1996 Supreme(SC) 1091

1996(5) Supreme 564
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy, N.P. Singh and S.P. Bharucha, JJ.
Dr. D.C. Saxena -Contemnor
versus
Hon ble the Chief Justice of India -Respondent
Contempt Petition No. 38 of 1996
In
W.P. (C) No. D17209/95
Decided on 19-7-1996

VERY IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Criticism of a judge s conduct or of the conduct of a court, even if strongly worded, is not a contempt provided that the criticism is fair, temperate and made in good faith, and is not directed to the personal character of a judge or to the impartiality of a judge.
2. A tendency to scandalise the Court or tendency to lower the authority of the court or tendency to interfere with or tendency to obstruct the administration of justice in any manner or tendency to challenge the authority or majesty of justice, would be a criminal contempt.
3. Power of the Supreme Court under Article 129 of the Constitution of India is independent and is not subject to Article 19(1)(a) and when the contempt of court is committed by a litigant, the freedom of expression being contemptuous becomes punishable under Art. 129 de hors the power u/s 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act.

Headnote:Constitution of India-Article 129-Contempt of Court-Petitioner, a professor of English filed a writ petition seeking to recover from the then Prime Minister, expenditure incurred for private use of Indian Air Force aircraft-Petition summarily dismissed by a Bench comprising of Chief Justice of India-Second writ petition making Chief Justice of India the respondent-He prayed that it be declared that respondent was unfit to hold office of Chief Justice of India etc. etc.-Allegations of fabrication, forgery, fraud and inaccurate recording of proceedings-Contempt notice-Petitioner emphasised and reaffirmed that averments were truthfully and carefully worded-Whether it would amount to contempt of court ?-(Yes)-Any tendency if it may lead to or tends to lower the authority of the court or Judge is a criminal contempt-Sentence of imprisonment of 3 months with fine of Rs. 2,000/-.

       Held : A tendency to scandalise the Court or tendency to lower the authority of the court or tendency to interfere with or tendency to obstruct the administration of justice in any manner or tendency to challenge the authority or majesty of justice, would be a criminal contempt. The offending act apart, any tendency if it may lead to or tends to lower the authority of the court is a criminal contempt. Any conduct of the contemnor which has the tendency or produces a tendency to bring the judge or court into contempt or tends to lower the authority of the court would also be contempt of the court. (Para 25)

       Further held : It is true that in an indictable offence generally mens rea is an essential ingredient and requires to be proved for convicting the offender but for a criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) any enumerated or any other act apart, to create disaffection, disbelief in the efficacy of judicial dispensation or tendency to obstruct administration of justice or tendency to lower the authority or majesty of law by any act of the parties, constitutes criminal contempt. Thereby it excludes the proof of mens rea. What is relevant is that the offending or affornt act produces interference with or tendency to interfere with the course of justice. (Para 26)

       When an advocate or a party appearing before the court requires to conduct himself in a manner befitting to the dignity and decorum of the court, he cannot have a free licence to indulge in writing in the pleadings the scurrilous accusations or scandalisation against the judge or the court. If the reputation and dignity of the judge, who decides the case are allowed to be prescribed in the pleadings, the respect for the court would quickly disappear and independence of the judiciary would be a thing of the past. (Para 30)

       Consequently held that when the first writ petition was dismissed by this Court, as a responsible citizen, the petitioner would have kept quite. When the result animated by the petitioner was not achieved, he embittered to foul at the process of this Court and emboldened to file the second writ petition with imputation made against this Court, in particular targetting the Chief Justice of India, Justice A.M. Ahmadi. As stated hereinbefore and need not be reiterated once over that it is the duty of the Court to hear and decide any matter posted for admission. Therefore, there is nothing improper for the first Court presided over by the Chief Justice of India to hear and decide the matter. When it came up for admission, the Court appears to have been persuaded to ascertain the correctness of the allegations made in the writ petition. This Court obviously before issuing notice had sent for and directed the Solicitor General to obtain the information from the Government as to the correctness of the allegations made before deciding whether the Court would exercise its prerogative power under Article 32 to issue directions as sought for. In furtherance thereof, the Solicitor General admittedly placed before the Court the record. On perusal thereof, the first Court had declined to exercise the power as enumerated and obviously stated by the petitioner that the exercise of the power under Article 32 was not appropriate since the Government in the Defence Department could recover from the Prime Minister s Secretariat or from the Congress party, as the case may be, all the arrears, if any, due and payable by the respective entities. It is not obligatory for this Court to give reasons for dismissing the writ petition. The petitioner obviously with half-baked knowledge in law mixed up the language as "improper for Chief Justice of India to hear it". "Dismissal of the "grouse" of the petitioner was totally unjust, unfair, arbitrary and unlawful, flagrant violation of mandate of Article 14." "Violation of the sacred oath of office" and to "declare Justice A.M. Ahmadi unfit to hold the office as Chief Justice of India". When these imputations were pointed out to the petitioner by three-Judge Bench presided over by brother Verma, J. while dismissing the second writ petition, to be scandalous and reckless, he had stated that he "stood by" those allegations. He reiterated the same with justification in his preliminary submissions. He has stated that the accusations made were truthful and "carefully" worded. In this backdrop scenario, the effect of these imputations is obviously reckless apart from scandalising this Court, in particular the Chief Justice of India and was intended to foul the process of the Court or lower or at any rate tends to lower the authority of the Court in the estimate of the public and tends to undermine the efficacy of the judicial process. It would, therefore, be clear that the accusations are gross contempt. (Para 35)

