The Supreme Court of India has established a definitive stance on the limitation period for appeals under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 , declaring the 120-day window for filing such challenges to be mandatory and inflexible. In a judgment delivered by Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu, the Court ruled that High Courts lack the authority to condone delays beyond the statutory limit by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . This decision effectively closes the door on belated appeals, emphasizing that the legislative intent behind the 2013 Act leaves no room for judicial discretion in extending these timeframes.

The matter arose from a challenge brought by the Rajasthan Housing Board against an order of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan . The Board had sought to overturn two directives from the Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority in Jaipur, which favored M/s Hariyali Rural Ventures Ltd. The Rajasthan High Court had previously dismissed the Board’s writ petition , ruling that the appellate remedy provided under Section 74 of the 2013 Act was the appropriate path, but that the Board had already forfeited this right by failing to file within the maximum permissible period of 120 days.

Strict Adherence to Statutory Timelines

The Supreme Court’s examination of the case centered on whether the precedent set in Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. S.V. Global Mill Limited —which suggested that the 60-day limitation period in the proviso of Section 74 was not mandatory—remained valid law. Upon review, the bench expressed significant reservations regarding the logic used in that earlier judgment. The Court observed that numerous other statutes, including the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code , contain similar in-built limitations that have been consistently upheld as absolute commands.

Justice Datta, writing for the bench, underscored that "a parliamentary prescription stands altered by a judicial interpretation, giving impetus to belated appeals under Section 74 of the 2013 Act being filed and to the plea that any delay, howsoever inordinate, be condoned." The Court maintained that the legislature’s intent to impose a strict outer limit is manifest, noting that if an extension had been intended, the statute would have provided the necessary linguistic framework for such leniency.

The bench explicitly rejected the argument that the 2013 Act, as beneficial legislation, implicitly permits the use of the Limitation Act to extend filing deadlines. By examining the scheme of the Act, the judges concluded that the period of 120 days is a rigid ceiling. Any attempt to interpret this as flexible would, according to the Court, effectively render the statutory proviso " otiose ." The Court further remarked on the principle of judicial restraint, stating, "If the legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission."

Addressing Judicial Consistency and Precedent

During the proceedings, counsel for the Rajasthan Housing Board had argued that the S.V. Global Mill Limited decision represented a significant shift in judicial thinking and requested that the matter be referred to a larger bench for reconsideration. However, the Supreme Court declined this request, citing the doctrine of stare decisis and the existence of a long line of decisions by larger benches that have consistently enforced strict limitations in similar statutory contexts.

The Court pointed out that the S.V. Global Mill Limited ruling had failed to account for binding precedents such as Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lal Narain Mishra , which clarified that even when a special law does not explicitly exclude the Limitation Act, courts must examine whether the nature of the scheme and the subject matter necessitate such an exclusion by implication. The current bench emphasized that the 2013 Act’s structure does not support the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as it would create " reverse prejudice " where acquiring bodies could file inordinately delayed challenges, further disadvantaging landowners.

Finality of the Appellate Process

Beyond the specific legal debate over limitation, the Court noted that the Rajasthan Housing Board ’s attempt to bypass the appellate procedure by filing a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was fundamentally flawed. The High Court had been correct in its assessment that the Board could not circumvent the statutory remedy simply by choosing a different constitutional route. The Supreme Court affirmed that the Board’s failure to act within the prescribed window resulted in the total foreclosure of its right to appeal.

The judgment clarifies that the "120 days" mentioned in Section 74 is an absolute cap. Even in the exercise of the Supreme Court's plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution , the Court indicated it would not condone delays that disregard this legislative command. By dismissing the special leave petition , the Court has reinforced a high standard of procedural compliance for government bodies and private entities alike.

For future proceedings, the ruling serves as a warning that statutory deadlines for land acquisition disputes are not suggestions but binding constraints. The Court ordered that all pending appeals before High Courts under Section 74 should be decided in accordance with these findings, signaling an end to the period of uncertainty regarding the maintainability of time-barred applications. The litigation concerning the Rajasthan Housing Board has reached its conclusion with the dismissal of the petition, leaving the initial orders of the Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority in full force.