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Supreme Court: No Allegation, Mere Presence Insufficient for Charges Against Aman Arora
In a significant oral observation that could reshape how courts evaluate criminal charges against political protesters, the on Tuesday indicated that merely being present in an unruly crowd does not automatically constitute for under the . The bench underscored that there was no allegation that Punjab Minister Aman Arora had exhorted or instigated violence during a protest march over electricity tariff hikes. The remarks came during the hearing of the ’s challenge to the ’s order that quashed and assault charges against Arora, Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann, and other leaders.
A Heated Protest and a Swift
The case traces back to a protest organised by the AAP against a steep electricity tariff increase by the . What began as a public demonstration soon escalated into allegations of , , and violence against public servants. The local police registered an FIR under . A chargesheet was subsequently filed naming Aman Arora, Bhagwant Mann, and several other AAP members as accused.
Representing the , forcefully argued that the AAP leaders were not passive bystanders. “It is not a case of mere presence... was there... it is a case of trial, not bail... there is evidence,” he submitted. However, the took a starkly different view. After examining the material on record, the High Court ruled that no case existed against any of the accused. It found the essential ingredients of the charged offences lacking and quashed the FIR and the consequential chargesheet in their entirety.
Supreme Court’s Caution on “Dangerous” Provisions
When the challenged the order before the Supreme Court, a bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice Vipul Pancholi did not mince words. Justice Bagchi, addressing ASG Raju, highlighted the perils of mechanically invoking .
“There are cases and cases. We understand what you are saying. [Sections] 147 and 148 added in the order... there is no over participation... but over-participation is not necessary... however, mere presence per se in an unruly group will also not result in sharing of . 147, 148 is a very dangerous proposition, because the boundaries can be extended to infinity. So we need to be a bit cautious when those offenses are added in the chargesheet.”
This observation cuts to the heart of a recurring dilemma in criminal jurisprudence: at what point does physical presence at a protest morph into criminal liability? The court’s anxiety is that an expansive reading of “” under the provisions could sweep in innocent participants who had no role in orchestrating or committing violent acts. The bench emphasised that something more than mere presence— an act, a word, a gesture indicating shared intent— is necessary to sustain a charge of or .
The Missing Ingredient: to Violence
The bench further noted a critical factual void in the prosecution’s case. Justice Bagchi pointedly observed:
“There is no allegation that he had exhorted... then you say he is a member of a political party so we will infer...”
This remark suggests that the court will not permit guilt by association— a person cannot be roped into a criminal case simply because he belongs to a political outfit that organised a protest. Without specific allegations of or in violence, the threshold for framing charges remains unmet. The comment also resonates with the constitutional guarantee of ; criminal law cannot be weaponised to penalise dissenting voices unless there is clear evidence of overt wrongful acts.
A Related Remark on “Naarebaazi”
The Supreme Court’s cautious approach in the Aman Arora matter aligns with a recent observation made by the same bench in the parallel challenge concerning Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann. In that connected proceeding, the CJI-led bench reportedly remarked, “Everyone does naarebaazi in democracy.” That statement, though made in a lighter vein, reinforces the principle that sloganeering and peaceful protest are integral to democratic discourse and should not be lightly criminalised. Together, these remarks signal a judicial mood that is increasingly protective of citizens’ right to protest while requiring a high evidentiary bar for serious IPC charges.
Legal Significance and the Road Ahead
The court’s comments, albeit oral at this stage, carry weight because they reflect a consistent line of Supreme Court precedents on the interpretation of . The or must be discernible from conduct, not presumed from passive presence. By cautioning that the boundaries of these offences “can be extended to infinity,” the bench is implicitly warning against overzealous prosecution that converts every public gathering into a potential riot case.
For criminal law practitioners, the hearing offers a valuable template for arguing petitions. It reinforces that a chargesheet must contain specific allegations linking each accused to the shared unlawful object. Mere knowledge of a protest or presence at the spot is insufficient. For prosecutors, the message is clear: if you rely on , you must demonstrate concrete acts or words of .
The matter has been re-listed for , along with the ’s challenge pertaining to Bhagwant Mann. A final ruling consistent with these oral observations could significantly influence how police across the country register FIRs against political figures and common citizens during agitations. It may also embolden High Courts to more rigorously scrutinise chargesheets that rely on vague and generic allegations of “” and “.”
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s robust oral observations in the Aman Arora case underscore that criminal liability cannot be stretched to cover every individual in a crowd absent clear evidence of or . As the bench put it, the law must tread cautiously—lest “dangerous” provisions like blur the line between peaceful assembly and criminal conspiracy. With the matter set for further hearing, the legal community will keenly watch whether these observations crystallise into a binding precedent that strengthens the shield around the .
