Supreme Court Agrees to Urgently Hear Uddhav Sena’s Plea Against Speaker Om Birla’s Merger Decision

In a dramatic turn ahead of the Parliament’s Monsoon Session, the Supreme Court of India on Tuesday agreed to urgently list a petition by the Shiv Sena (Uddhav Balasaheb Thackeray) faction challenging Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla’s recognition of six of its MPs unilaterally merging with the rival Shiv Sena led by Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister Eknath Shinde. Senior Advocate Devadatt Kamat, appearing for the Uddhav camp, told a bench headed by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant that the Speaker’s order—passed late on a Saturday night—had paralysed the party’s functioning in Parliament and raised serious constitutional questions about the abuse of the anti-defection law’s merger provision.

“This is an important matter.. Speaker recognises the merger of my 6 MPs to merge with the rival party. Speaker has recognised late Saturday night and it has brought parliament work for the party to a standstill,” Kamat said. Chief Justice Kant, sitting with Justices Joymalya Bagchi and Vipul M Pancholi, responded, “We don’t know about tomorrow. But we will list it,” signalling the bench’s willingness to examine the contentious issue at the earliest.

A Midnight Merger and Its Travails

The face-off stems from a July 18 order by Speaker Om Birla, issued just before the Monsoon Session, that accepted the merger of six Lok Sabha members from the Shiv Sena (UBT) into the Shinde-led Shiv Sena. Following the recognition, the Uddhav faction was left with only three MPs in the Lower House, while the Shinde camp’s tally swelled from seven to thirteen, according to a circular from the Lok Sabha Secretariat. In a parallel move, the Speaker also approved separate seating for 20 MPs who broke away from the Trinamool Congress and announced a merger with the Nationalist Citizens Party of India, underscoring a broader trend of legislative party realignments through the merger route.

For the Uddhav Sena, the fallout was immediate and severe. “My functioning as a political party in the Parliament has come to an absolute standstill because the MPs are not with me. The Speaker has recognised their merger with some other political party. This was intended for the Parliament session,” Kamat argued. The party’s spokesperson, Anand Dubey, later said the Speaker’s approval had “weakened democracy.”

The Core Legal Quandary: Original Party v. Legislature Party

At the heart of the dispute is a long-simmering tension in the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law) between two concepts: the original political party and the legislature party . The law, designed to curb floor-crossing, ordinarily disqualifies members who voluntarily give up their party membership or vote against its whip. Yet Paragraph 4 provides a safety valve: members are exempt from disqualification if their original political party merges with another party and two-thirds of the legislators agree to such a merger.

Kamat contended that this shield was being systematically misused. “The six MPs decided to merge unilaterally without the merger of the original political party. They just said ‘we have merged with the rival party’. They have joined a party we had contested against,” he told the court. The claim is that legislators bypass the foundational requirement that a merger must originate at the level of the original political party, not the legislative group. In effect, a group of MPs can orchestrate a defection and label it a merger, thereby immunising themselves from anti-defection penalties.

This is not an isolated manoeuvre. Kamat pointed to a recent instance where Rajya Sabha Member Raghav Chaddha and six other former Aam Aadmi Party MPs joined the BJP by characterising their move as a merger, highlighting what he called a nationwide pattern. “Such ‘mergers’ were happening all over the country,” he said, describing how a device originally meant to safeguard intra-party dissent had “metamorphosed into a cover for horsetrading.”

Judicial Pendulum: The Subhash Desai Constitution Bench

The Supreme Court itself has already drawn a firm line between the original political party and the legislature party. A 2023 Constitution Bench judgment in Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra clarified that the two are “distinguishable concepts” under the Tenth Schedule. Paragraph 1(b) defines the legislature party as a group of members belonging to a particular party, while Paragraph 1(c) construes the original political party as the party to which those members belong. The ruling said the Tenth Schedule recognises the independent existence of a legislature party only to the limited extent of presenting a defence for members who back a merger initiated by the original political party—not the other way around.

The Uddhav faction’s petition leans heavily on this reasoning. If the original party—the Shiv Sena (UBT)—did not itself decide to merge, then the six MPs’ unilateral declaration cannot trigger Paragraph 4 protection. The Speaker’s recognition, therefore, is alleged to have acted on a legally invalid premise, effectively permitting what the anti-defection law seeks to prevent.

A Wider Challenge: The Girish Chodankar Petition

The matter before the Supreme Court does not stand in isolation. A petition filed by Congress leader Girish Chodankar is already pending before the apex court, challenging a Bombay High Court decision of January 16, 2025, that accepted a similar legislature-party merger with the BJP as valid. Chodankar’s petition, argued through advocate Muhammad Ali Khan, contends that “mergers of State legislature parties in Opposition led by the Leader of Opposition are not only a Constitutional sin but also amount to a direct attack on the democratic setup of an Assembly.” He has warned of “anomalous situations” where the original political party is left at the mercy of the “whimsical musings of the majority members of a less conspicuous legislature party.”

Kamat reminded the bench about this pending case, urging the court to settle the question of law expeditiously. The convergence of these challenges suggests the Supreme Court may soon have to define the outer boundaries of the merger exception and decide whether Speakers can recognise a merger based solely on the say-so of breakaway legislators.

Constitutional Crossroads and Parliamentary Paralysis

The Uddhav Sena’s urgency is underscored by the practical shutdown of its parliamentary operations. The party’s ability to participate in debates, move motions, or function as a recognised group has been crippled. This immediate harm, combined with the larger systemic implications, likely prompted the bench to accord an early hearing.

Legal observers note that the case could test the extent of the Speaker’s discretion under the Tenth Schedule. While the Speaker’s decision on disqualification petitions is judicially reviewable, the recognition of a merger may fall into a grey zone. If the Supreme Court signals that a merger must demonstrably originate from the original political party—with a decision at the party level, not just among legislators—it could reshape the landscape of legislative defections across India.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision to urgently list the Uddhav Sena’s plea is a tentative first step toward resolving a constitutional conundrum that has repeatedly disrupted legislative politics. With the Subhash Desai precedent and the parallel Chodankar case providing a rich doctrinal backdrop, the apex court now has an opportunity to clarify that the Tenth Schedule’s merger defence is meant for genuine party amalgamations, not as a convenient cloak for political realignments. The outcome will resonate far beyond Maharashtra, shaping the boundaries of anti-defection jurisprudence for years to come.