Back
Professional Advice Can't Be Criminalised: Quashes FIR Against Lawyer
In a resounding affirmation of , the has quashed criminal proceedings against an advocate who was booked for and merely for discharging his professional duties. Justice M Nagaprasanna, presiding over a , held that subjecting lawyers to criminal prosecution for offering legal advice would strike at the very .
A Thin Line Between Professional Advice and Criminal Liability
The petitioner, , a practising advocate, was arrayed as accused No.4 in Crime No.162/2026 registered at for offences under Sections 318(4) () and 351(2) () of the . The complainant, Shrenik Chandrashekar, alleged that when he visited accused No.1's residence to recover a debt, the latter called several people including Bhanu, who allegedly threatened the complainant over a phone call.
Bhanu contended that he had merely spoken to a police constable present at the scene at the request of his client, and that the complainant's friend had used abusive language during the call. The complaint, he argued, was a delayed afterthought—filed nearly three months after the alleged incident and only after the complainant himself was made an accused in a cross-FIR registered by Bhanu's client.
The Missing Ingredients of
The court examined whether the allegations satisfied the
of
under Section 318(4) BNS. Observing that
presupposes a deceitful transaction between the parties from its inception, Justice Nagaprasanna noted that there was
"no transaction whatsoever between the petitioner and the complainant."
The sole allegation—a telephonic threat—could not form the substratum of a
charge.
When Words Don't Amount to Intimidation
Turning to , the court relied on settled precedents in and to reiterate that mere utterance of words, however unpleasant, does not constitute unless backed by an intentional design to cause alarm. The court noted that the complaint was conspicuously silent about any overt act or criminal intent attributable to the petitioner, beyond the bald assertion of a telephonic threat.
The judgment also highlighted the unexplained three-month delay in filing the complaint, remarking that promptness in approaching law enforcement
"lends assurance to the authenticity of the accusation."
Here, the delay, coupled with the context of a cross-complaint, indicated that the proceedings were
"
and
."
A Disturbing Trend: Lawyers Under the Scanner
In a strongly worded observation, the court flagged a growing tendency to implicate advocates in criminal cases solely for performing professional obligations:
"This Court has, of late, witnessed an increasing and disturbing trend where Advocates, merely because they discharge their professional obligations in representing litigants or legally assisting them, are sought to be implicated in criminal proceedings. Their only perceived offence is that they stood beside their clients, articulated their cause before judicial fora and performed the duties which the legal profession demands of them."
The court cautioned that if such nebulous allegations are allowed to mature into investigations, the consequence would be
"far graver than the fate of the individual petitioner"
and would cast a
"long and chilling shadow upon the fearless discharge of professional duties by members of the Bar."
Decision and Implications
Allowing the , the court quashed Crime No.162/2026 insofar as it concerns the petitioner—accused No.4. It clarified that the findings apply only to the petitioner and not to other accused in the case. The ruling reinforces the principle that so long as an advocate acts within the bounds of law and professional ethics, their conduct cannot be criminalised merely because their advice or representation displeases an adversary. The judgment serves as a shield against the to intimidate legal professionals.
