Supreme Court Seeks Centre's Response on PIL Against Perks for Judges Resigning to Avoid Removal

The Supreme Court of India has issued notice to the Union of Government in a public interest litigation (PIL) that challenges the grant of post-resignation perks and amenities to constitutional functionaries —including judges—who step down specifically to avoid facing removal proceedings . A bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice V Mohana recently passed the order, setting the stage for a potentially far-reaching constitutional debate on accountability and equality.

The petitioner, Pratik Vira, has sought a declaration under Article 32 that any constitutional functionary who tenders resignation to avert removal shall not be entitled to any perks, amenities, facilities, or entitlements. Additionally, the plea asks the court to strike down any provision that grants such benefits even after a mid-tenure resignation aimed at circumventing removal, arguing that such provisions are unconstitutional and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. An interim direction has also been sought to prevent the Union from extending any perks to a functionary who resigned after the removal process commenced or to deter such commencement.

The Core Legal Challenge: Equality and Probity

At the heart of the PIL lies a provocative question: Should high constitutional functionaries —like judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, the Chief Election Commissioner, and the Comptroller and Auditor General —be allowed to resign and walk away with full retirement benefits when they are under a cloud of misconduct? The petitioner contends that the Constitution imposes an unwritten obligation on such functionaries to either complete their full tenure or submit to a transparent removal process. “An easy option of resigning to avoid removal is neither contemplated nor desirable. These kinds of resignations defeat the confidence which the Constitution places upon the High Constitutional Functionaries ,” the plea asserts.

The argument is built on a comparison with ordinary government employees. Under service rules, non- constitutional functionaries facing disciplinary proceedings are typically not permitted to resign without facing the charges. The petitioner highlights this disparity, invoking Article 14 ’s guarantee of equality before the law . “Any discrimination between such non-constitutional employees and Constitutional Functionaries is hostile discrimination and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution,” the petition states. The logic is compelling: if a lower-level bureaucrat cannot escape a departmental inquiry by resigning, why should a judge or election commissioner be allowed to do so while retaining lifetime perks?

Historical Context and the “Probity” Argument

The plea draws on historical instances where constitutional functionaries resigned mid-tenure to preempt removal proceedings . While the petition does not name specific cases, it references a “history fraught with examples.” The underlying concern is that the availability of a comfortable retirement package incentivizes resignation rather than accountability . “These resignations are given primarily because the constitutional functionaries know that they would be entitled to the same perks and amenities after resignation as they would be if they completed the tenure,” the petitioner argues.

This raises a fundamental issue of probity in public life . The petitioner insists that constitutional functionaries occupy a higher moral pedestal and must demonstrate the highest standards of integrity. “The position of constitutional functionaries should be higher and they must demonstrate ‘probity’ in public life by completing their tenure and if required, by facing proceedings for removal like any other employee in the country,” the plea emphasizes. The PIL thus seeks to align the incentives for resigning with the constitutional expectation of accountability .

Legal Implications: Article 14 and the Doctrine of Reasonable Classification

From a constitutional law perspective, the PIL invites the Supreme Court to examine whether the existing framework that grants perks to resigning functionaries creates an unreasonable classification. Article 14 permits classification only if it is based on intelligible differentia and has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Here, the object of granting perks is presumably to ensure independence and security of tenure for constitutional functionaries . However, if the benefit is extended even after resignation to avoid removal, the classification may be seen as arbitrary—especially when compared to the stringent rules applied to non-constitutional employees.

The court will likely have to balance two competing values: the need to protect the independence of constitutional functionaries from external pressures, and the imperative of maintaining public confidence in the integrity of high offices. A ruling in favour of the petitioner could require Parliament to amend relevant statutes—such as the Supreme Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1958 , or the Election Commission (Conditions of Service of Election Commissioners and Transaction of Business) Act, 1991—to include a forfeiture clause for resignations under a cloud.

Potential Impact on Legal Practice and Judicial Appointments

For the legal community, the outcome of this PIL could have direct repercussions. If the Supreme Court holds that resigning to avoid removal results in loss of all post-retirement benefits, it may deter potential appointees from accepting high constitutional offices? Or, conversely, it may strengthen the screening process for candidates with questionable records. The petition also touches upon the broader debate about judicial accountability —a topic that has gained traction in recent years with calls for a more transparent mechanism for handling complaints against judges.

Moreover, the case could set a precedent for other constitutional functionaries , including governors, members of the Union Public Service Commission , and election commissioners. The petitioner’s argument that constitutional functionaries must “face a transparent procedure of removal” resonates with the principle that no one is above the law—not even those who interpret it.

Conclusion: A Matter of Constitutional Morality

The Supreme Court’s decision to issue notice and seek the Centre’s response indicates that the bench considers the issue worthy of serious examination. The PIL raises fundamental questions about the nature of constitutional offices, the ethics of resignation, and the equality of treatment under law. As the matter progresses, legal professionals will be watching closely for how the court navigates the delicate terrain between institutional independence and individual accountability .

In an era where public trust in institutions is under scrutiny, the case of Pratik Vira v. Union of India (W.P.(C) No. 1086/2026) could mark a significant step toward redefining the privileges attached to high constitutional office. The hearing is expected to draw extensive legal arguments on the scope of Article 14 , the doctrine of implied constitutional obligations , and the limits of legislative discretion. For now, the ball is in the Centre’s court to justify the status quo—or to support a reform that aligns perks with probity.