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Clerkship Model Risks Inequality Without Safeguards, Judgment Warns
The ’s landmark judgment in has drawn a new roadmap for the recruitment and training of Civil Judges (Junior Division), replacing the traditional three-year bar practice requirement with a structured two-year training-and-clerkship framework. But even as the majority hailed the model as a modernising step, the decision has ignited debate over whether the system sufficiently guards against subjectivity and unequal treatment at the evaluation stage.
By a 2:1 majority, the Court devised a transitional arrangement applicable until . Under this scheme, selected candidates are deemed to have already completed one year of Bar practice, then undergo a year of training at the followed by a further year of structured law clerkship—six months under a district judge or a member of the higher judicial services, and six months under a sitting Judge of the . Only after a “satisfactory” evaluation by the supervising judge does the trainee move into the regular post.
But the judgment leaves a critical question unanswered: what, exactly, does “satisfactory” mean? Does it rest on tangible markers like legal reasoning, grasp of procedure, and professional conduct—or could it stretch into vaguer notions of “suitability”? Without a clearer definition, the standard risks being interpreted differently by different evaluators, leaving too much room for personal bias to creep in.
The Equity Imperative: Articles 14 and 16 in Focus
The concern is not that judges would act with ill will, nor is it an argument against supervised judicial training. As the majority itself acknowledged, clerkship offers genuine value—exposure to court functioning, decorum, and the discipline of analysing cases and drafting orders. The real worry lies in how the system is designed. Once a single evaluator is entrusted with judging a candidate who has already earned their place through a competitive examination, safeguards become essential to ensure that discretion, however well-intentioned, does not quietly become a source of inequality.
This concern is amplified by the Court’s own observations on unequal opportunity within the legal profession. In , the Court accepted that the quality of Bar experience is far from uniform, shaped by candidates’ individual circumstances—financial security, mentorship, and access to opportunity. Although it chose not to create separate eligibility tracks, it acknowledged that professional barriers weigh more heavily on women and candidates from marginalised and economically weaker backgrounds. If such inequality already takes root before selection, the system owes it to these candidates to ensure it does not resurface at the clerkship stage.
Articles 14 and 16 of the come squarely into play. Article 14 guarantees , while Article 16 ensures . Together, they require more than a process that looks the same on paper. Public power must be exercised fairly, reasonably, and without —a principle established in and reaffirmed in numerous subsequent decisions. The clerkship is not merely informal on-the-job learning; it is a stage that determines entry into regular judicial service, and constitutional principles apply with full force.
Designing a Transparent Mechanism
The Court has already gone some distance by directing that evaluation should consider a trainee’s conduct, diligence, analytical ability, understanding of procedure, quality of legal reasoning, and overall suitability, and that the process remain “” rather than hardening into “an ” to appointment. What remains is not a question of principle but of practice. The task now is to give this direction real shape through a mechanism transparent enough that no candidate is left wondering how they were judged.
One safeguard is how clerks are allocated. Instead of leaving the process opaque, selected candidates could be shown a list of eligible judges with clerkship openings and asked to state their preferences. The final matching could be done through a clear, pre-decided system that keeps distribution fair. This would reduce the chance of allocations happening through hidden or informal channels and diminish the perception that decisions are influenced by caste, community, gender, region, language, university background, or personal connections. If multiple candidates prefer the same judge, the conflict could be resolved through rotation or a random draw.
Consistent evaluation criteria are equally vital. A trainee should know beforehand exactly what they will be assessed on and how. The criteria should be based on job-related skills rather than personal opinions. Additionally, a real, working grievance mechanism must allow a trainee to speak up if they feel unfairly treated, without fear of career repercussions.
Dissent on the Narrowest of Margins
Justice Vinod Chandran, in his dissenting opinion, raised fundamental objections. He argued that there was no ground for review at all and that a two-year regime leaving trainees on half pay with no service credit could never truly stand in for practice at the Bar. As he put it, “a Presiding Officer’s mistake puts to peril a litigant” while a lawyer’s error can still be caught and corrected by a senior colleague or an experienced judge. That very disagreement makes the evaluation and allocation mechanism so critical to get right. The majority’s framework prevailed by the narrowest of margins, and its true worth will be measured not on paper, but in how fairly it is carried out in practice.
Looking ahead, for notifications issued on or after , candidates will need at least one year of genuine Bar practice before entering the same training-and-clerkship framework. The Court has also directed that the scheme be revisited after a reasonable period, with a fresh look at recruitment quality, trainee performance, and the adequacy of training.
Conclusion: Merit Must Be Institutionalised
A candidate who has already earned their place through a competitive examination deserves to step into the clerkship stage with the assurance that their future will be judged by standards that are clear, relevant, and applied uniformly. Transparent allocation, candidate preference, well-defined evaluation criteria, and firm safeguards against discrimination are not a challenge to the majority’s judgment—they are the very means by which its own promise is kept: that evaluation remains objective, reasoned, and never allowed to become an unspoken barrier between a candidate and the Bench.
In the end, a judicial system that truly believes in equality cannot let that belief end with selection. It must extend equally to how those selected are treated in the years that follow. The examination may identify merit at the outset, but it is the institutional framework built around it that must ensure merit is not lost to discretion.
