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1998 Supreme(SC) 1153

1998(8) Supreme 555
Supreme Court of India
(From Andhra Pradesh High Court)
S. Saghir Ahmad & K.T. Thomas, JJ.
Rafat Ali -Appellant
versus
Sugni Bai & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 5777 of 1998
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8175 of 1998)
Decided on 18-11-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : D. Ramakrishna Reddy and Ms. D. Bharathy Reddy, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Subodh Markandeya, Sr. Advocate, R.N. Sharma, Feroza Bano, Ms. Chitra Markandeya and D. Mahesh Babu, Advocates.

Important Points
1. Jurisdiction of High Court under Section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act cannot be equated with appeal powers in all its parameters; High Court cannot substitute the findings of the lower courts with its own findings so easily while exercising the limited supervisory jurisdiction.
2. What is envisaged in Clause (iv) of Section 10(2) of the Andhra Pra­desh Rent Control Act is only a private nuisance and not public nui­sance; what is meant in Section 102(iv) is an actionable nuisance which is recognised in common law and the nuisance must be substantial or atleast of some significance.
3. All acts of waste do not amount to a ground for eviction under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Rent Conrol Act; only those waste which would very probably impair value of building or utility would be ground for eviction.

Headnote:(i) Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960-Section 22-Revision-Scope of jurisdiction-Power conferred under Section 22 is power of supervision for the purpose of High Court to satisfy itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of order of lower authority-Jurisdiction cannot be equated with appeal powers in all its parameters-High Court cannot substitute the findings of lower Courts with its own findings so easily while exercising the limited supervisory jurisdiction.

       Held : The appellation given to the Section 22 makes its unmistakably clear that the power conferred thereunder is revisional which means, it is a power of supervision. It is well neigh settled that a revisional jurisdiction cannot be equated with appeal powers in all its parame­ters. The power to call for and examine the records is for the purpose of the High Court to satisfy itself as to the “legality, regularity or propriety” of the order of the lower authority. Even such a widely worded frame of the Section may at best indicate that the revisional powers are not so restricted as in the enactments wherein the words are not so widely framed. Nonetheless, they remain in the realm of supervisory jurisdiction. Despite wide language employed in the Section, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with the findings of fact merely because it does not agree with to the finding of the subordinate authority. It is not open to the High Court to substitute the findings of the lower Courts with it own findings so easily while exer­cising the limited supervisory jurisdiction. (Paras 7, 19)

       (ii) Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960-Section 10(2)(iv)-Evic­tion on ground of nuisance-What is meant in Section 10(2)(iv) is actionable nuisance which is recognised in Common Law-Suffering of damage must be proved-Action­able nuisance must be substantial or atleast of some significance-What is envisaged in clause (iv) is only private nuisance and not public nuisance.

       Held : Though the word “nuisance” is not defined it can be inferred from the context that what is meant therein is the actionable nuisance which is recognised in Common Law. Nuisance as understood in law is broadly divided into two classes-public nuisance and private nuisance. The former consists of some acts or omissions which result in violation of rights which one enjoys in common with other members of the public. But the latter i.e. private nuisance, is one which interfere with the person’s use and enjoyment of immovable property or some right in res­pect of it. Suffering of damage must be proved in a case of nuisance unless it can be presumed by law to exist. But the damage to amount to action­able nuisance must be substantial or at-least of some significance. In other words, if the damage is insignificant or evanescent or trivial it would not be actionable nuisance. It is clear from clause (iv) of Section 10(2) of the Act that what is envisaged therein is only private nuisance and not public nuisance. This can be discerned from the words “nuisance to the occupiers of other portions in the same building or buildings in the neighbourhood”. Perhaps in a wide sense any industrial activity may create some sound while such activities are in operation. Such sound may be uncomfortable to those who are over sensitive to such noise. But then care must be taken because every inconvenience cannot become actionable nuisance. To make it actionable the nuisance must be of a reasonably perceptible degree as pointed out earlier. (Paras 12, 14 & 15)

       In the instant case Rent Control Court considered landlords’ case regarding nuisance. Landlords said that the tenant was quarreling with them “whenever they go for collection of rents”. They have also alleged that appellant was running machines late in the night and thereby causing nuisance to the other occupiers of the building. As the appellant was running high business with the same machines right from the beginning, Rent Control Court was not inclined to treat such noise as amounting to nuisance. Appellate authority pointed out that “there was no complaint prior to the filing of the eviction petition at any time against the tenant that he caused damage to the building”. On the other hand, the Rent Control Court noticed that machi­nery was installed in this building way back in 1970 and the same is under operation even now. On the above reasoning both the authorities uniformly concluded that tenant has not committed any act of nuisance to attract the ground of evic­tion. But the High Court upset such a finding in a very casual manner unmindful of the inherent limitations of the revisional jurisdiction. (Para 16)

       (iii) Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960-Section 10(2)(iii)-Evic­tion on ground of acts of waste-All acts of waste do not amount to a ground for eviction-Only those waste which would very probably impair value of building or its utility would be ground for eviction-It is not enough that some impairment has been caused to building.

