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Supreme Court Right to Walk Ruling Raises Constitutional Questions for Street Vendors Act
The has recognised the right to walk as a , holding that safe, convenient, and unhindered pedestrian movement is inseparable from the guarantee of under . The decision in makes clear that public footpaths are not discretionary amenities but constitutionally protected spaces that must remain usable for their primary purpose. At the same time, however, the judgment brings into sharp focus a competing legislative vision: the , which explicitly contemplates street vending on sidewalks and footpaths. The legal difficulty is not simply about crowded pavements; it is about how two constitutionally and statutorily protected interests can occupy the same physical space without one rendering the other illusory.
A Footpath Is Not a Mere Convenience
For decades, footpaths have been treated by urban local bodies as overflow zones for parking, hawking, construction material, and private encroachments. Pedestrians are routinely forced into carriageways, exposing them to accidents and injury. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Maniyar Iliyaz rejects that approach. It elevates pedestrian movement to the level of a , observing that “safe, convenient, and unhindered movement is an essential element of human dignity and personal liberty.” The Court further strengthened the on public authorities to preserve footpaths for their intended public purpose and to ensure that citizens are not pushed onto roadways because pedestrian spaces have become unusable.
This is a significant doctrinal move. Rather than treating the right to walk as a mere policy preference, the Court has anchored it in . That means any obstruction—whether by private encroachment, municipal negligence, or even an overbroad licensing regime—can potentially be challenged as a violation of fundamental rights. The ruling empowers pedestrians to demand that municipal authorities design, maintain, and police footpaths with pedestrian safety as the primary concern.
A Statute That Gives Street Vendors a Place on the Footpath
Yet the legal landscape is complicated by the Street Vendors Act, 2014. Unlike older laws that treated street vending as a nuisance to be tolerated at best and removed at worst, the 2014 Act proceeds from a different premise: vending is a source of livelihood for millions of urban workers and can be lawfully regulated on public streets, lanes, sidewalks, and footpaths. defines a street vendor as:
...a person engaged in vending of articles, goods, wares, food items or merchandise of everyday use or offering services to the general public, in a street, lane, sidewalk, footpath...
The inclusion of “footpath” in the statutory definition is not accidental. Parliament was not merely acknowledging an existing social reality; it was enacting a framework that legalises and regulates the presence of vendors in public spaces. The Act creates mechanisms for vending zones, certificates of vending, and municipal regulation, all aimed at balancing the vendor’s economic rights with the public’s right to use thoroughfares. In practice, municipal authorities such as the and the routinely issue Tehbazari licences and vending certificates that permit commercial activity on footpaths under the statutory framework. These permissions are not administrative indulgences; they are concrete expressions of a legislative policy that treats portions of public spaces as sites of livelihood.
Two Constitutional Visions on One Pavement
The tension is now unavoidable. Consider a footpath where a licensed street vendor lawfully occupies a substantial portion of the walking surface. A pedestrian is forced to step onto a busy carriageway to pass. Under the reasoning of Maniyar Iliyaz , that pedestrian’s to walk may be infringed, because cannot be effective if safe pedestrian passage is obstructed. On the other hand, if the vendor is removed solely because he or she occupies a footpath, another constitutional question arises: guarantees every citizen the freedom to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business, subject to , and the Street Vendors Act itself recognises footpaths as legitimate sites for vending. A licensed vendor’s presence is not merely private commercial activity but an activity undertaken pursuant to legislative recognition and municipal authorisation.
Neither interest can be dismissed as subordinate simply because the other has constitutional significance. The pedestrian’s claim is rooted in bodily safety and free movement. The vendor’s claim is rooted in economic survival and . Both are claims of dignity. The constitutional question is whether a footpath must be exclusively a corridor for movement or whether it can simultaneously accommodate regulated economic activity.
Toward Harmonious Construction
The answer lies in the , which requires courts to interpret constitutional rights in a way that gives effect to all of them rather than sacrificing one at the altar of another. The Constitution does not demand the complete exclusion of vendors from footpaths. It demands a model in which pedestrian safety and vendor livelihoods are reconciled through careful regulation.
That reconciliation is already implicit in the Street Vendors Act, which contemplates designated vending spaces, restrictions on obstruction, and the maintenance of free passage for pedestrians. The Act’s regulatory machinery can be used to define minimum clear widths, identify vending zones that do not impede movement, impose time-based restrictions, and require vendors to maintain hygiene and order. Likewise, municipal authorities can use their licensing power to condition the right to vend on the preservation of pedestrian access. A properly regulated footpath can function both as a pedestrian corridor and as a place of dignified work, provided the balance is struck with objective criteria and transparent procedures.
The Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to walk does not, therefore, sound the death knell for street vending. Rather, it recalibrates the terms on which vending may take place. It obliges urban local bodies to consider pedestrian flow when designating vending zones and to ensure that licences do not authorise vendors to render footpaths unusable. It also obliges vendors and their associations to accept that the public’s right to movement has , though not exclusive dominance.
Implications for Courts and Municipal Authorities
For lower courts, the judgment is a reminder that eviction and removal orders against street vendors cannot be passed mechanically. Where a vendor holds a licence under the Street Vendors Act, the question is not whether the vendor may be on the footpath but whether the manner of vending obstructs the public’s right to walk. Courts will need to examine factual details—the width of the footpath, the location of the vendor, the volume of pedestrian traffic, and the conditions attached to the licence—rather than treating all footpath vending as unlawful encroachment.
For municipal bodies, the ruling creates a positive duty to plan public spaces. They can no longer disclaim responsibility by allowing footpaths to fall into disuse or by permitting unregulated occupation. The constitutional right to walk demands that footpaths be maintained, clearly demarcated, and kept free from hazards. At the same time, the Street Vendors Act demands that municipal authorities provide vending opportunities in a planned manner. These obligations must be integrated in town planning, street design, and licence enforcement.
Conclusion
Maniyar Iliyaz is a landmark affirmation that walking is not a trivial activity but a essential to human dignity and liberty. Yet it does not resolve the deeper contest over the purpose of public spaces. Parliament’s Street Vendors Act, 2014, stands as a legislative acknowledgement that footpaths can also be places of livelihood for the urban poor. The Constitution does not require choosing one vision and discarding the other; it requires a principled balance. The challenge now lies with courts, municipal authorities, and urban planners to develop a framework in which the right to walk and the right to vend are not opposing claims but complementary components of a just public realm. The pavement can accommodate both—but only if the law insists on regulation that respects both.
