IMPORTANT POINT
Where acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 3(f)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act beneficiaries have right to be heard before withdrawal of acquisition under Section 48(1) for Section 48(1) does not exclude principles of natural justice.

Headnote:(i) Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 48(1) read with Section 3(f)(vi)- Withdrawal of acquisition-Acquisition for house purpose-Beneficiaries of acquisition has a right to be heard before notification under Section 48(1)-Section 48(1) does not exclude principles of natural justice- Decision to withdraw acquisition under Section 48(1) is justiciable.
       The requirements of natural justice will be read into statutory provisions unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication. (Para 26)
       Section 48(1) does not in terms exclude the principles of natural justice. However, the section has been construed to exclude the owner s right to be heard before the acquisition is withdrawn. This is because the owners grievances are redressable under Section 48(2). "No irreparable prejudice is caused to the owner of the land and, if at all the owner has suffered any damage in consequence of the acquisition proceedings or incurred costs in relation thereto, he will be paid compensation thereof under Section 48(2) of the Act." But as far as the beneficiary of the acquisition is concerned there is no similar statutory provision. In contrast with the owners position the beneficiary of the acquisition may by withdrawal from the acquisition suffer substantial loss without redress particularly when it may have deposited compensation money towards the cost of the acquisition and the steps for acquisition under the Act have substantially been proceeded with. An opportunity of being heard may allow the beneficiary not only to counter the basis for withdrawal, but also, if the circumstances permitted, to cure any defect or shortcoming and fill any lacuna. No reason has been put forward by the respondents to exclude the application of the principle of natural justice to Section 48(1) of the Act. (Para 10)
       As in the case of the Company, under Section 3(f)(vi) the prior approval to the acquisition is required if an acquisition is made for the purpose of providing land for carrying out, inter-alia, any housing scheme sponsored by a Society registered under the Society Registration Act, 1860. This approval must be made after adequate enquiry. Again the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 is followed by filing and hearing of objections under Section 5-A by the Collector. With the publication of declaration under Section 6, the Collector is to take steps for holding an inquiry under Section 9 after giving notice to all the persons interested. After completing the inquiry under Section 11, the Collector is required to pass an Award with the approval of the State government. All the steps had been taken in the instant case, A distinction may perhaps be drawn with beneficiaries who do not bear the cost of acquisition as the appellant has done in this case. But in the circumstances of this case, the State Government could not have withdrawn from the acquisition without hearing the appellant. This finding is sufficient to decide the appeal in favour of the appellant. In any event the decision to withdraw the acquisition under Section 48(1) is justiciable. (Paras 32 to 34)
       (ii) Land Acquisition Act, 1894- Section 48(1) read with 3(f)(vi)-Withdrawal of acquisition-Reason that Society not registered under State Societies Registration Act-Unjustified-Reason factually wrong -Society complied with all requirements-Withdrawal notification under Section 48(1) quashed.
       In order that an acquisition may be for a public purpose within the meaning of sub-section 3(f)(vi) as far as the case before us is concerned, the acquisition (1) should have been done with the prior approval of the appropriate Government; (2) must have provided for land for any housing scheme and (3) the housing scheme should have been sponsored by a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or any other corresponding law in the State. Of these three requirements, according to the Law Department, the third requirement was lacking. (Para 38)
       The opinion of the Law Department and consequently the basis of the impugned order are unacceptable for several reasons. Admittedly the appellant is registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act . What appears to be the contention of the respondents is that the appellant could not have been registered under the State Act. It is nobody s case that the registration of the appellant has in fact been withdrawn or cancelled under the Karnataka Act. Section 3 of the Karnataka Act specifies the Societies to which the Karnataka Act applies. The Societies must be formed for any one or more of the seven objects mentioned. The last two objects mentioned in the Karnataka Act are in fact included in the Memorandum of Association of the appellant as being two of the aims and objects of the appellant. The opinion of the Law Department that none of the objects of the Appellant were within the objects specified in Section 3 was factually incorrect. It has not been shown that if some of the objects with which a Society is established are invalid and others are valid, the registration of the Society is ipso facto vitiated. On the contrary, it appears from the records that on petitions being filed for cancellation of the appellant s registration, by letter dated 23rd March 1991, the District Registrar did not cancel the registration but said, "Therefore, it is hereby endorsed that the objects which are in accordance with Section 3 of the said Act are valid and remained (sic) not valid." Thus, it cannot be asserted with any certainty that the appellant could not have been and cannot continue to be registered under the Karnataka Act. It is to be noted that under Section 8(2) of the Karnataka Act, a society may be registered only after the Registrar is satisfied that all the requirements of the Act and the rules made thereunder have been complied with. One cannot assume, that the appellant s case did not come within Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act. (Paras 39 & 40)
