Back
Supreme Court Rules Wrong Statements Alone Cannot Warrant Prosecution Under Section 340 CrPC
In a significant ruling clarifying the threshold for initiating proceedings, the has held that merely making "wrong statements" in court pleadings is insufficient to warrant criminal prosecution under . A Bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar drew a critical distinction between a "" and a "," emphasizing that only deliberate falsehoods made with intent to deceive can trigger proceedings for offences relating to giving .
The Apex Court was hearing a criminal appeal filed by Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram and his advocate, who had been directed to face prosecution under over what the lower courts described as "wrong statements" in an appeal memorandum and stay application. Setting aside the orders of both the and the , Nagpur Bench , the Supreme Court ruled that the statutory prerequisites for initiating proceedings had not been satisfied, as the case involved nothing more than inadvertent typographical errors.
A Property Dispute, An Injunction, and Alleged Misstatements
The dispute originated from a civil suit concerning immovable property in Nagpur, where the plaintiffs (respondents before the Supreme Court) had obtained a in restraining the original defendants from obstructing their enjoyment of the property. During the pendency of the suit, Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram purchased the suit property and was impleaded as a defendant in .
When the trial court subsequently found a breach of the injunction order and directed restoration of the earlier position under , Masram challenged that order before the appellate court. Alongside his miscellaneous appeal, he filed an application seeking . On , the appellate court granted a stay in his favour.
The plaintiffs then raised objections, alleging that certain statements in both the appeal memorandum and the stay application were incorrect. Specifically, an earlier writ petition filed by the plaintiffs had been described as "dismissed" instead of "disposed of," and the word "no" had been inadvertently omitted before the phrase "permanent structure" in one paragraph, potentially altering the meaning of the pleading.
Armed with liberty granted by the after it declined to proceed with a petition, the plaintiffs moved an application under Section 340 CrPC before the appellate court, seeking prosecution of both Masram and his counsel for offences relating to .
The Lower Courts' Approach: From Mistake to Criminal Complaint
On
, the
, while partly allowing the application, recorded a finding that
"there is
case that wrong statements were made by the appellant and his counsel."
The court directed that a criminal complaint be lodged before the
, against both the litigant and his advocate under Sections 193 (punishment for
), 199 (
made in declaration receivable as evidence), and 200 (using as true such declaration knowing it to be false) of the IPC.
An appeal under preferred by the aggrieved parties was dismissed by the on . Notably, the High Court went a step further than the trial court, recording findings that the appellants had "filed a false affidavit" and that prosecuting them was — conclusions that were absent from the original order under challenge.
Arguments Before the Supreme Court
Appearing for the appellants, Advocate Satyajit A. Desai mounted a two-pronged challenge. First, he contended that the disputed statements were purely typographical errors committed by a part-time stenographer, and that no material existed on record to demonstrate any intention to make false statements or deceive the court. Second, and more significantly, he pointed out that the appellants had already filed an application on — months before the Section 340 CrPC application was instituted on — seeking correction of these very errors and tendering an unconditional apology for the oversight.
Crucially, Desai argued that unless there was a case of
"
with an intention to mislead or deceive the court,"
prosecution under Section 340 CrPC could not be directed. The respondents, despite being served notice, chose not to oppose the appeal.
The Critical Distinction: '' Versus ''
Writing for the Bench, Justice Atul S. Chandurkar delivered a judgment that methodically dismantled the reasoning of the courts below by drawing a bright-line distinction between two concepts that had been treated interchangeably.
"There is a material difference between making a ' ' and ' ' in the context of Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code. A ' ' of fact may not always have the character of a ' '. While making of a ' ' may not fall within the ambit of Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, a ' ' would qualify as relevant material for being considered as an offence under the said provisions."
The Court explained that a could readily result from inadvertence, human error, or typographical mistakes, whereas a carries with it a deliberate intention to deceive and gain an undue advantage. The lower court, having only recorded satisfaction that "wrong statements" were made, had applied an incorrect legal standard — one that failed to meet the necessary threshold for offences relating to giving .
"The threshold for initiating action for an offence punishable under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code is the making of a ' ' and not the making of a ' '. It is so because a ' ' denotes a deliberate intention in making such statement; in other words, it is a wrongful or erroneous statement made intentionally to gain an undue advantage."
