Pynchemalangaki Bareh convicted under Section 376 IPC despite no charge framed: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of India has held that an accused can be convicted under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code for rape even when no such charge was framed by the trial court, provided the ingredients of the offence are the same as those charged under the POCSO Act and no failure of justice has occurred. The bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria delivered the judgment in an appeal by Pynchemalangaki Bareh against his conviction under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act.

The Case and the Age Dispute

The case arose from an incident on November 26, 2019, when a 13-year-old girl was allegedly raped at Mokoidaling, Sutnga in Meghalaya. The appellant was charged under Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 506 IPC. The trial court convicted him to 20 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 4(2) of POCSO and two years under Section 506 IPC. The High Court of Meghalaya upheld the conviction.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the victim’s age was not proved as per Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The prosecution had relied on a Baptismal Certificate issued by the Khasi Jaintia Presbyterian Assembly and the mother’s testimony, but no school certificate, municipal birth certificate, or ossification test was produced. The appellant contended that in light of the judgment in P. Yuvaprakash v. State , the POCSO conviction could not stand.

The state, on the other hand, argued that the Baptismal Certificate was reliable and that the medical evidence, including the MLC noting that the victim had not attained menarche, corroborated her minority.

Court’s Analysis on Age Determination

The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme under Section 94 of the JJ Act, which prescribes a hierarchy of documents for age determination: first, a school date of birth certificate or matriculation certificate; in its absence, a birth certificate from a municipal authority or panchayat; and only in the absence of both, a medical ossification test. The Court observed that the Baptismal Certificate did not fall under any of these categories and that no ossification test was conducted. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove the victim’s minority beyond reasonable doubt.

“The only document available on the record for proving the age of the victim is the Baptismal Certificate issued by the Khasi Jaintia Presbyterian Assembly. Although the date of birth in the Baptismal Certificate finds corroboration in the deposition of P.W.-2, the mother of the victim girl, stating the girl was born on 05.03.2006, yet since the document itself is not the one prescribed under Section 94 of the JJ Act, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the age of the victim in the manner required under Section 94 of the JJ Act,” the Court held.

Can Conviction Under Section 376 IPC Be Sustained Without a Charge?

The more significant legal question was whether the appellant could be convicted for rape under Section 376 IPC when the trial court had framed charges only under the POCSO Act. The Court answered in the affirmative, relying on Section 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the principle of cognate offences.

The judgment noted that the actus reus for penetrative sexual assault under Section 3 of the POCSO Act is identical to that of rape under Section 375 IPC. The only distinction is the age of the victim. When the age remains unproved, the POCSO charge fails, but the substantive offence of rape under the IPC stands.

“The only distinguishing feature between Section 375 of the IPC and Section 3 of the POCSO Act is the minority of the victim, which determines the charge of offence under Section 376 of the IPC and/or under Section 4 of the POCSO Act. … However, where the Trial Court erred in framing a charge under Section 376 of the IPC but factum of rape is clearly proven, and prosecution failed to establish the age of the victim, charge under Section 4 of the POCSO Act fails, while prosecution for charge under Section 376 of the IPC sustains,” the Court observed.

No Failure of Justice

The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the absence of a Section 376 charge deprived him of a fair opportunity to defend. It found that the offence of rape is cognate to penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act, sharing the same ingredients. The accused had a full opportunity to contest the factual allegations of penetration, which were identical under both provisions.

“When the accused has been given an opportunity to defend himself against an offence under Section 3 of the POCSO Act, being of the same nature as offence under Section 376 of the IPC, there is no hesitation in holding that in event of prosecution's failure to prove victim's minority, there would be no failure of justice in proceeding against him under a charge of Section 376 of the IPC,” the bench stated.

The Court also referred to the test laid down in Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P. , which permits conviction for an uncharged offence if the accused was aware of its basic ingredients, the main facts were clearly explained, and he received a fair chance to defend.

Medical and Forensic Evidence Corroborates Rape

The judgment highlighted the overwhelming evidence against the appellant. The victim identified him in a test identification parade. The medical examination revealed a torn hymen and partial penile penetration. The appellant himself sustained a cut injury on his forehead, consistent with the victim’s account of striking him with a stone. The FSL report detected the appellant’s blood group on the victim’s clothing and seminal stains on his underwear.

“All the prosecution witnesses … were unanimous in their oral testimony that the accused person had sexually assaulted the prosecutrix and nothing was shaken in cross to disbelieve their depositions as their statement are firm and convincing,” the Court noted.

Final Decision

The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal. It set aside the conviction under Section 4 of the POCSO Act but convicted the appellant under Section 376 IPC for rape. The sentence was reduced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000, in default six months simple imprisonment. The conviction under Section 506 IPC was confirmed.

The judgment clarifies a crucial procedural point: a failure to frame a charge under Section 376 IPC does not automatically entitle an accused to acquittal when the evidence clearly establishes rape. The appellate court can remedy the error, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused.