Supreme Court Criticizes CARA Over Denied Family Adoptions

The Supreme Court of India, in a scathing critique of administrative overreach, has challenged the Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA) for its persistent opposition to inter-country relative adoptions. In a hearing on Monday, a bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Joymalya Bagchi expressed deep frustration regarding the bureaucratic roadblocks placed in the path of a 13-year-old girl seeking to join her maternal aunt in the United States. The proceedings have brought to the fore a critical legal conflict between the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (HAMA), 1956, and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act (JJ Act), 2015, which continues to jeopardize the lives and futures of vulnerable children.

The case, X v. Central Adoption Resource Authority & Ors. , hinges on the urgent needs of the minor petitioner, whose adoption by her late mother's elder sister and brother-in-law was stalled by a CARA Office Memorandum dated February 9, 2026. As the July 20, 2026, deadline for American relocation approaches, the court’s intervention has served as a stern reminder to the regulatory body that procedural rigidity should not supersede the welfare of a child or the fundamental rights of a family to reunite.

The Backdrop: A Regulatory Impasse

The controversy stems from the interaction between India's traditional personal laws and the modern regulatory framework governing inter-country adoptions. The petitioner was adopted under a registered deed pursuant to HAMA following the tragic death of her mother in 2024. Initially, their petition for inter-country relocation was moving toward a successful resolution under Chapter VII of the Adoption Regulations, 2022.

However, the process was brought to an abrupt halt by an Office Memorandum issued by CARA on February 9, 2026. This memorandum interpreted Sections 56(3) and 56(4) of the JJ Act in a manner that created an exclusionary wall. Section 56(3) explicitly states that the JJ Act does not apply to adoptions under HAMA, while Section 56(4) mandates that all inter-country adoptions must exclusively follow the JJ Act. CARA’s interpretation posits that once a HAMA adoption is concluded, the adoption cannot be processed under the JJ Act framework, effectively trapping the adoptive family in a legal gray area.

Compounding this, the United States discontinued issuing Hague Adoption Certificates for HAMA-based adoptions, arguing that the HAMA framework does not mirror the specific safeguards required by the Hague Convention. The petitioners now find themselves with a valid Indian adoption that is essentially "homeless" under international law, and a regulatory body that refuses to facilitate a transition to a compatible international framework.

Judicial Frustration: The "Negative Attitude"

During the session, Justice B.V. Nagarathna was characteristically direct. She questioned the rationale behind CARA’s stance, pointing to the detrimental impact of excessive administrative red tape on familial bonds.

“Why are you opposing adoption by family members? Why are you against this? Family wants to adopt but all bureaucratic red tape comes in the way. Very negative attitude by your department. This is not the first case we are coming across like this,” Justice Nagarathna remarked.

The bench recalled previous instances where CARA created systemic hurdles in similar cases, specifically referencing a matter involving twins adopted by a UK-based aunt. The Court’s observations underscore a long-standing tension between the judiciary’s interpretation of child welfare legislation and the executive’s strict, often robotic adherence to internal circulars.

Legal Implications and Constitutional Concerns

The writ petition raises profound constitutional questions, specifically regarding Articles 14 (Right to Equality) and 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty including the right to a family). The petitioners argue that the current interpretation of Sections 56(3) and 56(4) renders existing statutory provisions unconstitutional if they leave a child without an identity or a path to family stability.

The core legal debate centers on whether the JJ Act and HAMA should be read as mutually exclusive or as complementary modes of child protection. While the state possesses a duty to regulate, the judiciary is increasingly signaling that this regulation should not reach a point of "legislative absurdity"—a state where the law intended to protect children is eventually used as a tool to prevent them from moving to a stable home environment provided by their own biological relatives.

Justice Nagarathna explicitly disagreed with the argument that the JJ Act framework cannot interface with a HAMA adoption. She observed that “the adoption need not necessarily be processed under the Juvenile Justice Act itself and such adoptions are recognised under JJ Act.” This observation is pivotal; it suggests that the Court may be looking for a purposive interpretation of the law that allows for administrative bridging rather than strict refusal.

Impact on Legal Practice

For legal professionals, this case serves as a cautionary tale about the pitfalls of regulatory ambiguity. When a government body like CARA issues a memorandum that contradicts the practical urgency of a, the resulting litigation creates significant emotional and financial strain on families.

Practitioners dealing with adoption law should be prepared to argue: 1. Purposive Interpretation: Challenging overly literal readings of the JJ Act that frustrate the intent of family relocation. 2. Constitutional Precedence: Utilizing Articles 14 and 21 to highlight how regulatory barriers (like the Feb 9 memo) create an arbitrary classification of children's rights. 3. Provisional Relief: In cases involving time-sensitive foreign visa or immigration permissions, practitioners must emphasize the immediate harm of administrative inertia.

The Supreme Court’s order directing CARA to continue processing the application " without prejudice to CARA's contentions " is a vital move for advocates. It effectively separates the legal argument from the procedural progress , ensuring that while the parties debate the interpretation of the law, the child’s chance to join their family is not lost to time.

Conclusion: The Road to July 16

The Supreme Court has set a firm boundary. By placing the matter for hearing on July 16 and stating that the Court may proceed even in the absence of a counter-affidavit from CARA, the bench has signaled that it will not allow bureaucratic delay to defeat the rights of the minor. Justice Nagarathna’s ultimatum—that the permission granted by US authorities will not be thwarted simply because the authorities failed to file a response—is a stern corrective to the complacency often seen in administrative litigation.

As the legal community awaits the formal order on July 16, the case of X v. CARA stands as a benchmark for how the judiciary views the role of the state in family law. The message is clear: when the state acts as a mediator for family reunification, its duty is to facilitate, not to obstruct. The outcome of this case will likely define the future of inter-country relative adoptions in India, potentially forcing a more humane interpretation of the current adoption regulations.