Supreme Court Hears Sambhal Mosque Committee on Protection of Intrinsic Religious Character

The Supreme Court on Tuesday heard extensive arguments from the Sambhal Jama Masjid Committee, which contended that the law mandates the preservation of the intrinsic religious character of ancient monuments and that any claim seeking access for worship that alters that character is legally untenable. Appearing before a bench of Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe, Senior Advocate Huzefa Ahmadi forcefully challenged the trial court’s ex parte appointment of a local commissioner and the Allahabad High Court’s subsequent approval of that order. The arguments mark a critical juncture in the ongoing legal battle over the Shahi Jama Masjid in Sambhal, a dispute that has already sparked violence and raised fundamental questions about the interplay between monument protection and religious freedom.

Preserving Religious Character of Ancient Monuments

At the heart of the mosque committee’s submission was the assertion that the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (AMASR Act) prioritises the preservation of a monument’s religious character over any general right of access. Ahmadi argued that the Hindu plaintiffs’ case rested almost entirely on Section 18 of the AMASR Act, which grants the public a right of access to protected monuments. However, he pointed out that Section 16 of the same Act imposes a far more fundamental obligation—to protect the monument from misuse, pollution, and desecration, and, crucially, to maintain its existing religious character where one exists.

“Section 16 is a mirror image of Section 3 of the Places of Worship Act,” Ahmadi submitted, drawing a direct parallel between the two statutes. Section 3 of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 imposes a blanket prohibition on the conversion of any place of worship. According to Ahmadi, the protection afforded by Section 16 of the AMASR Act is equally absolute: if a protected monument has a religious character, that character must be preserved unchanged. He argued that the plaintiffs’ prayer for access to perform religious ceremonies and offer prayers in the mosque was fundamentally inconsistent with this statutory mandate.

“The substratum of the case of the respondent is based on Section 18 [right of access to protected monuments],” Ahmadi submitted, emphasizing that the suit itself was contrary to the protection provided under Section 16. He contended that a place of worship that is also an ancient monument cannot have its religious character altered through litigation, whether by a court order or by a party’s claim.

Procedural Irregularities in Commissioner Appointment

Ahmadi then turned to the procedural legality of the trial court’s order dated November 19, 2024, which appointed an Advocate Commissioner to conduct a local investigation of the mosque premises. He argued that the appointment was made ex parte, without any notice to the mosque committee, and without the trial court specifying the points on which the commissioner was required to report. This, he submitted, was a clear violation of Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which mandates that the court define the matters on which the local commissioner must investigate.

“There is no recording of the satisfaction by the Trial Court for the requirement of appointment of a local commissioner, no enumeration of what he has to report, which is in violation of mandatory provisions of the CPC,” Ahmadi argued. He highlighted that the trial court had appointed the commissioner merely on the “ipse dixit” of the plaintiff, without recording any reasons why a local investigation was necessary, especially given that the suit had been filed nearly seventy years after the underlying claim arose.

The senior counsel also questioned the urgency behind the appointment, noting that the suit was not filed recently and there was no imminent threat that warranted such “hot haste.” He pointed out that the commissioner’s visit to the mosque premises was followed by deadly violence in Sambhal, in which six persons lost their lives, and that prayers were disrupted.

Commission to Assist Court, Not a Party

Ahmadi also took issue with the Allahabad High Court’s observation that a commission could be used by a party to obtain the “best evidence.” He clarified the purpose of a commission under the CPC: “A commission is to assist the court.” He explained that a local commissioner may be appointed either to ascertain ground realities or, after evidence is completed, to resolve an issue that cannot otherwise be determined. However, the court does not appoint a commissioner to help a litigating party gather evidence.

“This finding of the learned judge of the High Court that the commission can be used by a party to get the best evidence; it is contrary to the CPC because the court doesn’t assist any party in getting evidence,” Ahmadi argued. This distinction is crucial in high-stakes property and religious disputes where surveys can inflame tensions and predetermine outcomes.

Places of Worship Act and the Supreme Court’s December Order

Ahmadi further submitted that the Allahabad High Court had erred in holding that the Places of Worship Act, 1991 did not apply to the suit because the monument is protected by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI). He argued that the exemption under Section 4(3) of the Act applies only to Section 4, which deals with the cessation of pending proceedings, and not to Section 3, which bans the conversion of any place of worship. Section 3, he stressed, is a standalone prohibition that applies to all places of worship regardless of ASI protection.

He also urged the Supreme Court to hear the Sambhal case alongside the pending batch of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Places of Worship Act, as well as the petition seeking its implementation. Referring to the Supreme Court’s December 12, 2024 order, passed by a three-judge bench, which directed that no fresh suits relating to places of worship be registered and that courts refrain from passing effective interim or final orders in such pending proceedings, Ahmadi contended that the Allahabad High Court ought not to have proceeded with the matter. The December order specifically restrained courts from ordering surveys, making the High Court’s approval of the commissioner’s appointment all the more questionable.

Broader Implications and the Path Forward

The arguments before the Supreme Court highlight a significant legal tension between the statutory regime protecting ancient monuments and the growing wave of suits seeking to reclaim places of worship based on historical claims. The mosque committee’s reliance on the “non-retrogression” principle—which prohibits the dilution of existing protections—as embedded in both the AMASR Act and the Places of Worship Act, could have far-reaching consequences. If accepted, it would effectively bar any litigation that seeks to alter the religious character of a monument that has been continuously used as a place of worship.

From a procedural standpoint, the case also reinforces the importance of adhering to the safeguards under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC when appointing local commissioners in sensitive matters. The Supreme Court’s earlier December 12 order already signals a cautious approach, and the present appeal may lead to further guidance on the permissibility of surveys and commissions in disputes involving places of worship.

After Ahmadi concluded, Advocate Nizam Pasha also made submissions, arguing that the Places of Worship Act and the AMASR Act are composite statutory enactments and must be read together, with the principle of non-retrogression being inherent in both. The petitioners have completed their arguments, and the court will hear the respondents on the next date of hearing.

The case, formally titled Committee of Management Jami Masjid, Sambhal v. Hari Shankar Jain (SLP (C) Diary No. 46111 of 2025 and connected matter), now awaits further proceedings. Legal professionals across the country will be watching closely, as the outcome could set a precedent for dozens of similar disputes and redefine the boundaries of religious freedom, monument preservation, and procedural propriety in civil litigation.