2000 Supreme(SC) 2037

2000(8) Supreme 536
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Andhra Pradesh High Court)
Dr. A.S. Anand, CJI., R.C. Lahoti and K.G. Balakrishnan, JJ.
T. Sudhakar Prasad etc. -Appellants
versus
Government of A.P. & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 5089-5090 of 1998
With
C.A. Nos. 5091-5092/1998 and C.A. Nos. 768-769/2000
Decided on 13-12-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : K.N. Shukla, Sr. Advocate, L. Nageshwara Rao, J.R. Manohar Rao, Roy Abraham, G.R.K. Prasad, Azim Laskar, R. Santhanakrishnan, S.U.K. Sagar, D. Mahesh Babu, Ms. Madhurima Tatia, Hemant Sharma, B.K. Prasad, D.S. Mehra, Avatar Singh Rawat, (K. Ram Kumar and C.S. Srinivasa Rao) Advocates (NP), Anil Kumar Tandale, Ms. T. Anamika, V. Sridhar Reddy, Advocates.

VERY IMPORTANT POINTS
1. The jurisdiction contemplated by Articles 129 and 215 is inalienable. It cannot be taken away or whittled down by any legislative enactment subordinate to the Constitution. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are in addition to and not in derogation of Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution. The provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be used for limiting or regulating the exercise of jurisdiction contemplated by the said two Articles.
2. Administrative Tribunals set up under the Provisions of Administrative Tribunals Act do have power to punish for their contempt. Any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt is appealable under Section 19 of the Act to the Supreme Court only.

Headnote:(i) Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985-Section 17-Constitution of India-Articles 323A and 323B r/w Articles 129 and 215-Power of Administrative Tribunals to punish for Contempt of Court-Has not been rendered unconstitutional or otise by decision in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, 1997(3) Supreme 147-Administrative Tribunals are competent to punish for their contempt-Jurisdiction is same as vesting in High Courts under Article 215 of Constitution read with provisions of Contempt of Courts Act-While holding proceedings u/s 17 Tribunal remain a Tribunal and so would be amenable to jurisdiction of High Court under Articles 226/227-Order or decision of Tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to Supreme Court.

       The Constitution Bench has not declared the provisions of Article 323-A (2)(b) or Article 323-B(3)(d) or Section 17 of the Act ultra vires the Constitution. The High Court has, in its judgment under appeal, noted with emphasis the Tribunal having been compared to like courts of first instance and then proceeded to hold that the status of Administrative Tribunals having been held to be equivalent to court or tribunals subordinate to High Court the jurisdiction to hear their own contempt was lost by the Administrative Tribunals and the only course available to them was either to make a reference to High Court or to file a complaint under Section 193, 219 and 228 of IPC as provided by Section 30 of the Act. The High Court has proceeded on the reasoning that the Tribunal having been held to be subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and its decisions having been subjected to judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution the right to file an appeal to the Supreme Court against an order passed by the Tribunal punishing for contempt under Section 17 of the Act was defeated and on these twin grounds Section 17 of the Act became unworkable and unconstitutional. We do not find any basis for such conclusion or inference being drawn from the judgments of this Court in the cases of Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 : 1998(4) Supreme 251 or L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997(3) Supreme 147 or any other decision of this Court. The Constitution Bench has in so many words said that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 could not be taken away by conferring the same on any court or Tribunal and jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the High Court now legislatively conferred on Tribunals to the exclusion of High Court on specified matters, did not amount to assigning tribunals a status of substitute for the High Court but such jurisdiction was capable of being conferred additionally or supplementally on any Court or Tribunal which is not a concept strange to the scheme of the Constitution more so in view of Articles 323-A and 323-B. Clause (2)(b) of Article 323-A specifically empowers the Parliament to enact a law specifying the jurisdiction and powers, including the power to punish for contempt, being conferred on administrative tribunals constituted under Article 323-A. Section 17 of the Act derives its legislative sanctity therefrom. The power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself under Article 215 of the Constitution remains intact but the jurisdiction power and authority to hear and decide the matters covered by sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act having been conferred on the Administrative tribunals the jurisdiction of the High Court to that extent has been taken away and hence the same jurisdiction which vested in the High Court to punish for contempt of itself in the matters now falling within the jurisdiction of tribunals if those matters would have continued to be heard by the High Court has now been conferred on the administrative tribunals under Section 17 of the Act. The jurisdiction is the same as vesting in the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The need for enacting Section 17 arose, firstly, to avoid doubts, and secondly, because the Tribunals are not "courts of record". While holding the proceedings under Section 17 of the Act the tribunal remains a tribunal and so would be amenable to jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution subject to the well-established rules of self-restraint governing the discretion of the High Court to interfere with the pending proceedings and upset the interim or interlocutory orders of the tribunals. However any order or decision of tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against in view of the specific provision contained in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Section 17 of Administrative Tribunals Act is a piece of legislation by reference. The provisions of Contempt of Courts Act are not as if lifted and incorporated in the text of Administrative Tribunals Act (as is in the case of legislation by incorporation); they remain there where they are yet while reading the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act in the context of Tribunals, the same will be so read as to read the word Tribunal in place of the word High Court wherever it occurs, subject to the modifications set out in Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for appeals. In its text also by virtue of Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the word High Court shall be read as Tribunal . Here, by way of abundant caution, we make it clear that the concept of intra-tribunal appeals i.e. appeal from an order or decision of a member of a Tribunal sitting singly to a bench of not less than two members of the Tribunal is alien to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The question of any order made under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a member of the Tribunal sitting singly, if the rules of business framed by the Tribunal or the appropriate government permit such hearing, being subjected to an appeal before a Bench of two or more members of Tribunal therefore does not arise. Any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt is appealable under Section 19 of the Act to the Supreme Court only. The Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar has nowhere said that orders of tribunal holding the contemnor guilty and punishing for contempt shall also be subject to judicial scrutiny of High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution in spite of remedy of statutory appeal provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act being available. The distinction between orders passed by Administrative Tribunal on matters covered by Section 14(1) of Administrative Tribunals Act and orders punishing for contempt under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 17 of Administrative Tribunals Act, is this : as against the former there is no remedy of appeal statutorily provided, but as against the later statutory remedy of appeal is provided by Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act itself. (Para 15)

