Unmarried Daughter Can Claim PG Education Expenses From Father Under DV Act: Karnataka High Court

In a significant ruling affirming the breadth of monetary relief under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the High Court of Karnataka has held that an unmarried major daughter is entitled to claim postgraduate educational expenses from her father, observing that parental obligation to fund a child's education does not cease merely because the child has attained the age of majority.

A single-judge bench of Justice H.P. Sandesh dismissed a criminal revision petition filed by a Mangaluru-based businessman challenging concurrent orders from the Trial Court and the Appellate Court that directed him to pay ₹16 lakh towards his 23-year-old daughter's first-year MD Dermatology course expenses at Fr. Muller's Institute of Medical Education and Research , Mangaluru.

A Family Fracture and a Daughter's Dream

The dispute traces its roots to a family that once lived together under one roof. When the respondent-daughter was admitted to the MBBS course, both parents were living together and the father was an active participant in her educational journey. Differences between the parents surfaced while the daughter was still pursuing her undergraduate medical education, fracturing the domestic arrangement.

After successfully completing her MBBS, the daughter secured an impressive All India Rank of 11,722 in the NEET postgraduate examination and obtained admission to the MD Dermatology programme through Karnataka Examination Authority (KEA) counselling. The first-year expenses—comprising ₹13.87 lakh in admission fees payable to KEA and approximately ₹1.5 lakh in annual college and tuition fees along with other incidental costs—totalled roughly ₹16 lakh.

With no independent source of income, the daughter borrowed nearly ₹14 lakh from her maternal grandfather to meet the urgent admission fee payment on December 2, 2025. She then approached the Magistrate's Court under Section 20(d) of the DV Act seeking a direction to her father to reimburse the borrowed amount and meet the remaining educational expenses.

Competing Claims: Stipend, Bank Loans, and a Father's Depression

Before the Trial Court, the father mounted a multi-pronged defence. He contended that having already funded his daughter's complete MBBS education, he bore no further obligation once she attained majority on August 17, 2018. He argued that the application was actuated by malice and intended solely to harass him—a man already grappling with depression caused by alleged harassment from his wife and daughter.

The father further submitted that the daughter, during her postgraduate residency, would receive a monthly stipend of ₹60,000, which rendered her financially capable of sustaining herself. He questioned the credibility of the grandfather's alleged loan of ₹14 lakh, pointing out that the elderly gentleman, a former auto driver over 75 years of age, had no apparent avocation to mobilise such a substantial sum.

Additionally, he highlighted that the daughter's mother had recently repaid two gold loans totalling over ₹7.9 lakh from Bank of Baroda and was earning a salary from M/s. Fernandes Brothers , Mangalore, suggesting that the mother-daughter duo had considerable financial resources at their disposal.

Critically, the father's legal argument pivoted on the definition of "aggrieved person" under Section 2(a) and "child" under Section 2(b) of the DV Act. He contended that since his daughter had crossed 18 years of age, she could not be treated as an "aggrieved person" entitled to invoke the provisions of the DV Act for seeking maintenance or educational expenses. Relying on this Court's decisions in G. Kalasegowda v. Smt. N.K. Nethravathi and Bhaskar Reddy v. Ms. Roshini , as well as the Supreme Court's ruling in Abhilasha v. Parkash and Others (2021) 13 SCC 99—which held that an unmarried major daughter cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC but must approach the Family Court under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act—the father argued that the Magistrate's order was without jurisdiction.

" But Is Not Limited To " : The Broad Canvas of Section 20

The daughter, represented by Advocate Ajay Prabhu M., countered by emphasising the continuity of her education—undergraduate studies seamlessly flowing into postgraduate training—and the absence of any independent income. She pointed to the father's substantial financial capacity, evidenced by his income tax returns showing acquisition of fixed assets worth over ₹1.34 crore in 2021 alone, multiple loans availed between 2021 and 2023 including an overdraft of ₹50 lakh, a housing loan of ₹32.18 lakh, and a car loan of ₹40.25 lakh, and business transactions running into crores.

Justice Sandesh, in a meticulously reasoned judgment, undertook a detailed examination of the statutory architecture of the DV Act. The Court extracted Sections 2(a), 2(b), and 20 of the Act and placed heavy reliance on the Madras High Court's exhaustive analysis in Jagadesan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 1 MWN (Cr.) 451.

The pivotal interpretive strand that emerged was the significance of the phrase " but is not limited to " appearing in Section 20(1) of the DV Act . The Court observed that the legislature had deliberately employed expansive language so as not to circumscribe the Magistrate's power to only the four enumerated heads of monetary relief —loss of earnings, medical expenses, loss caused by destruction of property, and maintenance . The expression, read alongside the words " in addition to an order of maintenance " in Section 20(1)(d) , signalled that the provision was capacious enough to embrace educational expenses.

The Court distinguished Abhilasha v. Parkash , noting that it dealt with the narrower framework of Section 125 CrPC and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, whereas the DV Act operated on a fundamentally different and wider statutory plane. Relying on the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Neelima Choure v. Vijay Choure (2025), where the Apex Court had observed that a daughter possesses "an indefeasible, legally enforceable, lawful and legitimate right to secure educational expenses from her parents," Justice Sandesh affirmed that a daughter's fundamental right to education could compel parents to provide necessary funds within the limits of their financial resources.

"His Role Is Not Stopped On The Child Attaining Majority"

In a passage that captured the moral core of the legal reasoning, the High Court quoted extensively from the Madras High Court's ruling in Jagadesan , stating:

"Father has an obligation to provide love and affection, righteousness basic amenities and the most important among others, health and education and the necessities of life. He has a unique role in the family. Protection intended in the Act is exhaustive. He is legally and morally obligated to provide all material needs and responsible to provide means of livelihood in all forms. His role is not stopped on the child attaining majority."

Addressing the father's argument that the daughter could avail an educational loan, the Court held that such a suggestion could not constitute a valid ground to set aside the concurrent findings of the courts below, particularly when the daughter was not earning and was pursuing continuous education.

The Court also rejected the contention that the daughter's attainment of majority automatically extinguished her entitlement under the DV Act. It noted that a daughter who attains majority falls within the definition of "woman" and may become an "aggrieved person" under Section 2(a) of the Act if she can establish that she has been subjected to domestic violence. Moreover, the definition of "economic abuse" under Section 3(d)(iv) of the Act—which includes deprivation of financial resources to which an aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom—was sufficiently broad to encompass denial of educational expenses.

Financial Muscle and Moral Duty

The Court noted that the Appellate Court had meticulously examined the father's financial records and found him to be a businessman of considerable means, handling transactions in crores and capable of availing and repaying substantial loans. This financial capacity, juxtaposed against the daughter's complete lack of independent income, militated against any finding of hardship to the father in meeting the educational expenses.

The Court observed:

"The Court has to take note of that the daughter is not earning money and she is pursuing her education and the same is a continuous education of under graduation and post graduation."

The Final Order

Finding no legal infirmity or factual error in the concurrent orders passed by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, Justice Sandesh dismissed the criminal revision petition in its entirety.

The ruling reinforces the proposition that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is a socially beneficent legislation whose provisions must be interpreted expansively to effectuate its protective purpose. It clarifies that Section 20 monetary relief is not confined to conventional maintenance alone but can legitimately encompass educational expenses—including for postgraduate studies—where the facts justify such an order and the respondent possesses the financial wherewithal to comply.

For the respondent-daughter, the judgment ensures that the doors of the MD Dermatology programme at Fr. Muller's Medical College remain open, funded by a father whose legal and moral obligation the Court has now definitively affirmed.