merely because the petitioner had submitted a representation or allegedly participated
does not alter the legal position,"
the Bench stated.
"Such representation, or participation
cannot, by itself, invalidate the tender process nor can it confer upon the petitioner a right to seek annulment of the process after the result has gone against it."
The Court applied the , citing the 's ruling in
R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir
(1992), which holds that no party can accept and reject the same transaction according to its convenience.
"Having taken a calculated chance of success, the petitioner cannot seek to invalidate the process solely because the outcome has not been favourable,"
the judgment emphasized.
Limited Scope of
On the merits of the eligibility condition, the Court declined to interfere, reiterating that the tendering authority is the best judge of its requirements. Citing a string of precedents— Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2012), Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (2016), Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India (2020), and N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain (2022)—the Court noted that in tender matters is confined to examining whether the decision-making process is arbitrary, , or .
"The Court cannot direct the employer to prescribe a particular eligibility condition merely because another criterion may also appear to be reasonable or because such alteration would render a particular bidder eligible,"
the Bench held. It found no evidence that the impugned condition was designed to favour any party or that it was irrational.
Key Observations
The judgment made several noteworthy observations on the limits of judicial intervention in procurement:
"The Court does not sit like a court of appeal over the appropriate authority; the court must realise that the authority floating the tender is the best judge of its requirements and, therefore, the court's interference should be minimal."
"If two interpretations are possible then the interpretation of the author must be accepted. The courts will only interfere to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or perversity."
"The mere fact that the turnover criterion and the experience criterion refer to different financial periods is, by itself, insufficient to invalidate the impugned clause."
Final Decision
The High Court dismissed the writ petition in its entirety, holding that the petitioner had failed to make out a case for interference. The Court also disposed of pending applications. The ruling reinforces the principle that bidders cannot opportunistically accept the benefits of a tender process while reserving the right to challenge its conditions only after an unfavourable outcome.