1998(6) Supreme 477
Supreme Court of India
(From Allahabad High Court)
M.M. Punchhi, CJI, K.T. Thomas and S.S. Mohd. Quadri, JJ.
M/s. Mahaluxmi Rice Mills & Ors. -Appellants
versus
State of U.P. & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 555-557 of 1997
With
(Civil Appeal Nos. 558, 559, 560, 561, 562 & 563 of 1997)
Decided on 19-8-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : B.D. Agarwal, O.P. Rana, Sr. Advocates, Joseph Pocckkatt, Prashant Kumar, Anis Dayal, Sunil Ambwani, R.C. Verma, Dr. I.P. Singh, (A.K. Srivastava) Advocate for R.B. Misra, T. Mahipal, Pradeep Misra, Y.P. Rao, Irshad Ahmad, Advocates.
Held : It is significant to note that the word used for the seller to realise market fee from his purchaser is “may” while the word used as for the seller to pay the market fee to the Committee is “shall”. Employment of the said two monosyllables of great jurisprudential import in the same clause dealing with two rights regarding the same burden must have two different imports. The legislative intendment can easily be discerned from the frame of the sub-clause that what is conferred on the seller is only an option to collect market fee from his purchaser, but the seller has no such option and it is imperative for him to remit the fee to the Committee. In other words, the Market Committee is entitled to collect market fee from the seller irrespective of whether the seller has realised it from the purchaser or not. (Para 10)
The aforesaid observations of the Constitution Bench makes the position clear that the Market Committee is fully entitled to collect the market fee from the seller and it is for the seller to pass the burden on the purchaser if he so chooses. It is not the look out of the Market Committee to see that seller gets the amount of fee paid by the purchaser. Thus the appellants cannot shirk the responsibility to pay the market fee to the Market Committee when the transaction falls within the purview of sub-clause (3) of Section 17(iii)(b) of the Act and then it would be open to them to recover the same from the purchaser-Government. For the above reasons we dismiss these appeals. (Paras 13, 14)
Judgment
Thomas, J.-The area of dispute, in this appeal, has now been considerably narrowed down with the decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Food Corporation of India v. State of Kerala1. The short question now remains is whether the market fee payable to the Market Committee constituted under the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (for short “the Act”) shall be paid by the seller or purchaser when agricultural produce is sold by a trader to the Government. The aforesaid question arose under the following facts:
2. Appellants are traders carrying on business in rice milling within certain areas constituted in the State of U.P. Such areas have been notified as market areas under Section 6 of the Act. Among the business activities carried on by the appellants they purchased paddy from cultivators or sellers outside the market area and the paddy so purchased is hulled to make it rice for sale. They are under a duty to sell rice to the State Government as levy by virtue of Clause (3) of the U.P. Rice and Paddy (Levy and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1985, which was issued under the Essential Commodities Act. It will hereinafter be referred to as the “Levy Order”.
3. Provisions of the Act envisage the formation of a Market Committee for each market area and the said Committee is empowered to levy and collect fee called “market fee” on transactions of sale of agricultural produce which take place within the market area, at such rates as the State Government may specify by notification. Section 17(iii) of the Act reads thus :
“17. Powers of the Committee.-A Committee shall, for the purpose of this Act, have the power to-
xxx xxx xxx
(iii) levy and collect:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) market fee, which shall be payable on transactions of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area at such rates, being not less than one per centum and not more than two percentum of the price of the agricultural produce so sold, as the State Government may specify by notification, and such fee shall be realised in the following manner-
(1) if the produce is sold through a commission agent, the commission agent may realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the same to the Committee;
(2) if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee;
(3) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce may realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee; and
(4) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee.”
4. The Market Committee concerned made demands on the appellants to remit the market fee as indicated in Section 17(iii)(b)(3) of the Act. Appellants challenged the said demand before the Allahabad High Court on different grounds. First ground is that when a rice miller gives rice to the Government as levy under the Levy Order it does not amount to a “transaction of sale” and hence no market fee can be collected thereon. Second ground is that the State Government is not a “trader” as contemplated in the sub-clause and hence there is no liability to pay market fee. Third ground is that, even if it was a sale to a trader the liability to pay market fee is on the purchaser i.e. Government and not the miller who sells it to the Government.
5. High Court did not accept any of the aforesaid contentions and hence the reliefs prayed for by the appellants in the writ petitions were disallowed. Against the judgment repelling those contentions Special Leave Petitions have been filed by the appellants and hence these appeals.
6. In the present appeals, appellants did not contend that Government is not a trader as envisaged in sub-clause
Ramesh Chandra etc. v. State of U.P. etc.
Food Corporation of India v. State of Kerala
Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Haldwani & Ors. v. Indian Wood Products Ltd. & Anr.
Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & Ors. v. Orient Paper & Industries Ltd.
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