Supreme Court says scribe access not limited to
In a landmark judgment that redefines the landscape of disability rights in India, the on , ruled that the denial of a scribe to a candidate with writer's cramp for the Civil Services Examination was unlawful, holding that access to is not contingent upon possessing a . A three-judge Bench comprising Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Justice Indira Banerjee, and Justice Sanjiv Khanna set aside the 's order, marking a significant victory for persons with disabilities across the country.
The Story of Vikash Kumar: A Battle for Dignity
Vikash Kumar, an MBBS graduate from JIPMER, suffers from dysgraphia, commonly known as writer's cramp—a chronic neurological condition that severely hampers his ability to write. When he applied for the Civil Services Examination (CSE) in , the rejected his request for a scribe, citing the , which limited scribe facilities to candidates with benchmark disabilities—those with at least 40% impairment—specifically blindness, locomotor disability, and cerebral palsy. Kumar's disability certificate from confirmed his condition, but the UPSC insisted that only a qualified for a scribe. After the and the dismissed his pleas, he appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Core Legal Question: Is a Precondition?
The central issue before the Court was whether the , permits the exclusion of persons with disabilities who do not meet the 40% benchmark threshold from accessing essential accommodations like scribes. The Court emphatically answered in the negative, drawing a clear distinction between "" under and "" under .
"Conflating the rights and entitlements which inhere in persons with disabilities with the notion of benchmark disabilities does dis-service to the salutary purpose underlying the enactment of the RPwD Act 2016,"
the Court observed. It further held that to deny such rights on the basis of a missing benchmark would be
"plainly
the RPwD Act 2016."
The Court emphasized that the concept of
is primarily relevant for special provisions like reservation in education and employment, not for
.
: From Largesse to Fundamental Right
Justice Chandrachud, writing for the Bench, articulated a transformative vision of as an integral component of the equality guarantee under . He noted that the RPwD Act marks a paradigm shift from the medical model of disability to a social model, recognizing that barriers in society—not just the impairment—hinder full participation.
"
is the instrumentality – are an obligation as a society – to enable the disabled to enjoy the constitutional guarantee of
,"
the Court stated. It rejected the argument that providing a scribe is a privilege dangled by the state, asserting instead that failure to provide such accommodation constitutes discrimination.
The Court also dismissed the UPSC's fear of misuse, noting that no empirical data supported such concerns and that the possibility of abuse cannot justify depriving entire classes of their statutory rights.
"Undue suspicion about the disabled engaging in wrongdoing is unwarranted,"
the Court added, rebuking the ableist premise that candidates might game the system.
A Policy Disconnect Between Ministries
The judgment highlighted a troubling disconnect between the
, which acknowledged that examining bodies could consider scribe requests on a case-by-case basis, and the
and UPSC, which rigidly adhered to the benchmark requirement. The Court expressed its disquiet:
"in a policy matter with profound consequences for India’s disabled population, the left hand does not know what the right one is doing."
To remedy this, the Court directed the MSJE to frame new guidelines within three months for providing scribes to all persons with disabilities under , in consultation with disability rights organizations, emphasizing the need for a case-by-case, individualized approach.
Correcting the Language of Discourse
The Court also took aim at insensitive language used by the Tribunal, which referred to disability as "suffering" and "disease." It insisted that the shift to a
must be reflected in our words:
"Insensitive language offends the human dignity of persons with disabilities."
This call for linguistic change aligns with observations from the
, which had criticized the use of terms like "divyangjan" and references to "normal life."
Broader Implications and Subsequent Impact
The Vikash Kumar judgment has since become a touchstone for disability rights litigation. The , in Santosh Hiraman Lashkare v. State of Maharashtra (), relied on this ruling to protect government employees from blanket reassessment of disability certificates, holding that while the state may re-examine certificates on specific, documented grounds, it cannot treat every certificate as perpetually provisional. That court stressed that , as recognized by the Supreme Court, demands trust in lawful certification rather than suspicion.
By grounding in the constitutional right to equality, the Supreme Court has paved the way for an "RPwD generation" in India—a generation of disabled citizens who regard their rights as a birthright, not a concession. The message from the apex court is clear: the doors to opportunity must open for all, not just for those who meet an arbitrary threshold.
Key Observations
"To confine the facility of a scribe only to those who have benchmark disabilities would be to deprive a class of persons of their statutorily recognized entitlements. To do so would be contrary to the plain terms as well as the object of the statute."
"
cannot be construed in a way that denies to each disabled person the customization she seeks. Even if she is in a class of her own, her needs must be met."
"The principle of
must also account for the fact that disability based discrimination is
in nature."
Decision and Direction
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s judgment and directing that Vikash Kumar be provided a scribe for any future examinations conducted by the UPSC. Additionally, the Court ordered the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment to formulate comprehensive guidelines within three months to ensure that persons with disabilities whose conditions impede writing can access scribes without being constrained by the requirement. This judgment stands as a clarion call for , insisting that accommodation is not an act of charity but an obligation of the state.