Patna High Court Rules Participation 'Under Protest' Doesn't Justify Challenge After Bid Rejection

The Patna High Court has firmly held that a bidder who participates in a tender process "under protest" cannot later challenge the very conditions it objected to after its bid is rejected. A Division Bench comprising Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma dismissed a writ petition by Adyaraj Developers Private Limited, which sought to invalidate an eligibility condition in tenders floated by the Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Limited for constructing rail over bridges.

The Challenge to Tender Conditions

The dispute arose from three tenders issued on March 17, 2025, which prescribed different financial periods for assessing eligibility: the annual financial turnover was to be evaluated for 2019-20 to 2023-24, while the experience in completing similar works was limited to 2020-21 to 2024-25. Adyaraj Developers argued that this inconsistency violated the Standard Bidding Document, which required a uniform "last five years" period, and was arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution.

Before bidding, the petitioner submitted a representation on April 25, 2025, challenging the condition. When no decision was forthcoming, it participated in the tender "under protest." Its technical bid was subsequently rejected for failing to meet the prescribed experience criteria, prompting the petition.

Participation 'Under Protest': No Legal Shield

The Court decisively rejected the petitioner's attempt to salvage its challenge through the "under protest" label. It observed that the petitioner was fully aware of the eligibility conditions before bidding and had voluntarily subjected itself to the evaluation process.

"Merely because the petitioner had submitted a representation or allegedly participated under protest does not alter the legal position," the Bench stated. "Such representation, or participation under protest cannot, by itself, invalidate the tender process nor can it confer upon the petitioner a right to seek annulment of the process after the result has gone against it."

The Court applied the doctrine against approbation and reprobation, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir (1992), which holds that no party can accept and reject the same transaction according to its convenience. "Having taken a calculated chance of success, the petitioner cannot seek to invalidate the process solely because the outcome has not been favourable," the judgment emphasized.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review

On the merits of the eligibility condition, the Court declined to interfere, reiterating that the tendering authority is the best judge of its requirements. Citing a string of Supreme Court precedents— Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2012), Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (2016), Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India (2020), and N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain (2022)—the Court noted that judicial review in tender matters is confined to examining whether the decision-making process is arbitrary, mala fide, or perverse.

"The Court cannot direct the employer to prescribe a particular eligibility condition merely because another criterion may also appear to be reasonable or because such alteration would render a particular bidder eligible," the Bench held. It found no evidence that the impugned condition was designed to favour any party or that it was irrational.

Key Observations

The judgment made several noteworthy observations on the limits of judicial intervention in procurement:

"The Court does not sit like a court of appeal over the appropriate authority; the court must realise that the authority floating the tender is the best judge of its requirements and, therefore, the court's interference should be minimal."

"If two interpretations are possible then the interpretation of the author must be accepted. The courts will only interfere to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or perversity."

"The mere fact that the turnover criterion and the experience criterion refer to different financial periods is, by itself, insufficient to invalidate the impugned clause."

Final Decision

The High Court dismissed the writ petition in its entirety, holding that the petitioner had failed to make out a case for interference. The Court also disposed of pending applications. The ruling reinforces the principle that bidders cannot opportunistically accept the benefits of a tender process while reserving the right to challenge its conditions only after an unfavourable outcome.