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1999 Supreme(SC) 1155

1999(8) Supreme 447
Supreme Court of India
(From Delhi High Court)
K.T. Thomas & M.B. Shah, JJ.
Satvinder Kaur -Appellant
versus
State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) & Anr. -Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 1031 of 1999
(@ Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 1246 of 1999)
Decided on 5-10-1999
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : D.N. Goburdhan, Advocate (SCLSC).
For the Respondent No. 1 : Ashok Bhan, (Ms. Neera Gupta) Advocate for Ms. Sushma Suri, Advocate/Advocates.
For the Respondent No. 2 : Sudhir Walia, Mahinder Singh Dahiya, Advo­cates.

Important Point
At the stage of investigation, the material collected by an investigating officer cannot be judicially scrutinized for arriving at a conclusion that police station officer of particular police station would not have territorial jurisdiction.

Headnote:Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 482 r/w Sections 156, 170, 177 and 178-Quashing of FIR on ground of territorial juris­diction of Investigation Officer-Matrimonial home of appellant was at Patiala from where she was allegedly thrown out-Parent’s residence at Delhi-Complaint u/s 498A IPC lodged at Delhi-High Court quashing FIR on ground Delhi Police has no jurisdiction to investigate into offence-Not sustainable-If offence is disclosed Court cannot inter­fere with investigation into case-At stage of investigation material collected by investigating officer cannot be judicially scrutinised for arriving at a conclusion that Police Station Officer of a particu­lar station would not have territorial jurisdiction.

       Held : The High Court arrived at the conclusion by appreciating the allegations made by the parties that the S.H.O., Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the F.I.R. lodged by the appellant because the alleged dowry items were entrusted to the respondent at Patiala and that the alleged cause of action for the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. arose at Patiala. In our view, the findings given by the High Court are, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous because:-

        (1) The S.H.O. has statutory autho­rity under Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any cognizable case for which an F.I.R. is lodged.

        (2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the Investigating Officer has no territorial jurisdiction.

        (3) After investigation is over, if the Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the F.I.R. has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence.

        (Para 8)

       Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the Police Officer to investigate any cognizable offence. It is true that territorial jurisdiction also is prescribed under sub-section (1) to the extent that the Officer can investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, sub-section (2) makes the position clear by providing that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in ques­tion on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered to investigate. After investigation is completed, the result of such investigation is required to be submitted as provided under Sections 168, 169 & 170. Section 170 specifically provides that if, upon an investigation, it appears to the Officer in charge of the police station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit for trial. Further, if the Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station, then F.I.R. can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction over the area in which crime is committed. But this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it. (Paras 8 & 9)

       Chapter XIII of the Code provides for “Jurisdiction of the Crimi­nal Courts in inquiries and trials”. It is to be stated that under the said Chapter there are various provisions which empower the Court for inquiry or trial of a criminal case and that there is no absolute prohibition that the offence committed beyond the local territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated, inquired or tried. (Para 10)

       Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed the Court will no normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the Court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. For the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. to quash a FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the com­plaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allega­tions. (Para 13)

       In the present case, the High Court committed grave error in accepting the contention of the respondent that investigating officer had no jurisdiction to investigate the matters on the alleged ground that no part of the offence was committed within the territori­al jurisdiction of police station at Delhi. The appreciation of the evidence is the function of the Courts when seized of the matter. At the stage of investigation, the material collected by an investigating officer cannot be judicially scrutinized for arriving at a conclusion that police station officer of particular police station would not have territorial jurisdiction. In any case, it has to be stated that in view of Section 178(C) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in which of the several local areas an offence was commit­ted, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, the said offence can be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Therefore, to say at the stage of investigation that S.H.O., Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction, is on the face of it, illegal and erroneous. That apart, Section 156(2) contains an embargo that no proceeding of a police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he has no territorial power to investigate. The High Court has completely overlooked the said embargo when it entertained the petition of respondent No. 2 on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. (Para 14)

       

Judgment

Shah, J.-Leave granted.

2. The appellant-wife contends that she had married to Rajinder Singh-Respondent No. 2 on December 9, 1990. Her parents were resident of Delhi and the marriage was performed at Delhi. A daughter was born on 19th December, 1991. It is her contention that on 19th January, 1992, she was thrown out from the matrimonial home in Patiala with 4 weeks baby girl and that at that time, she had only wearing apparel.

3. On the same day, that is, 19th January, 1992 at 3.40 p.m., a com­plaint bearing No. DD No. 18 was lodged by her at P.S. Kotwali, Patia­la making various allegations of torture and dowry demand against her husband and parents-in-law. Thereafter, she came to Delhi to live with her parents. Within that time also, threats by her husband continued. On 30th April, 1992, a complaint was lodged against her husband in the Women Cell, Delhi. Subsequently, on 23rd January, 1993, the impugned FIR No. 34 of 1993 under Sections 406 and 498A I.P.C. for the alleged occurrence dated 9th December, 1990 at Patiala was lodged at Police Station, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi. Rajinder Singh, respondent No. 2 was arrested on 4th February, 1993 at Patiala and certain recoveries were effected and he was brought to Delhi and produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate, who remanded him to judicial custody and, thereafter, released him on bail on 9th February, 1993.

4. Thereafter, the husband (R-2) filed petition in Delhi High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the FIR No. 34 of 1993 on the ground that the allegation made in the complaint were false and mala fide and no part of the cause of action for inves­tigation or trial of an offence arose within Delhi. On 12th October, 1993, after hearing the Counsel for the parties, the High Court held “since the return of stridhan and accounting thereof is being sought in Delhi, the Courts at Delhi will have the jurisdiction to try the case.” Hence, the petition was dismissed. That order was challenged before this Court. By Order dated 4th April, 1995, the order passed by the High Court was set aside and matter was remitted for fresh consid­eration on the points raised by the respondent in the petition. This Court observed :

“The High Court dealt with only the territorial jurisdictional ques­tion and did not go into the merits of the matter. Ex-facie, it ap­pears there a clear prayer of the appellant in his petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is to the effect seeking proceedings to be quashed. The claim apparently is based on the aforesaid memorandum recorded at the Police Station, Patiala. In the face of it, it is claimed that criminal proceedings could not be initiated at Delhi after settling the matter out of Court. As said before, there is no discussion on the merit of the matter in the order of the High Court.”

5. After remand, the High Court heard learned counsel for the parties and quashed the F.I.R. on the ground that Investigating Officer at Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction. The Court further clarified that the alleged compromise arrived at between the parties on 19.1.1992 cannot be a ground for quashing the F.I.R. because it would depend upon the evidence which may be led by the parties with regard to the articles returned by the in-laws. That order is chal­lenged before us in this appeal by special leave.

6. At the time of hearing of this appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that after rightly holding that the alleged set­tlement of 19.1.1992 cannot be a ground for quashing the F.I.R., the High Court materially erred in holding that the alleged cause of action for lodging the F.I.R. had not arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi Police Station. He further pointed out that the matter was remanded by this Court for deciding the effect of the alleged settlement and the findings given by the High Court on the question of territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter by Delhi Police was not disturb































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