State Cannot Invoke 3-Month Deadline After Wrongfully Rejecting Landowners' Timely Pleas: Telangana High Court

In a significant ruling reinforcing the rights of displaced landowners, the Telangana High Court has held that the State cannot use the three-month limitation period under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to defeat claims of those whose timely applications for a court reference under Section 18 were wrongfully rejected. A Division Bench of Justice P. Sam Koshy and Justice Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy dismissed the State’s appeal, observing that no party—least of all the State—can take advantage of its own wrong.

The Backdrop of Displacement and Denial

The case involved 55 residents of Hathini village in Kumuram Bheem Asifabad district whose homes were acquired for submergence under the P.P. Rao Project. After the Land Acquisition Officer passed Award No. B/628/2002 on May 26, 2003, the landowners promptly applied under Section 18 of the Act on July 5, 2003, seeking a reference to the civil court for proper determination of compensation. However, the Revenue Divisional Officer rejected their applications on August 1, 2003, solely on the ground that they had accepted compensation without recording an express protest.

Meanwhile, ten other awardees under the same notification were referred to the civil court in L.A.O.P. No. 32 of 2011 and secured enhanced compensation by judgment dated February 5, 2018, which was later upheld by the High Court in 2020. Upon learning of this enhancement, the 55 landowners sought re-determination under Section 28-A in October 2020, but their applications were rejected as time-barred—935 days beyond the prescribed three-month window.

A single judge of the High Court allowed their writ petition, directing re-determination at the rates fixed in L.A.O.P. No. 32 of 2011. The State appealed, arguing that the landowners had not challenged the 2003 rejection and that their Section 28-A applications were hopelessly delayed.

Court’s Reasoning: Protest Is Implied by a Timely Section 18 Application

The Division Bench rejected the State’s contention, holding that the rejection of the Section 18 applications was contrary to settled law. The court emphasized that neither Section 18 nor the second proviso to Section 31(2) prescribes a specific form for protest. A written application for reference made within limitation is itself an unequivocal manifestation of non-acceptance of the award. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) and the Full Bench judgment in District Collector, Kakinada v. P. Nagabhushana Rao (2004), the court held that protest is implied despite receipt of compensation.

The Bench further noted that the State had referred ten similarly placed awardees to the civil court based on representations, yet denied the same benefit to the 55 landowners who had filed written applications. This differential treatment, the court observed, was discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Section 28-A Limitation Cannot Shield the State’s Own Wrong

The State’s primary defense—that the landowners were out of time under Section 28-A—was firmly rejected. The court distinguished the case from ordinary Section 28-A claimants, noting that the landowners had already invoked Section 18 within the prescribed period. Their resort to Section 28-A was merely an alternative route to parity, occasioned by the State’s unlawful refusal to refer.

“Having illegally refused to refer the claims of the writ petitioners under Section 18 of the Act, the State now says that the writ petitioners ought to have travelled the route of Section 28-A, and are out of time under that provision. No party, and least of all the State, can be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong,” the Bench observed. The court added that the limitation prescribed by Section 28-A(1) was never intended to protect an authority that had wrongfully shut out a claimant from the Section 18 remedy.

Addressing Delay and Laches

On the objection of delay, the court noted that the landowners had continuously pursued their claims through representations in 2009, 2010, and 2013, and moved the authorities within months of the finality of the reference court’s judgment in 2020. The rejection order of July 2021 was served on only three of the 55 petitioners. The Bench emphasized that the landowners were illiterate, displaced villagers, and that no third-party rights had intervened. The single judge’s discretion to entertain the petition was therefore not improper.

Final Decision and Directions

The High Court dismissed the writ appeal and confirmed the single judge’s order with clarifications. The court directed the Land Acquisition Officer to re-determine compensation by adopting the rates fixed in L.A.O.P. No. 32 of 2011, including the additional amount under Section 23(1-A), solatium under Section 23(2), and interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act, after deducting amounts already paid. The exercise must be completed within three months. Where original claimants have died, amounts shall be disbursed to their legal representatives.

The court clarified that its ruling does not dilute the mandatory three-month limit for ordinary Section 28-A applications, but rests on the peculiar facts of this case—where the State’s own illegal action forced the landowners into a belated alternative remedy.

The judgment underscores that the State, as a model litigant, cannot rely on technicalities to evade its constitutional obligation to pay just compensation when it deprives citizens of their property.