The Missing Mandate: ''
Beyond the erroneous legal standard applied, the Supreme Court identified a second fundamental flaw: the appellate court had completely failed to address whether initiating prosecution was , a mandatory precondition under . The provision explicitly states that before directing an inquiry into any alleged offence, the court must form an opinion that doing so is .
"The forming of an opinion by the Court that holding of an inquiry is in fact is also a must. Ordering an inquiry without formation of any opinion as required by would render the order bad in law being not in accordance with the mandate of Section 340 (1)."
Relying upon the Constitution Bench decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005), the Court reiterated that Section 340 CrPC does not make prosecution automatic. The provision is expressly conditioned by the requirement that the court must consider whether the interests of justice demand such a course. In Iqbal Singh Marwah , the Constitution Bench had observed that even where a forged document may cause serious injury to a person, the court may still decline to order prosecution if the impact on the broader administration of justice is minimal.
The Court also drew support from the decision in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain (1973), quoting its seminal observation:
"Every incorrect or does not make it incumbent on the court to order prosecution. The court has to exercise in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its very object. It is only in glaring cases of where conviction is highly likely, that the court should direct prosecution."
Typographical Errors, Not Deliberate Deception
A crucial factor that weighed with the Supreme Court was the appellants' pre-emptive corrective action. On — well before the respondents filed their Section 340 CrPC application on — the appellants had moved an application under seeking rectification of the very errors that later formed the basis of the complaint.
In that application, the counsel candidly admitted that the mistakes had occurred because the pleadings were dictated to a part-time stenographer who committed errors while typing. The counsel further acknowledged that he had failed to thoroughly verify the typed pleadings before they were filed by his junior, and tendered an unconditional apology. The corrections sought included replacing "dismissed" with "disposed of" and inserting the omitted word "no" where necessary.
"The gravity of a statement that is false is definitely greater than that of a statement that is wrong. Inadvertent errors or mistakes in a statement could be termed as a ' '. However, a ' ' would imply something more than a mere untruth as it carries with it an intent to deceive coupled with knowledge, actual or constructive… It, therefore, cannot be said that the errors in the memorandum of appeal and the application for stay were of such a grave nature that it amounted to making 'false statements' requiring initiation of proceedings under Sections 193, 199 and 200 of the Penal Code."
High Court Overstepped Its Appellate Bounds
The Supreme Court also took exception to the manner in which the
had dealt with the appeal. While the trial court had only recorded a finding that "wrong statements" were made, the High Court proceeded to convert this into a finding that the appellants had "filed a false affidavit" and independently supplied the missing element of
"expediency in the interests of justice."
The Bench held that this amounted to improving the reasoning of the impugned order in an appeal filed by the aggrieved parties themselves — an approach that is impermissible in law.
The James Kunjwal Framework
The Court drew heavily from the recent three-judge Bench decision in
James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand
(2024), which had crystallized five essential principles governing Section 340 CrPC proceedings: (i) the court must form a
opinion that sufficient and reasonable ground exists to initiate proceedings; (ii) proceedings should be initiated only when
"
to punish the delinquent,"
not for innocent or immaterial inaccuracies; (iii) there must be
"
on a matter of substance"
; (iv) the court should be satisfied that there is a reasonable foundation for the charge, supported by distinct evidence rather than mere suspicion; and (v) proceedings should be initiated only in exceptional circumstances, such as when a party has perjured themselves to obtain beneficial orders from the court.
A Cautionary Note on Procedural Timing
Before concluding, the Supreme Court reiterated the Constitutional Bench's guidance in
Iqbal Singh Marwah
that directions under Section 340 CrPC
"normally ought not to be made during the pendency of the substantive proceedings before the Court but only when the proceedings conclude and the final judgment is rendered."
The Court observed that parties often seek to invoke Section 340 CrPC merely to delay the adjudication of substantive civil proceedings — a practice that courts must guard against.
The Final Verdict
Allowing the appeal in its entirety, the Supreme Court quashed the order dated passed by the , as well as the judgment dated of the . The application filed by the plaintiffs under Section 340 CrPC was dismissed. The Court held unequivocally that no case whatsoever had been made out to direct initiation of criminal proceedings against either the litigant or his counsel.
The ruling firmly establishes that courts must exercise caution and before directing prosecution, ensuring that the statutory thresholds of and expediency in the interests of justice are scrupulously satisfied. Inadvertent errors, typographical mistakes, or inaccuracies in pleadings — however undesirable — do not, without more, constitute criminal conduct warranting prosecution under the penal provisions relating to .
