The has ruled that a Hindu widow’s in agricultural land becomes under , and that to her must be determined by the applicable at the time of her death, not when the land was originally created. The decision means that the property of Khajano, a woman who inherited a from her first husband and later remarried, passes to her two sons from the second marriage, not to the from her first husband’s family.
A bench of Justices S.V.N. Bhatti and N.V. Anjaria dismissed a civil appeal filed by the —male lineal descendants of Khajano’s first husband, Mauji Ram—who had argued that the land should revert to them as the nearest surviving heirs of the . The Court upheld a Division Bench judgment of the dated , which had reversed a single judge’s decision and restored the orders in favour of Khajano’s sons, Chand Ram and Chander Bhan.
Dispute over 45 bighas in Delhi
The case concerns Khata No. 273/222, about 45 bighas of agricultural land in Bhawana village, Delhi. Khajano was the wife of Mauji Ram and mother of Ram Chander. After both her husband and son died, she held a under the . When the came into force on , Khajano was recognised as a under Section 11 of that Act, a fact admitted by both sides.
Khajano later entered into a remarriage (Karwa) with Bal Kishan, who belonged to another branch of the extended family. She had two sons from this marriage. Her first husband’s relatives, the appellants, opposed the application filed by these sons in , claiming that Khajano had only a and that upon her death in , the property should go to all male lineal descendants of Mauji Ram.
The , the , and the all rejected the ’ claim, that Khajano’s had been converted into by . The single judge of the later set aside that view, relying on the earlier decision in , which had interpreted a similar provision in the . However, the Division Bench reversed and restored the .
not frozen at 1954
The core legal question turned on the interpretation of , which governs when a —who inherited her interest before the Act’s commencement—dies. Sub-section (2)(a) creates two paths: (i) if she was under her , the devolves to the of the as per Section 50; (ii) if she was , the devolves as per the table in Section 53, which includes her own children.
The held that the phrase “in accordance with the applicable to her” in Section 51(2) must be read at the time of her death, not at the time she acquired the interest or was declared a . The bench observed that the word “dies” in the provision is in the present tense, indicating that the nature of her right is to be assessed when opens.
“Therefore, the is not frozen on the enactment of the Act, 1954, and it keeps open the classes of persons entitled to succeed to an interest of a to the applicable on the date of her demise,” the Court stated.
Adopting the principle from , the Court noted that legislation referring to “” by general reference incorporates later amendments and developments, including the Hindu Act. Since Khajano died in , well after the HSA came into force on , her had already been under .
How the rule applied
The Court illustrated the distinction: had Khajano died between and , she would still have held a , and would have followed . But because she lived beyond 1956, her interest became absolute.
“By operation of Section 14(1) read with the Explanation, with effect from , Khajano is not only a , but, through the of , i.e., HSA, 1956, her right is transformed into an , thus changing the course of from Section 50 to Section 53 of the Act, 1954,” the judgment explained.
The bench rejected the argument that Khajano’s rights crystallised on the date the Delhi Land Reforms Act was enacted. It clarified that the requirement that the woman must have inherited her interest before the Act’s commencement only identifies the category of holdings covered by Section 51(2); it does not freeze her ownership status permanently.
The Court also distinguished Ram Jivan , noting that in that case the female tenant had died in , before the Hindu Act. The decisions relied upon by the appellants, including and , were found not directly on point.
Practical consequence for land disputes
The ruling settles a recurring issue in and disputes under land reform laws that incorporate through referential expressions. The decisive factors are now the date of the ’s death and the nature of her right at that time as per the then in force. Heirs of a previous husband’s family cannot fall back on the law as it stood when the was created.
The found no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs. The entries in favour of Khajano’s sons therefore stand, and all pending applications were disposed of.