Restores NDPS Case Against , Rejects Quashing on Disclosure Alone
Holds That Inadmissibility of at Trial Cannot Justify at Threshold
In a significant ruling, the set aside a order that had quashed NDPS proceedings against an . The Court clarified that while under or under cannot be used as for conviction, their mere presence in the case file does not warrant quashing the prosecution .
Case Background
The respondent, Sadiq Pasha, an engineering graduate who had been studying in the United States, was arrayed as Accused No.3 in an FIR registered in at . The FIR alleged that on receiving information about transportation of ganja in a car, a police party found three persons near the car. Two were apprehended, and a search of the car revealed 32.615 kgs of ganja hidden in the dashboard and trunk. The third person, identified as Pasha, fled from the spot.
During investigation, Pasha remained absconding, leading to a . He was charged under , which deals with . The trial against the other accused proceeded separately.
The High Court quashed the proceedings against Pasha, relying on the judgments in , , , and . The High Court held that since Pasha was not apprehended at the spot and no contraband was recovered from him, he was implicated solely based on the confessional statement of the co-accused, which is under the .
The 's Analysis
A bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran examined whether the principles laid down in the cited judgments could be applied of .
The Court observed that all four cases dealt with either conviction appeals or , where the sole incriminating evidence was the confessional statement. In Tofan Singh , the had held that officers under are police officers, and recorded under Section 67 are hit by . However, that judgment concerned a conviction based solely on such a statement.
In the present case, the Court noted, there was neither a disclosure statement from the co-accused nor a statement under Section 67 from Pasha, as he had evaded arrest. The High Court had not examined the chargesheet or the material collected during investigation, nor had it considered whether the prosecution had other evidence to connect Pasha.
Key Observations
The Court made it clear that can serve as , not as :
"The disclosure made by the co-accused who were apprehended at the spot, about the identity and the name of the one who fled, is only a material which the Investigating Officer could use to gather further evidence, which alone could be the basis of a chargesheet or a conviction, in a properly instituted trial."
The bench emphasized that quashing charges solely because a confessional statement cannot be relied upon at trial would be an improper exercise of under :
"The quashing of charges merely on the ground that a confessional statement cannot be relied on in the trial, would not be a proper exercise of the conferred on the High Court."
The Court further noted that it would be premature to determine whether the prosecution had sufficient material against Pasha at the quashing stage, especially since the trial against the co-accused was still pending.
"The High Court has not looked into the evidence produced in the case, especially when the trial obviously would have been proceeded with against the co-accused. There is also no whisper as to the chargesheet filed in the case and the culpability found on the 3rd accused therein, who is the respondent herein; which in any event, would be premature at the stage of quashing."
Court's Decision
Allowing the State's appeal, the set aside the High Court's order and restored Special Case No.24 of to the files of the . The Court directed Pasha to appear before the trial court within two weeks, upon which he shall be released on bail on such terms as the court deems fit. If he fails to appear, the trial court was directed to issue steps for his apprehension.
The Court clarified that it had not made any observations on the merits and left open the respondent's right to raise the same contention at the time of or by filing an appropriate application for .
Implications
This ruling sends a clear message that the inherent power to quash proceedings cannot be exercised lightly, especially in serious offences under the . The mere presence of material like does not vitiate the entire prosecution if other evidence may be available. Trial courts must be allowed to examine the chargesheet and decide on the sufficiency of material at the appropriate stage.