Pratap Simha's FIR Challenge: Karnataka High Court Says Wrong Court Sending Mere Irregularity Not Ground

The Karnataka High Court on Monday heard submissions in a significant criminal procedure matter, where BJP leader and former Member of Parliament Pratap Simha sought the quashing of two First Information Reports (FIRs) registered against him. The State, opposing the plea, argued that merely sending an FIR to a court lacking jurisdiction amounts to a procedural irregularity, not an illegality that would warrant quashing. The Court, while noting the State’s admissions regarding jurisdictional errors, reserved its orders on the petitions.

Simha, who represented the Mysuru-Kodagu constituency in the Lok Sabha, faces two separate FIRs arising from an alleged speech delivered during a Ganesha Visarjan procession in T. Narasipura on September 18, 2024. The first FIR, registered suo motu, invoked multiple sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), including Section 356 (defamation). The second FIR, filed on September 22 by the President of a local association, added allegations under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, specifically Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u). Simha contends that the FIRs are politically motivated and that his remarks were directed at a police officer’s conduct, not any community.

Jurisdictional Flaw Admitted by State

The core legal issue revolved around the jurisdiction of the court that received the FIR. Simha’s counsel, Advocate Venkatesh Dalwai, pointed out that as a former MP, any case against him must be tried by a designated Special Court for MPs/MLAs, constituted by the Karnataka Government in 2018. However, the FIR invoking Section 356 BNS was sent to the Mysuru Sessions Court, which Dalwai argued lacked the authority to take cognizance or delete charges.

“It's not a special court. I am a former Member of Parliament. After 2018, the Karnataka Government constituted special courts… As of today, 356 has been conveniently deleted so that FIR could be sustained,” Dalwai submitted. He further relied on Section 222 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), corresponding to Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), to argue that defamation can be taken cognizance of only upon a complaint by the aggrieved person, not through a police report.

“Once you invoke 356 BNS, the bar under 222 BNSS applies… If there is a legal bar, the entire registration of FIR becomes illegal,” Dalwai argued, contending that the complainant would have to pursue a private complaint. He urged that the inclusion of Section 356 in the FIR, and its subsequent deletion by the Sessions Court without jurisdiction, vitiated the entire proceeding.

State’s Counter: Procedural Irregularity Does Not Vitate Proceedings

The State Public Prosecutor (SPP) countered by emphasizing that sending the FIR to the wrong court is at best a procedural irregularity, not an illegality that would justify quashing under Section 528 BNSS (analogous to Section 482 CrPC). “If we accept the argument that the FIR is sent to the wrong court, can it be quashed? The answer is no, milord,” the SPP submitted.

The SPP acknowledged that the FIR had been “wrongly” sent to the Mysuru Sessions Court and that the court had passed an order deleting Section 356 without jurisdiction. However, he argued that Sections 506 and 508 BNSS, which deal with procedural irregularities that do not vitiate proceedings unless prejudice is shown, could cure the defect. “Wrongly I have incorporated 356 in the FIR. Rightly I have sent a requisition. But does the wrong court vitiate the entire proceedings?” he asked.

Court’s Observations on Jurisdictional Error

The Bench, comprising Justice M. Nagaprasanna, engaged closely with the State’s submissions. The Court noted that the State was conceding two critical points: first, that the FIR was sent to a court lacking jurisdiction, and second, that the Sessions Court had passed an order deleting Section 356 without jurisdiction. The Court then observed:

“Two things you admit: the FIR was sent to a court with no jurisdiction, and the order was passed by a Sessions Court also without jurisdiction. But you are saving this by Section 506 BNSS & Section 508 BNSS…”

The Court’s observation suggests that while the State seeks refuge under procedural irregularity provisions, the Bench is concerned about the foundational legality of the proceedings. The applicability of Sections 506 and 508 BNSS will likely be a pivotal issue in the final judgment.

Legal Implications for Defamation and Jurisdictional Challenges

This case raises important questions about the interplay between jurisdiction, procedural compliance, and the power to quash FIRs. Under the BNSS, Section 506 provides that no order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on account of any error, omission, or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, or other proceedings unless such error has occasioned a failure of justice. Section 508 similarly protects judgments from being set aside for mere irregularities.

However, the Court’s pointed remarks indicate that the error here may be more than a mere irregularity—it goes to the root of jurisdiction. The Sessions Court, lacking authority to handle cases involving former MPs, should not have entertained the FIR or passed any order regarding deletion of charges. If the High Court accepts this argument, the entire proceeding before the Sessions Court could be rendered void ab initio.

Furthermore, the defamation charge under Section 356 BNS is procedurally distinct: it requires a private complaint by the aggrieved person under Section 222 BNSS. The State’s reliance on procedural irregularity may not salvage the case if the FIR itself was legally unsustainable from the outset due to the absence of a complaint. Simha’s counsel has forcefully argued that the bar under Section 222 BNSS applies the moment Section 356 is invoked, making the FIR illegal.

Broader Impact on Criminal Procedure

The Karnataka High Court’s decision in this matter could have far-reaching consequences for criminal proceedings involving former MPs and MLAs. The constitution of special courts to try such individuals was intended to ensure speedy and fair trials, but the current case exposes a gap in implementation—where FIRs are still being routed to regular courts. If the Court holds that such jurisdictional errors are fatal, it may compel police and lower courts to strictly adhere to the designated forum.

Additionally, the case underscores the importance of Section 222 BNSS in defamation cases. The provision prevents police from registering an FIR for defamation without a complaint, a safeguard that the State’s argument appears to circumvent by invoking procedural irregularity. Legal experts suggest that this could lead to more scrutiny of FIRs that include defamation charges alongside other offences, particularly when the complainant is not the aggrieved person.

Conclusion

As the Karnataka High Court prepares to deliver its judgment, the legal community awaits clarity on two critical issues: whether sending an FIR to a court without jurisdiction is a curable irregularity or a fatal illegality, and whether the inclusion of a defamation charge in a police FIR, without a private complaint, can be salvaged by subsequent deletion. Pratap Simha’s challenge, rooted in allegations of political vendetta, has inadvertently raised procedural questions that could reshape the handling of criminal cases involving public figures. The outcome will not only affect Simha but also set a precedent for similar challenges across the state.