Supreme Court: Temple Exclusions Harm Hinduism

In a pointed exchange during the third day of hearings in the high-stakes Sabarimala reference case, a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India has signaled strong reservations about religious denominations restricting temple access to their own followers. Led by Chief Justice Surya Kant, the bench, which includes Justice B.V. Nagarathna, questioned arguments favoring absolute denominational autonomy under Article 26 (b) of the Constitution over the State's reform powers under Article 25(2)(b) . Justice Nagarathna emphatically stated, independent of the Sabarimala women's entry controversy, that "everybody must have access to every temple and matha," warning that exclusivity "is not good for Hinduism" and would "divide the society." CJI Kant reinforced this by noting such positions are "directly in the teeth of the language of Article 25(2)(b) " and constrained by public order, morality, and health —principles intertwined with Article 17 's abolition of untouchability. These observations arose as Senior Advocate C.S. Vaidyanathan defended denominational temples' rights, reigniting debates from the 1958 landmark Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore . For legal professionals tracking religious freedom jurisprudence, this hearing underscores a potential tilt toward social inclusivity in Hindu institutions.

The Sabarimala Reference: A Constitutional Reckoning

The Sabarimala saga traces back to the 2018 judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala , where a Constitution Bench by 4:1 struck down the Kerala temple's custom barring women of menstruating age from entering, deeming it not an " essential religious practice " under Article 25(1) . Review petitions led to a reference to a larger nine-judge bench to resolve broader questions on the interplay between Articles 25 and 26, essential practices , and judicial review of religious customs.

Announced in 2019 , the reference encompasses whether courts can probe " essentiality ," the scope of denominational rights versus public access, and constitutional morality 's role. Day 3, on Thursday, focused on whether Article 25(2)(b) —an enabling provision for laws throwing open "Hindu religious institutions of a public character" to "all classes and sections of Hindus" —overrides Article 26 (b)'s management rights for denominations. The bench comprises CJI Surya Kant, Justices B.V. Nagarathna, M.M. Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, Prasanna B. Varale, R. Mahadevan, and Joymalya Bagchi. Live updates highlighted tensions over " transformative constitutionalism " and " constitutional morality ," with the Centre questioning its application in decriminalization cases like adultery and homosexuality.

This reference is pivotal amid rising challenges to customs in temples, churches, and mosques, testing the balance between group rights and individual freedoms in India's pluralistic secularism.

Day 3 Arguments: Challenging Denominational Exclusivity

Senior Advocate C.S. Vaidyanathan , representing the Nair Service Society and Kerala religious organizations, argued that Venkataramana Devaru —upholding the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act 's application to the Gowda Saraswat Brahmin-run Moolky temple—was wrongly decided. He contended Article 25(2)(b) is merely an "enabling power" for the State, not overriding Article 26 (b), a fundamental right. The State, including judiciary, he said, cannot intrude into " essential practices ."

Vaidyanathan distinguished public from denominational temples, noting private family temples (tharwads in Kerala) and ancient ones exclude outsiders without state funds or public dependency. "Denominations also... if they want only for the denominations, they can't seek funds from the State or the private donor or from public because they are not dependent on footfall from others," he submitted. He warned that prioritizing Article 25(2)(b) disadvantages only Hindu temples, as it targets Hindu institutions uniquely.

Justice Nagarathna interjected, clarifying her views transcended Sabarimala: "One apprehension, keep aside the controversy of Sabarimala. If you say the right of entry, in the context of Venkataramana Devaru, where they said anybody other than Gowda Saraswat Brahmin is excluded, it will affect negatively Hinduism."

Justices Push Back: Unity Over Division

The bench robustly countered. Justice Nagarathna envisioned a fragmented Hinduism: "Keep aside Sabarimala. Generally, if you say only persons only of Gowda Saraswat Brahmins must only come to a temple, followers of Kanchi Mutt must only go to Kanchi, they should not go to Sringeri, followers of Sringeri must not go elsewhere..." Justice Aravind Kumar added, "We will be dividing the society," cautioning Vaidyanathan, "don't pitch it too high."

CJI Surya Kant delivered a doctrinal blow: "These arguments probably will not survive for two reasons. One, what you are arguing is directly in the teeth of the language of Article 25(2)(b) . Directly in the teeth of it. Assuming Article 25(2)(b) applies, you are using the argument that it will have no effect on Article 26 . But Article 26 itself is subject to public order, morality and health. Article 17 (abolition of untouchability) is on principle of morality."

Justice Nagarathna amplified: "If you say: 'it is my practice, it is a matter of religion that only my section, my denomination must attend my temple and none else', that is not good for Hinduism." She noted Article 25(2)(b) 's historical roots in Hindu society's exclusionary past and posited that restricting access "may itself be contrary to morality under Article 26 ." Justice Bagchi linked it to Article 17 , while the bench stressed, "We have to unify."

Vaidyanathan conceded if a law passes public order/morality/health muster, but insisted on no judicial essentiality test. Justice Nagarathna deemed exclusivity "counter-productive" even for denominations.

Revisiting Venkataramana Devaru and Article Interplay

Central to the fray is Sri Venkataramana Devaru ( 1958 ), where the SC (7-judge bench) held denominational temples of "public character" subject to temple entry laws under Article 25(2)(b) , which prevails over Article 26 as a specific reform power. Vaidyanathan urged overruling it, arguing Article 26 's freedom isn't subordinate.

Yet, the current bench appears disinclined, viewing Article 25(2)(b) as harmonizing with Article 26 's limits. Article 26 (d) allows management "subject to public order, morality and health," echoing Article 25(1) . Historical context: Post-independence Temple Entry Acts targeted caste exclusions, fulfilling Ambedkarite reforms.

Constitutional Morality and Social Reform

" Constitutional morality "—coined by Ambedkar—emerged as a fulcrum, binding religious rights to egalitarian principles. Justices invoked it to argue exclusions perpetuate division, contra Article 17 's morality. Justice Nagarathna rooted Article 25(2)(b) in "history of Hindu society," enabling state intervention for welfare.

This aligns with precedents like Shayara Bano (triple talaq) and Joseph Shine (adultery), applying evolving morality to practices. The Centre's submissions (per links) critiqued loose applications, but here, it bolsters inclusivity.

Ramifications for Temples, Denominations, and Law

A ruling favoring Article 25(2)(b) primacy could mandate universal Hindu access to "public character" denominational temples, impacting funding (state grants require openness?), private tharwads (exempt?), and customs like Sabarimala. Denominations may litigate "public" status or essentiality defensively.

For legal practice, it refines the essential practices test ( Shirur Mutt onward), empowers NGOs for entry suits, and cautions religious bodies on exclusivity claims. Hindu law practitioners must navigate funding-access nexus; constitutional litigators gain clarity on Art 25/26 hierarchy. Broader: Reinforces secular reform, potentially influencing minority institutions under Article 26 .

What Lies Ahead for Religious Rights Jurisprudence

As hearings continue, the bench's unanimity on unity suggests a progressive pivot, possibly upholding Venkataramana Devaru while refining tests. This could unify Hindu practice amid diversity, balancing reverence and reform. Legal eagles await a verdict reshaping temple doors—and constitutional faith.