Supreme Court dismisses Sukhbir Badal's plea to quash defamation case over AKJ-BKI remarks

The Supreme Court of India on Friday dismissed a plea filed by Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) chief and former Punjab Deputy Chief Minister Sukhbir Singh Badal, seeking to quash criminal defamation proceedings initiated against him over remarks made in 2017 that linked the religious organization Akhand Kirtani Jatha (AKJ) to the banned terrorist outfit Babbar Khalsa International (BKI). A bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu declined to interfere with the October 2025 order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which had refused to quash the complaint and the magistrate’s summoning order. The criminal defamation case, filed by AKJ member Rajinder Pal Singh, will now proceed before the trial court.

Background: Remarks During the 2017 Election Campaign

The controversy traces back to January 2017, during the high-voltage campaign for the Punjab Assembly elections. At that time, then Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal visited the residence of Rajinder Pal Singh, an individual associated with the Akhand Kirtani Jatha. Badal, who was then serving as Deputy Chief Minister, allegedly made statements to the media and at political rallies describing AKJ as the “political front” of Babbar Khalsa International. He also reportedly referred to Singh as the organization’s chief spokesperson. The remarks were widely reported in local newspapers.

Singh, acting in his individual capacity, filed a criminal defamation complaint before a Chandigarh magistrate, alleging that Badal’s statements had damaged his personal reputation by associating him and his religious organization with a banned terrorist outfit. The magistrate took cognizance of the complaint and issued a summoning order against Badal in March 2020, compelling him to appear in court.

Legal Proceedings: High Court Rejects Quashing

Badal challenged the complaint and the summoning order before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, arguing that the alleged imputations did not constitute defamation even on a prima facie basis. His counsel further questioned the complainant’s authority to file the case, contending that there was no authorization from AKJ empowering Singh to represent the organization. In October 2025, a single judge of the High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the allegations made out a case for defamation and that the issue of authorization could be examined during trial. The court clarified that its observations were limited to deciding the quashing petition and would not influence the proceedings before the magistrate.

Supreme Court Hearing: Dismissal of the Plea

Badal then approached the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, seeking special leave to appeal against the High Court’s order. During the hearing on Friday, senior advocate Kapil Sibal, appearing for Badal, reiterated the argument that his client had not specifically named Singh as the spokesperson of AKJ. “He (complainant) says he is the spokesperson. We don't know who has authorised him,” Sibal submitted.

The bench, however, was not persuaded. “We have read this order. What is alleged against you (Badal)? You say that this organisation is a terrorist organisation and this complainant is the spokesperson of the other organisation which is the political front…,” the bench observed, indicating that the allegations on the face of it implicated Badal in making defamatory statements. Without further deliberation, the court dismissed the special leave petition, allowing the High Court’s order to stand.

Legal Analysis: Standard for Quashing Defamation Complaints

The Supreme Court’s refusal to interfere reflects the settled principle that criminal defamation proceedings under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be lightly quashed at the initial stage. A complaint can only be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the allegations, even if accepted in toto, do not disclose any offence. Here, the Bench found that Badal’s alleged remarks—linking a religious group to a banned terrorist organization—could prima facie harm the reputation of an identifiable individual.

The question of whether the complainant had the authority to file the case on behalf of AKJ is a matter of evidence and authorization, which the trial court is better equipped to decide. The High Court’s observation that this issue could be examined during trial aligns with established jurisprudence: a defect in the complainant’s authority does not automatically vitiate the proceedings if the defamation alleged is personal in nature.

Impact on Legal Practice and Political Speech

The judgment carries significant implications for the intersection of political speech and defamation law. Politicians often make sweeping statements during election campaigns, and this ruling serves as a caution that such remarks can lead to protracted legal battles if they specifically target individuals or organizations. The Supreme Court’s willingness to let the trial proceed underscores that the right to reputation under Article 21 of the Constitution must be balanced against political rhetoric.

For legal practitioners, the case reaffirms the narrow scope of quashing petitions in defamation matters. Unless the complaint is manifestly frivolous or malicious, courts will lean in favor of letting the trial run its course. The absence of authorization to file a complaint is not a fatal flaw at the pre-trial stage, as the trial court can later determine the complainant’s locus standi.

Conclusion

With the Supreme Court’s dismissal, Sukhbir Singh Badal now faces a full trial on the criminal defamation charge. The case will return to the Chandigarh magistrate’s court, where the complainant will have to prove that Badal’s statements were defamatory and made with the requisite intent. The ongoing proceedings will closely watch the interplay between political campaigning and the law of defamation—a balance that the judiciary continues to calibrate case by case.