Questions UP Govt Over Detention of Sambhal Violence Accused, Reserves Order
The on Tuesday sharply questioned the on the validity of a order passed under the () against Mulla Afroz, an accused in the Sambhal violence. A bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu reserved its order after hearing arguments that probed the very foundation of the detention—a confession allegedly made while in police custody. The court’s scrutiny zeroed in on whether a , which is generally inadmissible in a criminal trial, can lawfully form the basis of the “” required for .
Background of the Case
The violence in Sambhal erupted following a court-ordered survey of the Shahi Jama Masjid, resulting in four deaths. Mulla Afroz was arrested approximately 54 days after the incident, based on what the police claimed was a confession made during his custody. Although the later granted him bail, the state government swiftly passed a detention order on , under the . The upheld that order, prompting Afroz to approach the .
Before the apex court, the petitioner argued that his arrest itself was suspect—grounded in a confession that is legally inadmissible. He further contended that the police had themselves opened fire during the violence, an aspect he claimed had not been fairly investigated. On the issue, Afroz’s counsel relied on landmark rulings such as and to assert that a mere possibility of future criminal activity, unsupported by cogent material, cannot justify detention.
Court Questions as Basis
During the hearing, Justice Datta posed a series of pointed questions to the state’s counsel, led by . The bench specifically asked whether a confession made in police custody could be treated as a “fact” for the purpose of arriving at the requisite under the . The court observed that the detention order appeared to rely heavily on that confession.
Justice Datta remarked: “Detention order is preventive, not punitive and it cannot be invoked as a mantra to be invoked before the court to defeat every challenge. Therefore, there has to be some material on the basis of which you are subjectively satisfied. Your entire detention order is based on the confession.”
The state defended the order by pointing to the “likelihood” of the petitioner causing violence or disrupting public order. However, the bench remained unconvinced, questioning whether a mere “strong possibility of recreating an atmosphere of terror” could constitute sufficient material. The court also flagged an apparent contradiction: the state claimed that Afroz had deleted messages from his phone, yet simultaneously relied on an alleged message to implicate him. “How was the message procured if the messages were deleted?” Justice Datta asked.
The 54-Day Delay in Arrest
Another significant point of contention was the 54-day gap between the violence and Afroz’s arrest. The bench noted that CCTV footage was available from the very first day of the incident, yet it was not referenced in the detention order. Justice Datta questioned: “Why was he arrested 54 days later? Why is CCTV footage not being referred to?” The delay, coupled with the reliance on a , cast doubt on the of the detention.
Referring to Ameena Begum , the bench reiterated that is an , not a judicial function, and must be exercised reasonably and fairly. “Is this the way you pass a detention order?” Justice Datta asked, underscoring the need for adherence to procedural guidelines.
Legal Implications and Next Steps
The case raises fundamental questions about the limits of law in India. The allows the state to detain a person without trial if it is satisfied that the individual is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public order. However, the has consistently held that the must be based on credible material, not on confessions that would be inadmissible in a criminal trial.
If the court ultimately rules against the state, it could set a precedent limiting the use of custodial confessions as a basis for , particularly when the confession is not corroborated by independent evidence. Legal experts note that the judgment may also clarify the standard of “likelihood” required for such detention, potentially curbing arbitrary use of the .
The bench has directed the respondent to file its reply on whether a can be relied upon for passing a order. The order is now reserved, and the legal community awaits a decision that could have far-reaching consequences for jurisprudence in India.
Conclusion
As the deliberates, the central tension remains: can a order, which by nature seeks to avoid future harm, be anchored on a statement that the law deems unreliable for proving guilt? The answer will not only decide the fate of Mulla Afroz but also shape the contours of the state’s power to detain without trial. The court’s pointed questions signal a robust review of the executive’s discretion, reaffirming that the is not a “mantra” to defeat every challenge but a power that must be exercised with discipline and fairness.