Punjab and Haryana High Court Acquits Man in 22-Year Dowry Death Case on Dying Declaration

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has acquitted Bhanu Parkash, who was convicted for dowry death under Section 304-B IPC, holding that the dying declaration of his wife Geetika Sharma—which clearly stated she suffered accidental burns—created reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to dispel. Justice Mandeep Pannu emphasized that the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act can only be invoked after the prosecution proves the foundational ingredients, including that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment “soon before” her death.

A Fatal Accident or Dowry Harassment?

Geetika Sharma married Bhanu Parkash on February 10, 1993, in Muzaffarnagar and moved to Jagadhri, where her husband worked as a Chargeman in the Railways. On August 4, 1998, she suffered 90% burn injuries at her matrimonial home. When first taken to the Railway Hospital and later to PGI Chandigarh, she consistently told the doctor and then a Judicial Magistrate that she was painting the kitchen wall, and while soaking a brush in kerosene, the liquid splashed onto her clothes. The bottle fell, and since the gas stove was on, her clothes caught fire accidentally. She died on August 9, 1998.

After her death, her father Sakesh Mani Sharma lodged an FIR alleging that Bhanu Parkash, along with his brother and father, had been harassing and demanding dowry, ultimately setting her on fire. The trial court convicted Bhanu Parkash under Section 304-B IPC, disbelieving the dying declaration and relying on the father’s testimony and an alleged suicide note dated May 3, 1998.

Dying Declaration Proves Too Strong to Overcome

The appellant, represented by Senior Advocate Bipan Ghai, argued that the dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate after obtaining a doctor’s fitness certificate was a contemporaneous, reliable account that excluded homicide. He pointed out that the deceased’s parents were present at the hospital for five days but never complained until after her death—strongly suggesting the FIR was an afterthought.

The State and the complainant, on the other hand, contended that the dying declaration was made under pressure and that the letters written by the deceased (including the note Ex.PV) proved harassment. They argued that the appellant’s absence from the house at the moment of fire was a deliberate ploy.

Court’s Reasoning: Proof Before Presumption

Justice Pannu meticulously analyzed the evidence, noting that the deceased’s earliest statement to the doctor and her detailed dying declaration were consistent and unimpeached. Critically, the court observed:

“There is no convincing reason emerging from the evidence to discard the testimony of the Judicial Magistrate. The Magistrate had specifically satisfied himself regarding her fitness to make the statement, after obtaining the doctor’s opinion.”

The court also highlighted the significance of the five-day period during which the deceased survived and her parents had access to her, yet no complaint was made. The delay in lodging the FIR—only after death—was not fatal per se, but here it assumed “significance because it is not an isolated circumstance.” The court inferred that the parents’ conduct was inconsistent with genuine belief in dowry harassment.

Turning to the alleged suicide note, the court found its recovery doubtful and noted conflicting handwriting expert opinions—one linking it to the deceased, another stating it did not match her admitted writings. The document was thus deemed unsafe to base a conviction.

Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2024 INSC 713), the High Court reiterated that the presumption under Section 113-B does not arise automatically; the prosecution must first prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demands “soon before” her death. The court found no proximate link between any alleged harassment and the death.

Key Observations from the Judgment

  • “The prosecution is also required to rule out the possibility of an accidental death before the statutory presumption can be invoked.”
  • “A conviction cannot rest upon a possibility or conjecture, particularly when the deceased herself had given a version of accidental burning.”
  • “The prosecution has failed to establish the requisite proximate and live link between any alleged dowry-related harassment and the death.”

Final Order

Allowing the appeal, Justice Mandeep Pannu set aside the conviction and sentence of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment. The revision petition filed by the deceased’s father seeking enhancement of sentence was dismissed. Bhanu Parkash was acquitted of all charges and directed to be released forthwith, with his bail bonds discharged.

The judgment underscores that in dowry death cases, the evidentiary burden on the prosecution remains heavy, and a credible dying declaration of accidental death can tip the scale in favor of the accused—especially when paired with delays in complaint and lack of proximate harassment evidence.