Supreme Court Refuses YSRCP Plea Against Social Media Post Takedown, Asks to Move High Court

In a significant ruling on August 25, the Supreme Court of India dismissed a writ petition filed by the Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP) challenging the takedown and blocking of its social media posts from official party handles. A bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu declined to entertain the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, directing the party to approach the jurisdictional High Court for appropriate relief. The decision underscores the Court’s reluctance to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction in matters where alternative remedies are available, even when allegations of state-sponsored censorship are raised.

Background: The Kurnoor Tragedy and Alleged Censorship

The YSRCP, the principal opposition party in Andhra Pradesh, approached the apex court alleging that its social media posts on platforms including Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter) were being systematically taken down at the instance of the state government. The controversy stems from a post made on October 26, 2025, regarding the Kurnoor tragedy, which the party claimed was caused by illegal belt shops. Following the post, an FIR was registered accusing the party of insulting the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh with the intention of provoking the cadre of the Telugu Desam Party.

According to the petitioner, subsequent posts on the same issue led to the lodging of multiple FIRs. On January 27, the Inspector of Police, Kurnoor Rural Circle, issued a notice to X directing the removal of the specific URLs. The party further alleged that when it posted another tweet drawing attention to the censorship, the Inspector issued a notice under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, read with Rules 3(1)(d), (g), and (f) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. The notice directed the removal of the accounts and posts within 36 hours, failing which the safe harbour protection would be withdrawn.

The Legal Framework: Shreya Singhal and Proper Procedure

The YSRCP’s challenge was anchored in the landmark Supreme Court judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2014), which struck down Section 66A of the IT Act and laid down the procedure for blocking content. As per Shreya Singhal , content can be blocked or taken down only by an order of the designated officer of the central government under Section 69A of the IT Act read with the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, or by a competent court. The party contended that no such order under Section 69A or any court order was ever issued. Instead, the state resorted to issuing notices by police inspectors under Section 79(3)(b), which deals with the safe harbour protection for intermediaries, not with the blocking of content. The petitioner argued that this circumvention of the established procedure amounted to a gross violation of the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Court’s Decision: Directs Party to Move High Court

During the brief hearing, the bench noted that the issues raised by the YSRCP could be effectively adjudicated by the High Court under Article 226. The court observed that the writ petition under Article 32 was not the appropriate remedy, especially when the petitioner had not approached the High Court first. While the Supreme Court has the power to entertain petitions directly under Article 32 for enforcement of fundamental rights, it often refrains from doing so when alternative remedies exist and when the facts require detailed examination. The bench dismissed the petition without going into the merits, leaving it open for the YSRCP to move the jurisdictional High Court.

Analysis: Implications for Social Media Censorship

The ruling has significant implications for the intersection of state power, intermediary liability, and freedom of speech. By refusing to entertain the petition, the Supreme Court has effectively affirmed the principle that Article 32 is not a substitute for an ordinary statutory remedy or a High Court petition. However, the court did not comment on the legality of the police notices under Section 79(3)(b). This leaves open the question whether a police officer can use the safe harbour provisions as a tool to compel intermediaries to take down content without a Section 69A order or court direction. Legal experts argue that the misuse of Section 79(3)(b) to block accounts or posts could become a backdoor method of censorship, especially in states with political motivations.

The Shreya Singhal framework was designed to ensure that content blocking is not arbitrary and is subject to strict procedural safeguards. The use of police notices to achieve the same effect without judicial oversight undermines that framework. The YSRCP’s petition highlighted a growing concern among opposition parties and civil society groups that state governments are increasingly resorting to informal pressure on intermediaries, bypassing the legal process.

Impact on Legal Practice and Future Litigation

For legal practitioners, the case serves as a reminder of the importance of exhausting alternative remedies before invoking the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Article 32. While the court does entertain petitions directly in cases of grave violations, it typically expects litigants to first approach the High Court. Lawyers advising clients on social media censorship cases should consider filing a writ petition under Article 226, where a detailed factual inquiry can be conducted.

Moreover, the case highlights the need for clarity on the scope of Section 79(3)(b). The provision grants intermediaries immunity from liability if they observe due diligence and comply with government directions. However, it does not explicitly authorise police inspectors to order takedowns. The language of the rule suggests that such directions must come from a government authority with the power to block content, which is typically the central government under Section 69A. The YSRCP’s argument, if pursued in the High Court, could lead to a judicial interpretation limiting the use of police notices for content removal.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision to dismiss the YSRCP’s plea without prejudice to its right to move the High Court is a procedural setback for the party but does not foreclose the substantive legal challenge. The core issue—whether state governments can use police notices under Section 79(3)(b) to effectively censor political speech on social media—remains unresolved. As the YSRCP prepares to approach the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the case will be closely watched for its potential to clarify the limits of intermediary directives and the protection of free speech in the digital age. For now, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that Article 32 is not the first port of call, but the battle over the proper procedure for takedowns is far from over.