Cancels for Pruthviraj Shinde and Jyotiraditya Jadhav in Burning Murder Case
A Ghastly Night in Satara
The has set aside the granted to two accused in a horrifying murder case where a farmer was doused in petrol and set ablaze outside his home. The judgment, delivered by a bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta on , sharply criticized the lower courts for granting on what it termed "" grounds.
The case stems from an incident on the night of , at Satara in Maharashtra. Deceased Anil Madhukar Shinde was attacked by four men who arrived in a four-wheeler, demanding that his son apologize for a wedding dispute. When Shinde arrived home, the assailants—led by main accused Shivjit Ranjit Mane—assaulted him, poured petrol from a can, and set him on fire. The victim died from his injuries.
Initially named as "unidentified accomplices" in the FIR, the other three accused—Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, Jyotiraditya Ajitsinh Jadhav, and Yash Mahesh Gaikwad—were later identified through a and CCTV footage. A fourth accused, Ranjit @ Dadaso Balkrushna Mane, the father of the main accused, was implicated for allegedly supplying the petrol.
Granted on Flimsy Grounds
The legal saga saw the 's Kolhapur bench grant to Jyotiraditya in , reasoning that he had merely recorded the incident on his phone and was a 19-year-old student. The extended the benefit of to Pruthviraj in . Meanwhile, the High Court granted to Ranjit in , citing his absence from the scene.
However, the High Court denied to Yash in , noting his role as the driver who transported the accused and the petrol can to the location—a role indicative of .
The appealed the grants, while Yash challenged his rejection.
Premeditation and
The found the orders for Jyotiraditya and Pruthviraj to be vitiated by . The Court highlighted that the FIR established a "" by all four accused against the victim's house, with repeated threats and the pre-arranged presence of a petrol can.
"The fact that the accused persons were prepared well in advance to commit some grave offence is
borne out from the fact that the can containing petrol was carried in the vehicle in which all four accused persons had arrived at the crime scene,"
the Court observed.
The bench emphasized that the time of the incident, the prior preparation, and the repeated threats cumulatively indicated the
nature of the attack.
"The High Court and the learned trial Court completely ignored the preceding facts where all the four accused persons continuously attacked the house of the complainant party,"
the judgment stated.
The Law on in Serious Offences
The Court reiterated : in serious offences like murder, the order granting must reflect proper application of mind and record . Citing precedents including
,
and
, the bench noted that
"any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from
."
Applying these principles, the Court found the High Court's reasoning for granting to Jyotiraditya to be "." The fact that he recorded the incident did not negate his active participation; rather, it furnished concrete evidence of involvement.
What the Court Said
In a crucial passage, the stated:
"The time of the incident, the prior preparation of the accused persons to commit the crime and the repeated threats extended to the complainant party constitute significant and grave circumstances, which, when considered cumulatively, indicate the nature of the ghastly attack in which an innocent human being was burnt alive by pouring inflammable fluid on his body."
The Court made clear that its observations were confined to the aspect and would not influence the trial on merits.
Final Verdict
The allowed the State's appeals against the orders for Jyotiraditya and Pruthviraj, cancelling their . They must surrender within three weeks, failing which the trial court will secure their arrest.
The Court dismissed the State's appeal against the granted to Ranjit, noting that he was not present at the scene and the case against him rested on . It also dismissed Yash's appeal, upholding the denial of his .
The trial court has been directed to complete the trial within two years from the date of the order.