       Furthermore, this very objection had been considered at every level and rejected on 14th November 1991 after which the Notification under Section 6 was issued and published declaring that the land was required for a public purpose. Once this was done, under sub-section (3) of Section 6, the said declaration was "conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose.....". The stage for questioning the public purpose aspect of the acquisition is over and cannot be reopened by the State nor can the respondents/owners raise. (Para 42)
       The acquisition in favour of the appellant was properly initiated by publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) and by the declaration issued under Section 6. The withdrawal of the acquisition under Section 48(1) was vitiated not only because the appellant was not heard but also because the reason for withdrawal was wrong. The High Court erred in dismissing the appellant s writ petition. The decision of the High Court is accordingly set aside. The impugned Notification under Section 48(1) is quashed and the appeal is allowed with costs. (Para 63)
       (iii) Land Acquisition Act, 1894- Section 48(1) read with Section 3(f)(vi)-Withdrawal of acquisition-Notification on ground society was not registered under Societies Registration Act-Before Court Government trying to justify notification with another reason-Not permissible. (Para 43)
       (iv) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -Section 3(f)(vi)-Approval of Government for acquisition-Material collected before earlier notification under Section 4(1) which lapsed could be relied upon-Approval granted on basis of such material is valid approval.
       No form of the prior approval required under Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act has been specified in the Act itself. What the section in terms requires is the prior approval to the acquisition for the purpose specified. This was expressly given. That the letter dated 15.3.91 was issued by the Government is not in dispute. The lack of compliance with Article 166 did not render it a nullity. The approval in this case was a culmination of a lengthy exercise which started in 1983 with two prior abortive attempts to complete the acquisition. This is evident from the language of the letter dated 15.3.1991 itself. The genuineness of the need of the appellant has not been doubted. But, the respondents contend, the materials on which the appellant sought to rely to show that the prior approval in 1991 was granted after being satisfied about the housing scheme, were submitted prior to the earlier notifications under Section 4(1). According to the respondents, with the dropping of the earlier notifications, the entire proceedings on the basis of which they were issued became non est. After the publication of the first notification under Section 4(1) on 6th August 1987 the respondents-owners had objected. The objections included a submission that the Society is not a registered Society. The second objection was that the acquisition was not for a public purpose. In dealing with these objections by letter dated 12th/19th November, 1987 written by the Assistant Commissioner, Tumkur to the Revenue Commissioner it was affirmed that the appellant was registered and "the purpose of acquisition is housing. As such the proposed acquisition falls under Section 3(e)(vi). After the first notification under Section 4(1) was issued by letter dated 16th April, 1988 sent by the Under Secretary to the Deputy Commissioner. It was pursuant to this directive that enquiries were held and the District and State Level committees enquired into and verified the appellant s case before recommending it. The material was relevant not only to the question of public purpose under Section 4 but could also form the basis of an approval under Section 3(f)(vi). It is not disputed that the material was considered when the second and the third notifications under Section 4(1) were issued and both these Notifications clearly state that the acquisition was being made for a public purpose and not under Part VII of the Act. Therefore, even if the acquisition was originally commenced under Part-VII it was continued under Part II. The earlier notifications were not cancelled nor is there any question of any agreement under Section 41 being superseded by another. No further steps could be taken on the earlier notifications only because of administrative delay which crossed the period of limitation provided under Section 6(1)(A). While the proceedings under Section 4(1) may come to an end as a matter of law, it does not mean that the material on the basis of which the earlier Notification was issued ceased to exist as a matter of fact. Section 4(1) read with Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act indicates that there are two separate functions to be performed by the State Government. Under Section 4(1) it must prima facie come to the conclusion that the land proposed to be acquired is required for a public purpose and under Section 3(f)(vi), such tentative conclusion must be coupled with specific approval to acquire the land for the purposes specified for the benefit of the registered society or co-operative society, as the case may be. The Act does not specify the material on which either the tentative conclusion to Section 4(1) or approval under Section 3(f)(vi) are to be based. The view of the Government that land is needed either for public purpose or for a company may be based either on independent enquiry or from reports and information received by the government or even from an application by the company concerned. The same sources may provide information for granting prior approval under Section 3(f)(vi). There is no prohibition on the State Government acting on the basis of material already on record provided the material is sufficient, relevant and genuine. The material in this case although collected prior to the issuance of the second Notification was all these and according to the letter of approval, the matter was "minutely examined" by the State Government in consultation with the Law Department before granting the approval for the third and final notification in 1991. (Paras 47, 49, 50, 58, 59 & 60)