       The decision is that of the Bench on behalf of the Court and the Chief Justice, being the senior-most among the members constituting the bench, had spoken on behalf of the Bench. Therefore, the attribution of improper motives scandalises the efficacy of judicial adjudication and per se contumaciously lowers or at any rate tends to lower the dignity or authority of the Court. The prayer for prosecution of the Chief Justice, though sought in Item 14(a) and (d) to be withdrawn, which would be of no consequence, is, therefore, unbelievably outrageous contempt. (Para 36)

       Then held : Fair criticism of the judicial proceedings outside the pleadings of the Court is a democratic feature so as to enable the court to look inward into the correctness of the proceedings and the legality of the orders of the Court by the Court itself for introspection. But a party has a duty and responsibility to plead as a part of the averments or the prayer in the relevant portion with language befitting with the dignity of the Court and the judicial process and not in self-abuse of the freedom of expression given under Article 19(1)(a). Abuse of the process of the court is a self-evidence. As such Article 19(2) creates an embargo on the freedom of expression and excludes from its operation the power of contempt of Court under the Act. This Court being court of record, power of this Court under Article 129 is independent and is not subject to Article 19(1)(a). Ex abundanti cautela, Article 19(2) excludes the operation of Article 19(1) when speech or expression is trapped in contempt of court or tends to trench into it. When the contempt of court is committed by a litigant, the freedom of expression being contemptuous becomes punishable under Article 129 of the Constitution de horse the power under Section 12 of the Act. (Para 38)

       Finally held : The repeated assertions of the petitioner that he has no personal gain in the litigation and was actuated by the public duty and laid the petitions, bear no relevance or a defence. It is already held that in a contempt proceedings, the motive, in other words, the mens rea is not relevant. What would be the effect of the act or conduct or imputation is the relevant question for decision? It is true that in an indictable offence under penal law generally mens rea is an essential ingredient and the burden lies on the prosecution to prove it affirmatively. In a contempt proceedings of summary nature, the proof of mens rea is absolutely unnecessary. What is material is the effect or the tendency of the act, conduct or the publication of the words, written, spoken or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise and whether it scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of the Court or prejudices or tends to prejudice or interfere or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings or interferes or tends to interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. The tendency due to the publication, whether by words - written or spoken or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise, of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever is relevant and material. It is already noted that while dismissing the second writ petition, this Court has pointed out the scandalous nature of accusations which found place in the second writ petition and when the petitioner persisted for consideration of scandalous accusations to lay proceedings against the Chief Justice of India for prosecution and other reliefs referred to hereinbefore, he reiterated that he would stand by those accusations. Resultantly, this Court was constrained to go into merits and dismissed the petition and initiated suo motu contempt proceedings and got the notice issued to him pointing out specifically 14 items which constituted scandalous and reckless litigations pleaded with irresponsibility. He reiterated them in his preliminary submissions with further justifications. He did not tender any unconditional apology, though this Court is not bound to accept such an unconditional apology for consideration. Considered from the totality of the facts and circumstances, the gravest magnitude of the contumacious conduct of the contemnor, we are left with no option but to convict and sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- payable in a period of 3 months and in case of default, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one month. (Paras 41 & 42)

       (ii) CONTEMPT OF COURT-Criticism about judicial system and judges -Scandalising judges or courts tends to bring authority and administration of law into disrespect and disregard and tantamount to contempt-However, criticism of a judge s conduct or of the conduct of a court, even if strongly worded, is not contempt provided that criticism is fair, temperate, made in good faith and not directed to personal character of a judge or to impartiality of a judge or court.

       Held : Scandalising the court, therefore, would mean hostile criticism of judges as judges or judiciary. Any personal attack upon a judge in connection with office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slender. Yet defamatory publication concerning the judge as a judge brings the court or judges into contempt, a serious impediment to justice and an inroad on majesty of justice. Any caricature of a judge calculated to lower the dignity of the court would destroy, undermine or tend to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or majesty of justice. It would, therefore, be scandalising the judge as a judge, in other words, imputing partiality, corruption, bias, improper motives to a Judge is scandalisation of the court and would be contempt of the court. Even imputation of lack of impartiality or fairness to a judge in the discharge of his official duties amounts to contempt. The gravamen of the offence is that of lowering his dignity or authority or an affront to majesty of justice. When the contemnor challenges the authority of the Court, he interferes with the performance of duties of Judge s office or judicial process or administration of justice or generation or production of tendency bringing the judge or judiciary into contempt. (Para 25)

       Further held : Law is not in any doubt that in a free democracy everybody is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness or legality of a judgment or sentence or an order of a court but he should not overstep the bounds. Though he is entitled to express that criticism objectively and with detachment in a language dignified and respectful tone with moderation, the liberty of expression should not be a licence to violently make personal attack on a judge. Subject to that, an honest criticism of the administration of justice is welcome since justice is not a cloistered virtue and is entitled to respectful scrutiny. Any citizen is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness of the judgment, order or sentence with dignified and moderate language pointing out the error or defect or illegality in the judgment, order or sentence. That is after the event as post-mortem. (Para 28)

       (iii) CONTEMPT OF COURT-Constitution of India-Articles 129 and 19(1)(a) and 19(2)-Power of Court under Art. 129 is independent and is not subject to Art. 19(1)(a)-Art. 19(2) excludes operation of Art. 19(1) when speech or expression is trapped in contempt of court or tends to trench upon it-Freedom of expression when being contemptuous becomes punishable under Art. 129 de hors the power u/s. 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. (Para 38)

       (iv) CONTEMPT OF COURT-In contempt proceedings, motive, i.e. mens rea is not relevant-What would be the effect of the act or conduct or imputation is relevant and material. (Para 41)