       Held : All acts of waste do not amount to a ground for eviction. It is only those acts of waste which would very probably impair the value of the building or its utility. The word “likely” in the above clause must be understood as a condition which is reasonably probable that such acts would cause impairment to the value or utility of the building. However, it is not enough that some impairment has been caused to the building. The value of the building or utility thereof should have been lessened in a reasonably substantial degree. Then only it can be said that the acts of waste are likely to impair the value or utility of the building “materially”. (Para 17)

       In the instant case an Advocate-Commissioner visited the building and pointed out the following features in his report regarding the damage noticed by him: “There is only concrete flooring with uneven surface. Due to the use of machinery there is a hole in the flooring on the eastern side and it was meant for inserting pipe. There was no damage to the roof and walls. Some nail-holes were also noticed. When the lathe machines were operated the advocate commissioner noticed that there was no vibration either on the ground floor or on the walls of the main building, though very slight vibration was noticed on the parapet walls of the first floor.” Both the fact finding courts found that the above items of damage are only trivial and will not affect the building. But the High Court found that “the landlords proved that the tenant caused damage to the demised premises by causing holes and leaving spaces between the shutter and the wall as seen from the Commissioner’s report.” It was not open to the High Court to substitute the findings of the lower courts with its own findings so easily as that while exercising the limited supervisory jurisdiction. (Paras 18 & 19)

       

Judgment

Thomas, J.-Leave granted.

2. A building situate at Mahboob Gunj, Hyderabad belonged to one Babu Lal. He leased it out to the appellant in 1970 wherein appellant has been running a business by name M/s. Royal Agro Industries. Lathe and machinery have been installed therein for the purpose of the business. Babu Lal died leaving behind him the present res­pondents as his legal heirs who are his widow and children. In the year 1988 res­pondents/landlords launched a litigation against the appellant for evicting him from the leased premises. Though the respondents failed in the Rent Control Court as well as in the Appellate Authority they succeeded in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, where in a revision the concurrent findings were reversed and an order of eviction was granted in favour of the landlords. Hence, appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.

3. Three distinct grounds have been set up by the respondents in their petition filed under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short ‘the Act’). They are: (1) that the tenant had committed default in paying rent of the building from 1.11.1986 to 30.4.1986, (2) that the tenant commit­ted acts of waste by which damage has been caused to the building, (3) that the tenant has been committing acts of nuisance to other occu­pants of the buildings in the neighbour-hood.

4. All the three grounds were found against the respondent by the Rent Control Court which dismissed the petition for eviction. When respond­ents filed appeal under Section 20 of the Act, the Appellate Authority also found, in concurrence with the findings of the Rent Control Court, that the landlord failed to make out any one of the grounds. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. It was when respondents moved the High Court in revision under Section 22 of the Act that they succeed­ed as a learned single Judge interfered with the concurrent findings regarding all the three grounds.

5. Learned single Judge has stated as follows in the concluding part of the impugned order:

“The findings of the Courts below are quite arbitrary, perverse and capricious. The orders under challenge cannot be said as free from legal lacunae. The Courts failed to take into consideration the events started subsequent to leasing out the premises, namely, causing nuisance prior to the filing of eviction petition. The evidence given clearly establishes that the tenant was a defaulter, had caused damage to the premises and causing nuisance to the landlords and other occu­piers. Having found that the orders under challenge suffer from illegality, the same deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, the CRP is allowed and the orders under challenge are set aside and consequently, the eviction sought by the landlords is granted.”

6. It is contended before us that learned single Judge made those observations without considering the reasoning of the fact finding courts and without adverting to the evidence and without keeping within the bounds of revisional jurisdiction conferred by Section 22 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, made an endeavour to show that the revisional powers under the Act are not so limited as in other similar enactments and that the High Court has wide powers to interfere even with the concurring findings of fact, and looking from that angle the High Court has not acted beyond its jurisdiction.

Section 22 of the Act reads:

“22. Revision:-(1) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceeding taken under this Act by the Controller in execution under Section 15 or by the appellate authority on appeal under Section 20, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or of propriety of such order or proceeding, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

(2) The costs of and incident to all p






























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