JUDGMENT

Rama Pal, J.-The question to be decided in this appeal relates to the rights of the beneficiary of an acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) to resist withdrawal of acquisition proceedings.

2. In the course of the arguments before us, we were of the view that the original records pertaining to this case should be produced. This was directed on 14th September 2000. The entire records have admittedly not been produced by the State Government. We have been informed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State that one of the files pertaining to the case has been destroyed on 3rd February, 2000.

3. On the basis of the records we have found that the appellant is a Society registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1961. It has 360 members all of whom are State Government Employees belonging to the Schedule Castes of Adidravida and Adikaranataka. It wanted to provide house sites for its members all of whom are houseless. In 1983, the appellant approached the Government to acquire 15 acres of land at Maralur village. The land belonged to respondents Nos. 5 to 7 herein.

4. By a letter dated 10.1.1983 the Planning Authority wrote to the Assistant Commissioner, Tumkur stating that a resolution had been passed to issue "no objection certificate for suitability of the land for house sites in favour of the appellant. It further said that the land was earmarked partly for residential and partly for open place in the draft lay out plan of Tumkur.

5. On 16.7.1984 a letter was written by the Assistant Commissioner to the appellant in which the appellant had been asked to furnish the following particulars:

"1. The lists of members of the Association who are siteless and houseless.

2. The financial soundness of the Association by way of the shares collected. The amount deposited in the Bank etc.;

3. The audit report for the previous three years;

4. Whether the area proposed for acquisition is treated as residential in the plan i.e. outline development plan, or comprehensive development plan, prepared by the Town Planning Department or not;

5. Whether the layout plan proposed by the association fits in the comprehensive plan of the city area;

6. Whether the proposed area is in excess/less as compared to the demand based on the number of eligible members."

On 17.8.1984 the particulars as required by the Assistant Commissioner were furnished including a copy of the lay out plan.

6. According to the appellant, the State Government required the appellant to make a deposit towards the cost of acquisition. The appellant deposited the required amount in 1984. According to the appellant, the State Government granted prior approval to the acquisition by letter dated 7th September, 1986. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 6th August 1987.

7. On 9th July 1987, the appellant was called upon to deposit a further sum towards the cost of acquisition by the Land Acquisition Officer. This amount was also deposited.

8. The records were then forwarded by the Assistant Commissioner, Tumkur under cover of a letter dated 19.11.1987 to the Revenue Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Revenue Department. These were returned with the direction that the recommendation of the District Level Committee should be submitted.

9. According to the appellant, on 13th May 1988 it wrote to the Assistant Commissioner, Tumkur Sub-Division giving particulars of the housing scheme and again enclosing a proposed lay out plan.

10. A letter dated 30.5.1988 was written by the appellant to the Divisional Commissioner, Tumkur requesting for expedition in which it was stated "the Association has already formed 361 sites as per the draft plan measuring East to West and North to South 30ft. x 40ft. respectively apart from road and park in 15 acres of land acquired at SY No. 49 as per the

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2000 Supreme(SC) 2008

IMPORTANT POINTWhere acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 3(f)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act beneficiaries have right to be heard before withdrawal of acquisition under Section 48(1) for Section 48(1) does not exclude principles of natural justice.

Cases Referred (10)

IMPORTANT POINT
Where acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 3(f)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act beneficiaries have right to be heard before withdrawal of acquisition under Section 48(1) for Section 48(1) does not exclude principles of natural justice.