1998 Supreme(SC) 1088

1998(8) Supreme 133
Supreme Court of India
(From Delhi High Court)
S. Saghir Ahmad & K.T. Thomas, JJ.
Sarla Ahuja -Appellant
versus
United India Insurance Company Ltd. -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 5213 of 1988
(@ Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11553 of 1998)
Decided on 27-10-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Advocate, Rajeev Sharma, Manmohan Singh and Sanjeev Sindhwani, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Keshav Dayal, Sr. Advocate, Kewal Nandwani, Debasis Misra, Advocates.

Important Points
1. Power conferred to High Court u/s 25B(8) of Delhi Rent Control Act is revisional power; while perusing record of case Court must confine its satisfaction to limi­ted sphere that order of Rent Controller is according to law; High Court cannot come to a different fact finding unless finding of Rent Controller is unreasonable.
2. To deprive landlord benefit of bona fide requirement on ground of availability of alternative accommodation it is not enough that such alternative accommodation is in a far different state; accommodation must be available in same city or town or atleast within reasonable proximity thereof if it is outside limits of city.
3. When evidence is sought for on ground of bona fide requirement Rent Controller shall not proceed on presumption that requirement is not bona fide.

Headnote:(i) Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Section 25B(8) read with Section 14(1)(e)-Revision-Scope of power of High Court-Power conferred u/s 25B(8) to High Court is revisional power-Satisfaction of High Court when perusing record of case must be confined to limited sphere that order of Rent Controller is according to law-Not permissible for High Court to come to a different fact finding unless finding arrived at by Rent Controller on facts is unreasonable.

       Held : Proviso to Section 25B(8) indicates that power of the High Court is supervisory in nature and it is intended to ensure that the Rent Controller conforms to law when he passes the order. The satisfaction of the High Court when perusing the records of the case must be con­fined to the limited sphere that the order of the Rent Controller is “according to the law”. In other words, the High Court shall scruti­nize the records to ascertain whether any illegality has been commit­ted by the Rent Controller in passing the order under Section 25B. It is not permissible for the High Court in that exercise to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the Rent Controller on the facts is so unreasonable that no Rent Controller should have reached such a finding on the materials available. Although, the word “revision” is not employed in the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act it is evident from the language used therein that the power conferred is revisional power. In legal parlance dis­tinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction is well under­stood. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction is wide enough to afford a re-hearing of the whole case for enabling the appellate forum to arrive at fresh conclusions untrammelled by the conclusions reached in the order challenged before it. Of course, the statute which provides appeal provision can circumscribe or limit the width of such appellate powers. Revisional power, on the contrary, is ordinarily a power of supervision keeping subordinate tribunals within the bounds of law. Expansion or constriction of such revisional power would depend upon how the statute has couched such power therein. In some legislations revisional jurisdiction is meant for satisfying itself as to the regularity, legality or propriety of proceedings or decisions of the subordinate court. (Paras 6 & 7)

       Learned Single Judge of the High Court in the present case has reassessed and re-appraised the evidence afresh to reach a different finding as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even while exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evi­dence can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact finding court is wholly unreasonable. A reading of the impugned order shows that the High Court has over-stepped the limit of its power as a revisional court. The order impugned, on that score, is hence vitiated by juris­dictional deficiency. (Para 11)

       The landlord put forth a variety of reasons which persuaded her to seek recovery of the tenanted premises: (1) That the tenanted building is her own and it is a residential building. (2) In the building where she now resides at Calcutta her son and daughter-in-law are also living with their children. (3) She and her son have to go to Delhi quite often and stay there for days in connec­tion with their business. (4) Her daughter is living in NOIDA which is on the outskirts of Delhi and it would be convenient for that daughter to stay with the mother frequently. (5) Landlord is getting old and developed orthopedic problems and hence she feels that living in the ground floor is more advisable. (6) The flat in which she lives now at Calcutta is on the third floor whereas the tenanted premises are on the ground floor. Rent Controller approved the claim of the landlord as bona fide after taking into account the aforesaid broad aspects. It cannot be said that the Rent Controller had taken into account irrelevant factors in reaching the conclusion. Hence the High Court has improper­ly exercised its revisional jurisdiction in upsetting the findings of the Rent Controller. (Paras 16 & 17)

       (ii) Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 14(1)(e)-Eviction on ground of bona fide requirement-To deprive landlord benefit on account of availability of alternative residential accommodation it is not enough that such alternative accommodation is in a far different state-Such accommodation must be available in same city or town or atleast within reasonable proximity thereof if it is outside limits of city.

       Held : If the landlord has another residential accommodation which is reasonably suitable, he is not permitted to avail himself of the benefit afforded in the ground set out in the clause. Learned Single Judge of the High Court has noted that the landlord in this case has “admitted in her deposition that the house in Calcutta was a 3-bedroom house with drawing/dining room and one of the bedrooms was used by her and other by her son with his wife, and another bedroom was kept for her daughter who use to come and stay”. This was one of the reasons which persuaded the learned Single Judge to interfere with the order of eviction. To deprive a landlord of the benefit of the ground men­tioned in Section 14(1)(e) on account of availability of alternative residential accommodation, it is not enough that such alternative accommodation is in a far different State. Such accommodation must be available in the same city or town, or at least within reasonably proximity thereof if it is outside the limits of the city. The said limb of clause (e) cannot be interpreted as to mean that if landlord has another house anywhere in the world he cannot seek recovery of possession of his building under clause (e). High Court therefore went wrong in observing that since the landlord has possession of another flat at Calcutta she is disentitled to seek recovery of possession of the tenanted premises situated at Delhi. (Para 13)

       (iii) Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Section 14(1)(e)-Bona fide requirement-Eviction on ground of-When landlord asserts that he requires building for his own occupation Rent Controller shall not proceed on presumption that requirement is not bona fide.

       Held : The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the land­lord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the ques­tion of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. (Para 14)

       Facts such as the cordial relationship between a landlord and her daughter-in-law or that he is comfortably residing in the present building are not relevant in judging the bona fides of the claim of the landlord. Otherwise it would appear that landlord can think of residing in his or her own residential building only when cracks develop in the relationship between him and his other kith and kin. (Para 15)