Tansukhlal Jain Gets FIR Quashed as Bombay HC Finds Procedural Error Under CrPC

A procedural misstep by a Magistrate in Thane has led the Bombay High Court to quash an FIR and the order that triggered it, reinforcing a key distinction between pre- and post-cognizance stages under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Case at a Glance

Justice Ranjitsinha Raja Bhonsale allowed an application under Section 482 of the CrPC (now Section 528 of the BNSS) filed by Tansukhlal Pannalal Jain , who was arrayed as accused No.2 in an FIR registered at Mumbra Police Station. The FIR was based on an order dated 1 October 2016 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No.1, Thane, directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

The dispute arose from a private complaint filed by Rajaram Ragho Taware (Respondent No.2) alleging that a power of attorney relating to his land had been forged and manipulated, leading to the transfer of his property. The Magistrate initially directed the complainant to lead evidence under Section 200, then called for a report under Section 202 after recording verification. The police report, received in April 2016, concluded that no offence was made out.

Despite this, the Magistrate—apparently without recalling the earlier orders—directed investigation under Section 156(3), which led to the registration of the FIR in April 2017. Jain challenged both the order and the FIR.

A Critical Legal Distinction

The core question before the High Court was whether a Magistrate, having taken cognizance of a complaint and proceeded under Chapter XV of the CrPC (sections 200–203), could revert to the pre-cognizance stage and order an investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

The Court answered with a firm no .

Justice Bhonsale traced the procedural timeline: on 24 August 2015, the Magistrate ordered the complainant to lead evidence under Section 200. Verification was recorded on 23 September 2015. On 6 November 2015, the Magistrate called for a report under Section 202, noting that the accused were not residing within local jurisdiction—a trigger for the mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) proviso.

“Perusal of the orders... are clearly indicative of the fact that the Court took cognizance of the complaint and proceeded with the complaint under Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. and not under Chapter XII,” the Court observed.

Impermissible 'Switch-Back'

The Court relied on the landmark ruling in Devarapally Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976) 3 SCC 252, which held that the power under Section 156(3) is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, while Section 202 operates at the post-cognizance stage. Once a Magistrate embarks on the procedure under Chapter XV, “he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3).”

This principle was reiterated in Madhao v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 5 SCC 615 and Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. State of Karnataka (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2334). The Bombay High Court also applied its own earlier decision in Pandurang Shripati Magadum v. Rajaram Ragho Taware (Criminal Writ Petition No. 3420 of 2017, decided on 24 February 2025), which arose from the same complaint and had already quashed a similar FIR against other accused.

No Room for Reversion

“The Cr.P.C. does not provide for reverting back to a stage of section 156(3) after the Complainant has been examined and inquiry has been conducted under section 202(1),” the Court underscored.

It distinguished the two provisions: an inquiry under Section 202 is limited to ascertaining whether there is sufficient ground to proceed, while a direction under Section 156(3) is issued when the Magistrate finds credible material and sees no reason to postpone process. Once cognizance is taken under Chapter XV, the Magistrate must complete that chapter—either dismissing the complaint under Section 203 or issuing process under Section 204.

The Court found “clear procedural illegality” in the impugned order and held that “an FIR cannot be registered or sustained on the basis of an untenable or illegal order.”

Final Verdict

The High Court allowed the application in terms of prayer clause (a), quashing and setting aside both the Magistrate’s order dated 1 October 2016 and the resultant FIR No.I-165 of 2017. However, it remanded the matter back to the Magistrate to proceed with the Section 202 report dated 6 April 2016 and decide the complaint afresh in accordance with law, directing expeditious disposal given that the complaint dates back to 2015.

Key Observations from the Judgment

  • “It would not be permissible for a Magistrate to revert back to the pre-cognizance stage and order an investigation under section 156(3) of Cr.PC, when cognizance is taken under section 202 of Cr.PC.”
  • “There is clear procedural illegality in passing the order dated 1st October 2016 directing investigation under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.”
  • “An FIR cannot be registered or sustained on the basis of an untenable or illegal order.”

This ruling serves as a timely reminder to Magistrates to adhere strictly to the procedural framework, ensuring that once they take cognizance and adopt the Chapter XV route, they see it through—rather than doubling back to the investigation stage.