       Jurisdiction should not be confused with status and subordination. The Parliament was motivated to create new adjudicatory fora to provide new, cheap and fast-track adjudicatory systems and permitting them to function by tearing of the conventional shackles of strict rule of pleadings, strict rule of evidence, tardy trials, three/four-tier appeals, endless revisions and reviews - creating hurdles in fast flow of stream of justice. The administrative tribunals as established under Article 323-A and the Administrative Tribunal Act 1985 are an alternative institutional mechanism or authority, designed to be not less effective than the High Court, consistently with the amended constitutional scheme but at the same time not to negate judicial review jurisdiction of constitutional courts. Transfer of jurisdiction in specified matters from the High Court to the administrative tribunal equates the tribunal with the High Court in so far as the exercise of judicial authority over the specified matters is concerned. That, however, does not assign the administrative tribunals a status equivalent to that of the High Court nor does that mean that for the purpose of judicial review or judicial superintendence they cannot be subordinate to High Court. It has to be remembered that what has been conferred on the administrative tribunal is not only jurisdiction of the High Court but also of the subordinate courts as to specified matters. High Courts are creatures of Constitution and their judges hold constitutional office having been appointed under the Constitution. The Tribunals are creatures of statute and their members are statutorily appointed and hold statutory office. There is no anathema in the tribunal exercising jurisdiction of High Court and in that sense being supplemental or additional to the High Court but at the same time not enjoying status equivalent to High Court and also being subject to judicial review and judicial superintendence of the High Court. (Para 17)

       Section 30 is merely declaratory of the proceedings before a tribunal being judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Penal Code. By no stretch of reasoning, Section 30 could have been held as impinging upon the power conferred on the tribunal by Section 17 of the Act and to hold further that in case of contempt of its lawful authority the only remedy available to tribunal was to have recourse to Section 30 to the exclusion of power to punish for contempt conferred by Section 17. (Para 19)

       Contempt jurisdiction is exercised for the purpose of upholding the majesty of law and dignity of judicial system as also of the courts and tribunals entrusted with the task of administering delivery of justice. Power of contempt has often been invoked, as a step in that direction, for enforcing compliance of orders of courts and punishing for lapses in the matter of compliance. The majesty of judicial institution is to be ensured so that it may not be lowered and the functional utility of the constitutional edifice is preserved from being rendered ineffective. The proceedings for contempt of court cannot be used merely for executing the decree of the court. However, with a view to preserving the flow of the stream of justice in its unsullied form and in unstinted purity willful defiance with the mandate of the court is treated to be contemptuous. Availability of jurisdiction to punish for contempt provides efficacy to functioning of the judicial forum and enables the enforcement of the orders on account of its deterrent affect on avoidance. Viewed from this angle the validity of Section 17 of the Act is protected not only by sub-clause (b) of Clause (2) of Article 323-A but also by sub-clause (g) thereof. (Para 20)

       (ii) Constitution of India-Articles 129 and 215-Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Contempt of Courts-Power of High Courts and Supreme Court-Jurisdiction contemplated under Articles 129 and 215 is inalienable-Cannot be taken away or whit tled down by any legislative enactment subordinate to Constitution-Provisions of Contempt of Court are in addition to and not in derogation of Articles 129 and 215.

       Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India declare Supreme Court and every High Court to be a Court of Record having all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. These articles do not confer any new jurisdiction or status on the Supreme Court and the High Courts. They merely recognise a pre-existing situation that the Supreme Court and the High Court are courts of record and by virtue of being courts of record have inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt of themselves. Such inherent power to punish for contempt is summary. It is not governed or limited by any rules of procedure excepting the principles of natural justice. The jurisdiction contemplated by Articles 129 and 215 is inalienable. It cannot be taken away or whittled down by any legislative enactment subordinate to the Constitution. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are in addition to and not in derogation of Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution. The provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be used for limiting or regulating the exercise of jurisdiction contemplated by the said two Articles. (Para 9)