Supreme Court refers to larger bench question on trademark suits before civil judges

The Supreme Court of India has referred to a larger bench a critical question concerning the interplay between the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The core issue is whether state notifications that designate Civil Judges (Senior Division) as Commercial Courts can override the requirement under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act that trademark infringement suits be instituted only before a District Court. A bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, hearing an appeal in I.S.D.S. Private Limited v. Khemka Food Products Pvt. Ltd. , found an apparent conflict in earlier decisions of the Apex Court and referred the matter to a larger bench for an authoritative resolution.

The Statutory Framework

Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, provides that no suit for infringement of a registered trademark or for passing off shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit. This provision was designed to ensure that trademark disputes—often involving complex questions of fact and law—are adjudicated by a court of sufficient seniority and experience.

On the other hand, the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, was enacted to provide for the speedy resolution of commercial disputes, including intellectual property matters. Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) expressly includes disputes involving registered and unregistered trademarks within the definition of a "commercial dispute". Section 3 of the Act empowers High Courts to constitute Commercial Courts at the district level, and Section 21 gives the Act an overriding effect over any inconsistent provisions in other laws.

The tension arises when a High Court, by notification, designates a Civil Judge (Senior Division) as a Commercial Court for disputes of a certain pecuniary value. In Jharkhand, for instance, Civil Judges (Senior Division) have been notified as Commercial Courts for suits valued between ₹3 lakh and ₹1 crore. This means that a trademark infringement suit falling within that pecuniary range would ordinarily be filed before a Civil Judge, not a District Judge.

The Appellants' Submissions

The appellants, I.S.D.S. Private Limited, argued that Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act represents a legislative mandate that trademark disputes must be heard by a District Court. They contended that a State notification cannot dilute this requirement. The practical consequence of the Jharkhand notification, they pointed out, is that a trademark suit would be instituted before a Civil Judge (Senior Division), with an appeal lying to the District Court. This arrangement, they submitted, denies the parties a direct appeal to the High Court, limiting the High Court's oversight to revision or a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. In such proceedings, the High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence, which is a significant disadvantage in complex trademark litigation.

An intervener supporting the appellants further argued that the phrase "having jurisdiction to try the suit" in Section 134 refers only to territorial jurisdiction and does not alter the specific requirement that the suit be heard by a District Court . In other words, even if a Civil Judge has territorial jurisdiction , the suit must still be filed before a District Court .

The Respondents' Counter

The respondents, Khemka Food Products Pvt. Ltd., placed heavy reliance on the Commercial Courts Act. They argued that Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) explicitly covers trademark disputes, and Section 21 gives the Act overriding effect. Since the Commercial Courts Act is a later enactment, its provisions should prevail where there is any inconsistency with the Trade Marks Act. They also submitted that the purpose of the Commercial Courts Act—to provide a specialized forum for commercial disputes—would be undermined if trademark suits were excluded from the jurisdiction of notified Civil Judges.

Conflicting Precedents

The bench examined two significant decisions that adopted divergent approaches to the relationship between the Commercial Courts Act and special enactments.

In Kandla Export Corporation v. OCI Corporation (2018), the Supreme Court held that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, operates as a self-contained code. It therefore ruled that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act did not apply to applications under Section 50 of the Arbitration Act. This decision treated the special law as paramount.

In Jaycee Housing Private Limited v. Registrar (General), Orissa High Court , a challenge was made to a notification constituting Civil Judges (Senior Division) as Commercial Courts. The reasoning in that case was that the Commercial Courts Act, being later in time and having overriding effect, could legitimately confer jurisdiction on Civil Judges, even for arbitration matters.

The bench also considered Fun N. Fud v. GLK Associates , a Gujarat High Court decision authored by Justice Pardiwala when he was a judge of that court. In that case, the Division Bench held that an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act could be entertained only by the District Court having principal civil jurisdiction, not by a Civil Judge notified as a Commercial Court.

The Supreme Court bench observed that Kandla Export treated the Arbitration Act as a special code, while Jaycee Housing conceded jurisdiction to the Commercial Courts Act. These two approaches are irreconcilable.

The Conflict Exposed

The bench noted that the Commercial Courts Act deals with the broader category, or "genus", of commercial disputes. Intellectual property disputes, including trademark disputes, are a specific "species" within that genus under Section 2(1)(c)(xvii). Section 3 empowers High Courts to constitute Commercial Courts at the district level, which includes District Courts. Section 21 gives overriding effect only where there is inconsistency.

The problem, the bench observed, arises only when the notification constitutes Civil Judges as Commercial Courts. If the Commercial Court is itself a District Court, there is no inconsistency with Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. But where a Civil Judge is designated, the requirement of a District Court is bypassed.

The bench further examined the pecuniary jurisdiction. In Jharkhand, a Civil Judge (Senior Division) can hear suits valued between ₹3 lakh and ₹1 crore. A trademark suit valued below ₹3 lakh would still have to go to a District Court because of Section 134. A suit valued above ₹1 crore would go to a District Court as well. Only suits within the middle range are affected. This creates an anomalous situation where the forum depends on the valuation of the suit, not on the nature of the dispute.

The Referral

The bench held that the apparent conflict between the decisions in Kandla Export and Jaycee Housing needs to be resolved by a larger bench. It also noted that jurisdiction should not be left to varying notifications by different High Courts, as this could lead to a lack of uniformity across states.

"The legislative imprimatur cannot be diluted by the notifications issued by the High Courts," the bench observed. It therefore directed that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. Pending the resolution, the suit before the Civil Judge (Senior Division)-I, Jamshedpur , was stayed.

Implications for Legal Practice

This referral has significant implications for intellectual property practitioners. If the larger bench holds that the Trade Marks Act's requirement prevails, then all trademark infringement suits—regardless of value—must be filed before a District Court. This would restore a uniform forum and ensure that such cases are decided by judges with the requisite seniority.

Conversely, if the larger bench upholds the notifications, it would confirm the power of High Courts to delegate trademark disputes to Civil Judges. This could lead to a proliferation of similar notifications across states, potentially affecting the quality and consistency of trademark adjudication.

The decision will also clarify the hierarchy of forums in commercial disputes. The outcome will determine whether the Commercial Courts Act can override specific procedural safeguards in special statutes like the Trade Marks Act, or whether those safeguards remain inviolable.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's referral to a larger bench is a welcome step towards resolving a critical jurisdictional puzzle. The interplay between the Trade Marks Act and the Commercial Courts Act has created uncertainty for litigants and practitioners alike. A clear, uniform rule is essential to ensure that trademark disputes are heard by the appropriate forum, balancing the goals of specialized commercial adjudication with the legislative intent behind trademark protection.

As the matter awaits a final decision, the stay of the proceedings in Jamshedpur underscores the need for an early resolution. The legal community will be watching closely as the larger bench takes up this important question.