Supreme Court of India: State Can't Prolong Trial While Citizen Languishes, Slams Karnataka's 'Absurd' Plan

The Supreme Court of India on Wednesday delivered a scathing rebuke to the State of Karnataka over its prosecution strategy in a case under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, observing that the state cannot have the “luxury of prolonging trial for years” while an accused remains in custody. A bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice V Mohana was hearing a bail application filed by Shahid Khan, who has been incarcerated since September 22, 2022, on charges of conspiracy involving the Popular Front of India. The Court’s ire was directed at the prosecution’s “absurd” witness examination plan, which it said reflected a lackadaisical approach to securing a timely trial. In addition to criticising the state’s plan, the bench directed the Union, the State of Karnataka, and the Karnataka High Court to ensure the establishment of exclusive NIA courts, and granted the petitioner liberty to seek bail after three protected witnesses are examined.

Background: The Case and the Charges

Shahid Khan, the petitioner, was arrested for his alleged involvement in a larger conspiracy to radicalise youth and induce them into unlawful and violent activities, allegedly at the behest of the Popular Front of India (PFI). The chargesheet invokes Sections 17 and 18 of the UAPA, alongside Sections 153A, 121A, 120B, and 121 of the Indian Penal Code. The case is part of a broader crackdown on the PFI, with multiple individuals facing similar allegations. Khan has been in judicial custody for over four years, a duration that the Court found particularly troubling given the absence of a tangible trial schedule.

The prosecution’s plan, however, painted a starkly different picture. Of the 707 witnesses listed in the chargesheet, the state proposed to examine only 50 against Khan. Among the 64 protected witnesses, only three or four were to be examined. When pressed for clarity on how many witnesses were actually essential, the state failed to provide a concrete number, instead suggesting that all 50 would need to be examined over the course of a year. This vague and inflated approach drew immediate fire from the bench.

Key Developments: The Court's 'Fairytale' Observation

Justice Bagchi did not mince words, labelling the prosecution’s approach “as absurd as a fairytale.” He questioned how the state could propose to examine witnesses over a one-year period without identifying the minimum number actually required. The bench also rejected the state’s contention that repeated interim bail and discharge applications by the accused had delayed the trial. Justice Bagchi observed:

“Does interim bail application [hinder] a trial? You are giving a prosecution plan which is as absurd as a fairytale. You want to examine the witnesses in 1 year...we want clarity on the minimum witnesses you want to examine...[...] shows the lackadaisical approach. We are showing the callousness of a prosecuting agency, which can have the luxury of not giving a clear picture when a citizen languishes in jail pending trial.”

He further clarified that the filing of an interim bail application does not automatically adjourn witness examination, as “nowhere in India” are witnesses sent back when a bail plea is made. The Court’s frustration was palpable, as it noted that prosecuting agencies often devote more energy to opposing bail than to ensuring convictions through swift trials.

Chief Justice Surya Kant added a practical dimension, pointing out that the trial court’s order rejecting interim bail ran to 10-12 pages, when a brief order would suffice. This use of judicial time, he said, could be better spent on the actual trial.

Legal Analysis: Right to Speedy Trial Under Article 21

The judgment underscores the fundamental right to a speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. While the right is not absolute and must be balanced against the need for fair trial, prolonged pre-trial detention without meaningful trial progress is a violation of personal liberty. In this case, the Court found that the prosecution’s plan not only lacked specificity but also demonstrated a “callousness” that could not be tolerated when a citizen’s liberty was at stake.

The bench’s directive on witness examination is also significant. The Court implicitly rejected the prosecution’s strategy of presenting an inflated list of witnesses, many of whom may not be essential. By demanding clarity on the minimum number of witnesses actually required, the Court is signaling that trial courts must actively manage cases to prevent delay. This aligns with recent Supreme Court observations on the need for effective case management and the use of technology to expedite handling of criminal matters.

The rejection of the state’s argument that interim bail applications caused delay is equally important. The Court clarified that such applications, when filed on days when witnesses are present, do not require witnesses to be sent back. This practical interpretation ensures that trial progress is not derailed by ancillary proceedings, a common issue in Indian criminal courts.

Impact on Legal Practice and the Justice System

The ruling carries significant implications for prosecution agencies across the country. It serves as a stern reminder that vague and unrealistic prosecution plans will not be countenanced, especially in serious cases like those under UAPA. The Court’s insistence on a concrete witness schedule is a call for accountability—prosecutors must present a realistic and tailored plan that reflects the actual number of witnesses essential to the case. This could lead to a reduction in the practice of overlisting witnesses, which often burdens the trial process and contributes to backlogs.

Additionally, the Court’s direction to establish exclusive NIA courts addresses a systemic issue: the overburdening of trial judges who manage hundreds of cases. The bench noted that the trial judge in Khan’s case was handling 97 other trials—an impossible workload that inevitably delays verdicts. By directing the creation of exclusive NIA courts, the Court aims to ensure specialised and timely trials for national security offences. The expectation that the trial judge be assigned only 10-12 cases (including Khan’s) reflects a practical approach to reducing judicial backlog.

For the accused, the liberty to apply for bail after three protected witnesses are examined provides a tangible benchmark. It offers a ray of hope for long-term undertrials, who often languish in prison without trial progress. The Court’s observation that a citizen should not “languish in jail” while the state pursues a leisurely prosecution is a powerful affirmation of the presumption of innocence.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s intervention in Shahid Khan v. State of Karnataka is a decisive check on prosecutorial inaction and a reaffirmation of the right to a speedy trial. By rejecting the state’s “fairytale” witness plan and ordering concrete measures to expedite trial proceedings, the bench has sent a clear message: the criminal justice system cannot function as an instrument of indefinite detention. The establishment of exclusive NIA courts and the practical guidance on interim bail applications are steps towards a more efficient and humane trial process. For the legal community, this judgment serves as a precedent that trial management and constitutional rights must take precedence over convenience and procedural inertia.