SC Rules Art 161 Remission Prevails Over 2008 Haryana Policy

In a landmark verdict concerning the rights of life convicts, the Supreme Court of India has clarified the hierarchy between Constitutional powers and statutory regulations regarding premature release. The Bench, comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, ruled that the 'Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002,' which operates under Article 161 of the Constitution, cannot be overridden by the subsequent 'Premature Release of Life Convicts 2008' policy, which is statutory in nature.

Case Background

The appellant, Parveen Kumar, was convicted for the murder of a 12-year-old child and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2009. After serving over 14 years of actual imprisonment, he sought premature release under the 2002 Policy. However, the State of Haryana rejected his representation, contending he was governed by the 2008 Policy, which mandated more stringent eligibility criteria including longer periods of actual and total confinement. The appellant challenged this rejection, leading to the current appeal before the Supreme Court.

Arguments Presented

The appellant argued that because the 2002 Policy was framed under the exercise of Article 161—the Governor’s constitutional power of clemency—it holds a higher position in the legal hierarchy than the 2008 Policy, which was issued under the statutory provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). He further contended that the judgment in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021) , which treated the 2002 Policy as statutory, was inconsistent with the decision of a larger Bench in State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) .

Conversely, the State of Haryana maintained that the 2008 Policy explicitly superseded all previous memos and that the policies were merely guidelines under the CrPC. The State argued that the date of conviction dictates the applicable policy, and as the 2008 Policy replaced the 2002 version entirely, the appellant was ineligible for release under the earlier norms.

Legal Analysis

The Court revisited the distinction between the exercise of sovereign constitutional power and executive statutory power. Citing State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) , the Bench reaffirmed that the power under Article 161 is untrammeled and cannot be curtailed by subordinate rules or statutory procedures.

The Court scrutinized the previous ruling in Raj Kumar , declaring it per incuriam because it treated the 2002 Policy as a purely statutory instrument, thereby ignoring the constitutional foundation established in Jagdish . The Bench emphasized that when a prior three-judge Bench ruling provides a definitive interpretation—that 1993/2002 policies are constitutional exercises—a later co-equal bench cannot depart from that logic.

Key Observations

Highlighting the constitutional status of the remission power, the Court noted:

"It need not be said that a statutory policy , even if it may be so, cannot override an exercise of power under Article 161, for that power is distinct and independent, uninfluenced by any other power."

Regarding the conflict in precedents, the Bench observed:

"The Policies of 1993 and 2002 are, as already observed above, identical in terms of their source of power under Article 161, and since the former has been declared by a Bench of three judges to be an exercise under the constitutional power, the inescapable conclusion would be that the identical later policy would also be the same."

Addressing the appellant's entitlement, the Court stated:

"In case a liberal policy prevails on the date of consideration of the case of a ' lifer ' for premature release , he should be given benefit thereof."

Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the 2002 Policy remains legally effective for those eligible under its criteria. The Court directed the Government of Haryana to reconsider the appellant’s plea for remission in accordance with the 2002 Policy within four weeks. To avoid administrative chaos, the Court clarified that this ruling applies prospectively and does not mandate the reopening of already settled remission applications. This decision enforces the principle that constitutional mandates provide a protective layer for convicts that executive policy changes cannot easily dismantle.