Recalling Child Victims in POCSO Cases Violates Right to Life, Holds Madras High Court

In a significant ruling underscoring the rights of child victims of sexual offences, the High Court of Judicature at Madras has held that a child cannot be repeatedly summoned to court and made to relive the trauma of sexual assault. Justice D. Bharatha Chakravarthy , sitting in a single bench, dismissed a criminal original petition filed by an accused seeking to recall a ten-year-old victim for cross-examination, observing that such secondary victimisation violates the child's fundamental right to life.

The court's order, pronounced on July 1, 2026, draws a firm line against routine recall applications in cases under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) , reinforcing the victim-centric and child-friendly approach mandated by the statute.


The Allegations: A Child's Ordeal

The case arose from an incident in Gingee, Villupuram district, where the accused, Ramesh , was present with his cattle while two victim children were rearing goats nearby. According to the prosecution, the accused called the children towards him. While the elder child managed to wriggle free and escape, the accused caught hold of the younger child—a ten-year-old girl—and committed sexual assault. As per the child's statement, the accused was preparing to sit on her when she pushed him away and ran.

The child's statement was duly recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , and the trial commenced before the Special Court for Exclusive Trial of Cases under the POCSO Act, Villupuram . The victim girl was examined-in-chief on January 5, 2026. On that day, the accused was present but did not cross-examine the child witness.

Subsequently, the accused filed an application under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) seeking to recall the victim (PW-1) for cross-examination. The Trial Court dismissed this application on May 5, 2026, prompting the present petition before the High Court.


A Missed Opportunity or a Systemic Safeguard?

Mr. T. Maha Vishnu , counsel for the petitioner, argued that the accused's previous counsel had failed to appear before the Trial Court on the date of examination-in-chief. He contended that the accused's valuable right to cross-examine a crucial witness should not be forfeited due to the advocate's default. The petitioner had since engaged new counsel and was willing to conduct the trial diligently.

On the other hand, Mr. M. Mohamed Riyaz , Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the State, opposed the plea. The prosecution maintained that recalling the child would subject her to further trauma, directly contravening the protective framework of the POCSO Act.


The Court's Reasoning: A Child's Right to Heal

Justice Bharatha Chakravarthy approached the matter by placing the best interest of the child at the centre of the analysis. The court identified the multiple stages at which a child victim is compelled to recount the traumatic experience—disclosure to parents or relatives, interaction with the Child Welfare Committee , medical examination, statement recording by the investigating officer, proceedings under Section 164 CrPC before a magistrate, and finally, examination before the court.

"That, by itself, is enough to cause trauma to the child," the court stated, adding that permitting any further reliving of the ordeal through recall applications would amount to secondary victimisation .

The judgment placed heavy reliance on Section 33(5) of the POCSO Act , which imposes an express statutory duty on the Special Court to "ensure that the child is not called repeatedly to testify in the court." The court extracted this provision verbatim and held that it brooks no casual or routine exceptions.

The bench also noted that the accused was not left without any remedy. The elder child, who had wriggled out of the accused's hold, was yet to complete her examination, and the accused could cross-examine that witness. Furthermore, the accused had raised a defence of a property dispute with the de facto complainant—a line of defence he could pursue through other witnesses and by examining witnesses on his own behalf.


Key Observations from the Bench

The judgment is replete with powerful observations that reaffirm the child-centric mandate of the POCSO Act:

"The child cannot be repeatedly called to relive the ordeal. As soon as possible, the child has to be healed."

"It is not about granting an opportunity to the accused alone. But, it is about the right to life of the child itself."

" Secondary victimisation in a sexual abuse case would invade the very right to life of the victim child."

"In the guise of fair opportunity and the routine and stereotypic allegations of counsel not being present on the particular day etc., the child's right to life itself cannot be violated."

These remarks make it abundantly clear that procedural fairness to the accused cannot override the fundamental rights and psychological well-being of a child sexual assault survivor.


Supreme Court Precedent: A Child-Centric Mandate

The High Court drew strength from the Supreme Court of India's decision in Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 5 SCC 546, where the Apex Court had emphasised that in matters of child abuse, the " best interest of the child is paramount and not the interest of perpetrator of the crime." The Supreme Court had mandated a "child-centric" approach and cautioned that even family members who perpetrate abuse "shall not go scot-free."

Applying this binding precedent, Justice Bharatha Chakravarthy concluded that the "approach has to be victim centric and in the best interest of the child ."


What the Verdict Means

By dismissing CRL OP No. 16742 of 2026 , the Madras High Court has sent an unequivocal message: recall applications for cross-examination of child victims in POCSO cases cannot be allowed as a matter of routine. The statutory duty under Section 33(5) of the POCSO Act is mandatory, and courts must guard against secondary victimisation with utmost vigilance.

The judgment also serves as a caution to defence counsel in POCSO trials—absence on the date of examination-in-chief carries irreversible consequences when the witness is a child. The accused in such cases must rely on other available evidentiary avenues and cannot insist on putting the child through the trauma of repeated testimony.

As India grapples with the alarming prevalence of child sexual abuse, this ruling reinforces the protective architecture of the POCSO Act and aligns judicial practice with the legislative intent: that the law itself must never become an instrument of further suffering for the child.