The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has ruled that a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable if the petitioner has previously challenged the same order in a statutory revision and subsequently withdrawn those proceedings as “not pressed.” The division bench comprising Justice Siddhartha Varma and Justice Kunal Ravi Singh emphasized that the voluntary abandonment of a statutory remedy precludes a litigant from seeking judicial intervention in the High Court regarding the same subject matter, a principle rooted in the Rule of Public Policy.

The ruling came in the case involving M/S Raj Hans Towers Private Limited, which had sought to quash an order passed by the Meerut Development Authority (MDA) dated May 23, 2026. The petitioner had challenged this order before the State Government under Section 41(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. However, before the revisional authority could adjudicate the matter, the petitioner moved an application to have the revision concluded as “not pressed,” which was granted on June 30, 2026. The court determined that this withdrawal effectively stripped the petitioner of the right to re-agitate the same issues through a writ petition, treating the withdrawal as an abandonment of a claim that brings the Rule of Public Policy into play.

Evolution of a Commercial Dispute

The dispute originated from the allotment of a commercial plot in the Shraddhapuri Awasiya Yojna, Phase 2, in Meerut. The petitioner was allotted the plot in 2006 but subsequently defaulted on premium installments. Following several failed attempts to rectify the payment defaults and navigate one-time settlement schemes, the MDA cancelled the allotment on June 19, 2013, and ordered the forfeiture of the deposited funds.

This cancellation triggered years of litigation. The petitioner’s initial challenges, including Writ Petition No. 12751 of 2014, were unsuccessful, and the Supreme Court eventually affirmed the dismissal of these petitions. In subsequent years, the petitioner initiated multiple rounds of legal action, including efforts to secure a refund under the Authority’s 103rd Board resolution and repeated attempts to restore the plot based on Clause 13 of the original scheme brochure. Each time the petitioner secured a remand from a revisional authority, the MDA would re-examine the claim and reiterate its decision to uphold the cancellation and initiate a fresh auction process.

Application of Judicial Discipline

During the hearing, counsel for the petitioner argued that the MDA had repeatedly ignored directions from the State Government issued under Section 41(3) of the 1973 Act, asserting that the Authority was bound by the principle of judicial discipline to comply with the superior body's remand orders. The petitioner contended that the previous writ petitions did not address the specific issue of plot restoration as per the brochure's terms, thus justifying the current legal challenge.

The High Court, however, focused on the procedural finality created by the petitioner’s own actions. The bench observed that the petitioner had consistently sought statutory relief, only to abandon it once the litigation reached a decisive juncture. Justice Kunal Ravi Singh, writing for the bench, noted: “What the order could have been can only be speculated about and is certainly not the subject matter of the present dispute. But by withdrawing the revision as ‘not pressed’ a completely new set of circumstances have arisen which do not favour the petitioner.”

The Court drew a clear parallel between the current scenario and the established legal precedent in cases like Sarguja Transport Services v. State and Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P. . In these judgments, the Supreme Court established that when a litigant withdraws a petition without obtaining liberty to file a fresh one, they cannot be permitted to initiate a new round of litigation on the same cause of action. The High Court underscored that allowing the petition would undermine the finality of legal proceedings and encourage repetitive litigation.

Finality and Legal Recourse

The bench emphasized that the rule of public policy, as enshrined in Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, is equally applicable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. By choosing not to press the statutory revision, the petitioner had effectively waived their right to contest the order dated May 23, 2026, in a higher forum. The court noted that if the petitioner had approached the High Court initially without resorting to the statutory revision process, the matter might have been viewed differently as a discretionary exercise. However, having submitted to the jurisdiction of the statutory revisional authority and then abruptly ending those proceedings, the petitioner was now precluded from reopening the matter.

In its decision, the Court explicitly addressed the maintainability challenge raised by the respondent Authority. The court stated: “We see no reason as to why the same principle cannot be applied in the present case where the statutory remedy has been withdrawn, and then a writ petition has been filed. If the statutory forum had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision, then the position would have been different, but in the present case, the statutory forum has the necessary legislative mandate to examine the issue of alleged non-compliance.”

The High Court concluded that the writ petition was not maintainable, and the previous dismissals by both the High Court and the Supreme Court regarding the validity of the cancellation and forfeiture had already rendered the matter settled. The court, while rejecting the writ petition as lacking merit, granted the petitioner the liberty to pursue any other legal remedies as they may be advised under the appropriate forums. Following the dismissal, the MDA is now expected to proceed with the fresh auction of the commercial plot in accordance with the existing regulations, as the legal barrier to the auction process has been removed by the court’s order.