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reduces mandatory legal practice for Civil Judge exams from 3 to 1 year
The on Friday substantially modified its judgment that had restored a for entry-level judicial service exams, reducing the precondition to just one year. The modification comes in response to a batch of review petitions and a writ petition filed by , an NGO representing persons with disabilities, and others who argued that the sudden imposition of the three-year rule had caused widespread hardship.
A calibrated recalibration
A bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Augustine George Masih, with Justice K Vinod Chandran dissenting, held that while prior exposure to the workings of courts remains indispensable for judicial officers, the manner of implementation must be fair and reasonable. The court observed that “the requirement of prior experience must also bear a to the objective it seeks to achieve” and that the abrupt change had “visited hardship on young lawyers and law graduates.”
Transition relief and structured training
For judicial examination notifications issued between and , the court completely waived the practice requirement, deeming all applicants to have automatically completed one year of active practice. Under this transition, selected candidates will not immediately become regular judges. Instead, they will be designated as and must spend one year at the , followed by one year of —six months under a District Judge or Higher Judicial Service officer, and six months under a sitting judge. During this period, they will receive half the gross remuneration of a Judicial Magistrate. Only after a satisfactory evaluation from the supervising judge will they be appointed to the regular post with full pay and benefits.
For recruitment notifications issued on or after , candidates must show at least one year of verified active practice at the Bar. They will then undergo the same one-year training and one-year clerkship regime. The court directed all high courts to amend their service rules within three months.
Why the change was necessary
The bench noted that restoring the three-year requirement without any transition had created a vacuum for fresh graduates who had planned their careers under the earlier regime, which allowed fresh law graduates to apply directly. “The future of such candidates has been severely affected due to the change in status quo,” the judgment stated. It also highlighted the disproportionate impact on women, economically weaker sections, and persons with disabilities, who often face additional barriers in sustaining themselves during prolonged unpaid or low-paid practice at the Bar.
Importantly, the majority did not backtrack on the principle that practical experience is essential. It reaffirmed that “a judge from the very first day… must have exposure… neither knowledge from books nor can be an adequate substitute.” However, it concluded that a shorter period of practice, combined with intensive and supervised clerkship, could achieve the same goal without sacrificing meritorious talent.
Justice Vinod Chandran dissents
Justice K Vinod Chandran delivered a forceful dissent, holding that there was no error apparent on the face of the record warranting review. He argued that a three-year practice requirement was grounded in constitutional principles, pointing to Articles 233, 217, and 124 which mandate similar experience for higher judicial posts. He rejected the argument that the three-judge bench that originally mandated the requirement in could be modified by a coordinate bench, noting the proceedings were in the nature of a . “In my opinion, there is no scope for a review of the well-considered judgment,” he wrote, adding that the proposed training-and-clerkship model would create “ ” and impose financial strain on the exchequer without constructive work being elicited.
A five-year trial period
The majority kept the new framework reviewable after five years, recognising that “ .” The court directed that empirical data on the quality of recruitment, performance of trainees, and adequacy of training be placed before it at the end of the period, enabling any further course correction.
The judgment disposes of Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1110/2025 filed by and all connected review petitions, while dismissing two interlocutory applications that sought to count higher education as practice.
Key Observations
- “The sudden restoration of the three-year practice rule without any transitional arrangement has visited hardship on young lawyers and law graduates.”
- “A judge from the very first day… must have exposure… neither knowledge from books nor can be an adequate substitute.”
- “The requirement of prior experience must also bear a to the objective it seeks to achieve.”
- “ , and the effect of the present arrangement can be properly assessed only after it has operated for a reasonable period.”
- “If the entry requirements become so burdensome that a significant segment of talented candidates are discouraged from even competing, the judiciary may lose precisely the pool of candidates which the requirement was intended to improve.”
Implications
The ruling strikes a middle path, retaining the principle that future judges need hands-on familiarity with court functioning while lowering the barrier that had blocked a whole generation of law graduates. It places a greater premium on post-selection institutional training, effectively shifting the burden of gaining practical exposure from private practice to supervised state-run programmes. The five-year review clause leaves room for empirically grounded adjustments, potentially creating a more dynamic and inclusive pathway into the subordinate judiciary.
