The Supreme Court of India has dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (RVUNL), confirming the restoration of arbitral awards in favour of the Parsa Kente Collieries Limited (PKCL). In a decision delivered on November 16, 2026, the bench comprising Justice Satish Chandra Sharma and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh emphasized that courts exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, must exercise restraint. The Court held that appellate bodies cannot engage in a merit-based reappraisal of an arbitral tribunal’s findings if they are based on a plausible interpretation of the contract, effectively reinforcing the finality of domestic arbitration proceedings.

The legal battle originated from a 2008 Coal Mining and Delivery Agreement (CMDA) between RVUNL and PKCL for the development of the Parsa East and Kanta Basan coal block. Following a Supreme Court-mandated cancellation of coal block allocations in 2014, the block was re-allocated to RVUNL under the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015. A Supplementary Agreement was later executed to continue the existing operational contract. Disputes subsequently arose regarding payments for coal quality, lease charges, bank guarantee costs, and resettlement obligations, leading to an extensive arbitration process adjudicated by a sole arbitrator.

The Arbitral Tribunal had originally allowed the majority of PKCL's nine claims. However, the Commercial Court, acting under Section 34 of the Act, set aside the entire award, prompting PKCL to appeal to the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan. The High Court restored the awards, ruling that the Commercial Court had exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction. The Petitioner, RVUNL, then sought to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court ’s judgment provides a critical clarification on the scope of judicial interference in arbitration. The Court noted that " Article 136 of the Constitution is not an integral part of the legal architecture of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ." By framing its decision within the context of minimizing judicial intervention, the Court underscored that the appellate scrutiny of an arbitral award is not equivalent to an ordinary appeal on facts and law. The judges reiterated that "The Arbitral Tribunal is the final arbiter of facts, and the construction of the contractual terms is primarily its domain."

Regarding the specific claims, the Court engaged in a detailed examination of the nine points of dispute to ensure neither forum had violated established legal principles. On Claim No. 1, involving rejected rakes of coal, the Court found that the Arbitrator’s interpretation—that consumption of coal by RVUNL before receiving quality reports constituted acceptance—was a plausible construction of the CMDA. Similarly, on Claim No. 2, relating to stamp duty for the fresh mining lease, the Court rejected the contention that the Tribunal had failed to interpret the "force majeure" clause correctly, finding that the Tribunal had adequately weighed the fundamental alteration of the contract’s basis.

The Court also addressed concerns about the severability of the award. The Petitioner had argued that the award was fundamentally intertwined, requiring a comprehensive remand if any portion was found invalid. The Supreme Court countered that because each claim was subject to separate arbitration notices and distinct causes of action, they were inherently severable. However, because the Court found no perversity or patent illegality in any of the individual claims, the question of severance ultimately did not arise.

Reflecting on the limits of its own oversight, the Court stated, "The proviso to sub-section (2A) of Section 34 of the Act provides that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence." This observation was central to the dismissal of the RVUNL petition. The Court noted that while some of the Arbitrator’s findings might admit to alternative interpretations, an error in evidence appreciation or contract construction does not automatically provide grounds for setting aside an award. An award only meets the threshold for interference if it is perverse—defined as being based on no evidence, relying on irrelevant material, or ignoring vital evidence.

The ruling maintains that the Commercial Court, by setting aside the findings on multiple claims, had overstepped the boundaries of Section 34. The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a stern reminder to lower courts to respect the autonomy of the arbitral process. By upholding the High Court’s restoration of the awards, the Supreme Court has cleared the path for PKCL to enforce the claims awarded by the tribunal, including the Additional Award made in July 2021 regarding land acquisition costs.

The petition was formally dismissed with no order as to costs, and all pending applications were disposed of accordingly. This final adjudication brings to a close a long-standing dispute that underscores the necessity of adhering to the limited parameters of judicial review in commercial arbitration. The judgment reinforces the expectation that parties entering into complex mining and utility agreements must anticipate the finality of their chosen alternative dispute resolution mechanism, barring extraordinary instances of illegality that strike at the root of the arbitral process. The restoration of the awards means that all financial directions provided by the Arbitral Tribunal, including interest and costs awarded under Claim No. 9, remain binding and enforceable against RVUNL.