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Criticizes for Unexplained
In a pointed critique that resonated through the legal fraternity, Senior Advocate and former High Court Chief Justice Dr. S Muralidhar delivered a scathing assessment of the for judicial appointments, alleging “unexplained interference by the executive” over the past twelve years. Speaking at the 28th DS Borker Memorial Lecture on the Vision of India 2047, Dr. Muralidhar also tore into the myth of judges being solely responsible for mounting , instead holding the State largely accountable for the crisis of .
The lecture, attended by a distinguished audience of judges, lawyers, and academics, highlighted systemic flaws that Dr. Muralidhar argued have undermined the independence and efficiency of the judiciary. His remarks come at a time when the —first established through the and reaffirmed in the —faces renewed scrutiny from both within and outside the judiciary.
Background: The Under Fire
The , which gives primacy to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in appointments to the and , was designed to shield the judiciary from executive influence. However, Dr. Muralidhar noted that the system has failed to deliver its core objective: securing the best possible candidates. “Despite switching over in to a that gives primacy to the view of the CJI in the matter of appointments both to the and the , there is a general agreement now that this has not served the objective of getting the best possible candidates,” he stated.
The former Chief Justice emphasized that the appointment process has become opaque and inefficient. “The appointment process has in the past twelve years witnessed unexplained interference by the executive. Compounding this is the vagueness as to the criteria, a lack of transparency and an overall inefficiency,” he added. These comments echo long-standing criticisms from judicial reformers and civil society groups who have called for a more transparent and merit-based selection mechanism.
: A Growing Concern
Dr. Muralidhar’s charge of “unexplained interference” is particularly significant given the constitutional scheme that envisions a collaborative role for the executive in judicial appointments. Under Article 124 and , the President appoints judges in consultation with the CJI and other senior judges, but the has shifted the balance of power. Yet, Dr. Muralidhar argued that the executive has found ways to intervene, often by delaying or blocking recommendations without providing reasons.
The former judge did not name specific instances, but his reference to “twelve years” roughly corresponds to the period since , when the Act was struck down by the . Since then, the has been the sole mechanism, but complaints of executive foot-dragging have persisted. For instance, in , the had to pull up the government for delaying clearance of judicial appointments, with the then CJI noting that “the executive cannot sit over recommendations for months.”
The Myth of Judicial Sloth
Turning to the issue of mounting , Dr. Muralidhar challenged the popular narrative that judges are lazy or inefficient. “This is a myth and requires to be broken. The statistics tell us that judges are doing their best possible with CCRs [Case Clearance Rates] being 90% and over,” he said. He acknowledged that a minority of judges may be shirkers, but the majority are overburdened. “Yes, there are judges who are shirkers but then there are those among them who are ant-like and do the heavy lifting of the overall court caseload. It would be fair to state that at all levels of courts in our country, there are around 20 to 30% of the serving judges who are punctual, punctilious, conscientious, hard-working, efficient in court and case management. We should be worried about the remaining that aren’t.”
This nuanced portrayal underscores the structural challenges facing the judiciary: low judge-to-population ratio, inadequate infrastructure, and ever-increasing filings. Dr. Muralidhar pointed out that while judges dispose of cases at high rates, the sheer volume of new cases keeps stable rather than reducing it. For example, he noted that every month approximately 29 lakh cases are instituted in , while judges dispose of 24 lakh. Similarly, receive over 10 lakh new cases annually and dispose of an almost equal number. In the , 62,000 cases were instituted in , with nearly 57,000 disposed of, leaving a current of 93,000 cases.
The State as a Litigant: A Major Contributor to
Dr. Muralidhar argued that the government—both at the Centre and state levels—is the single largest contributor to judicial backlog. “By their actions of taking arbitrary decisions, or not deciding at all, or by unthinkingly criminalising normal activities in a democracy like peaceful protests and unnecessary arrests, governments drive people to courts. This explains why despite the delays, costs, and uncertainties in the court system, the filings have grown over the years,” he said.
He further criticized the State’s litigious strategy of appealing every adverse order, no matter how trivial. “The other problem is that the State’s capacity to litigate can outmatch even the richest conglomerate. If the state loses a case, at any level, it will appeal, and keep doing that till the . It could be an increment of 100 Rs given to a mali in a government department or a pension of 300 Rs to a widow of the deceased government servant. Everything has to be appealed. And if the private individual succeeds there is no guarantee that the government will accept and comply with the court order.”
This relentless appeal culture clogs the system with cases that could have been resolved at lower levels. Moreover, the quality of government lawyering often exacerbates delays. Dr. Muralidhar noted that many government counsel appointments are “distributed as largesse with no real relevance to the expertise required.” As a result, proceedings are plagued by adjournments due to non-availability of counsel, poor instructions, and failure to file reply affidavits on time. “Judges at all levels, are deeply frustrated by this intransigence but can do little about it since very often no real progress can be made in a case without the participation of the government counsel,” he added.
Implications for and Efficiency
Dr. Muralidhar’s lecture carries significant implications for the legal profession and the justice system. His condemnation of in appointments strikes at the heart of the debate over . If the cannot guarantee autonomy, the judiciary risks being perceived as subservient to political masters. This, in turn, could erode public trust in the courts.
On the front, his argument that judges are not the primary cause of delay challenges the prevailing narrative in media and policy circles. By shifting focus to the State’s role—both as a creator of disputes and as a litigant—he calls for a fundamental rethinking of how the government interacts with the judiciary. The suggestion that the State should adopt a more conciliatory approach, accepting reasonable outcomes instead of appealing every decision, could dramatically reduce the caseload.
The Road Ahead: Reform or Status Quo?
Dr. Muralidhar did not offer a specific solution but his diagnosis points to the urgent need for reform. The , as he noted, only works if the executive acts in good faith and the criteria for appointment are transparent. Without such reforms, the judiciary will continue to suffer from vacancies and delays.
Similarly, on , his recommendations implicitly target the government’s litigation policy. If the State were to appoint competent counsel, instruct them properly, and refrain from appealing minor matters, the courts could focus on genuinely complex disputes. The National Litigation Policy, which aims to reduce government litigation, has so far had limited impact, suggesting that stronger accountability mechanisms are needed.
Conclusion
Dr. S Muralidhar’s lecture was a clarion call for introspection within the legal system. His critique of the for unexplained and his debunking of the myth of judicial sloth offer a sobering assessment of the challenges ahead. For legal professionals, the message is clear: without structural reforms—covering appointments, transparency, and state litigation patterns—the vision of a robust and efficient judiciary for India 2047 may remain elusive. The ball now lies in the court of both the judiciary and the executive to act on these warnings before the system collapses under its own weight.
