IMPORTANT POINT
High Court is not justified in quashing the proceeding initiated by the appellant against the respondent on the ground that as the Civil suit in pending in the High Court, the magistrate is not justified to proceed with the criminal case.

Headnote:Indian Penal Code, 1860-Sections 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120B -Private complaint for offences under for forgiving signature of complainant on a fake dissolution deed used in a civil suit pending in High Court-Cr.P.C. 1973-Section 200-Magistrate after examining Appellant and her witnesses issuing process-Challenged by accused u/s. 482 before High Court-High Court quashing on ground that a civil action is pending in which genuineness of the document can be seen-Whether corrects? (No)-Appeal allowed-Case law discussed.
       Held : We have already noticed that the nature and scope of civil and criminal proceedings and the standard of proof required in both matters is different and distinct. Whereas in civi1 proceedings the matter can be decided on the basis of probabilities, the criminal case has to be decided by adopting the standard of proof of "beyond reasonable doubt". A Constitution Bench of this Court, dealing with the similar sircumstances, in M.S. Sheriff & Anr. v. State of Madras & Ors. [AIR 1954 SC 397] held that where civil and criminal cases are pending, precedence shall be given to criminal proceedings. Detailing the reasons for the conclusions, the court held:
       "As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.
       Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests depend that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the gui1ty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.
       This however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it expedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under S. 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished."
       In the present case we have noticed that before issuance of the process, the Trial Magistrate had recorded the statement of the witnesses for the complainant, perused the record including the opinion of the expert and his deposition and prima facie found that the respondents were guilty for the offences for which the process was issued against them. The High Court rightly did not refer to any of those circumstances but quashed the proceedings only on the ground:
       "Consideration is and should be whether any criminal proceeding instituted before a court subordinate to this court should be allowed to continue when the very foundation of the criminsl case, namely, forgery of document is under scrutiny by this court in a civil proceeding instituted by same person i.e., the complainant in the criminal case. In my considered view it would not be proper to allow the criminal proceeding to continue when the validity of the document (deed of dissolution is being tested in a civil proceeding before this court. Judicial propriety demands that the course adopted by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Manju Gupta (supra) and Sardool Singh (supra) should be followed. If such course of action is adored by this court, that would be in consonance with the expression used in Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - "or otherwise to secure the ends of justice". In both the cases referred to above civil suits were pending, where the validity and genuineness of a document was challenged. It was held by the Hon ble Supreme Court that when the question regarding validity of a document is subjudice in the civil courts, criminal prosecution, on the allegation of the document being forged, cannot be instituted."
       In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings. In the result the appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and restoring the order of the Magistrate with direction to proceed with the trial of the case in accordance with the provisions of law and decide the same on merits. (Para 15 to 18)

JUDGMENT

Sethi, J.-Leave granted.

2. Aggrieved by the impugned order of the High Court quashing her complaint and the order of the Magistrate issuing the process against the respondents for the offences under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant has approached this Court by way of this appeal for setting aside the order of the High Court with direction to the Magistrate for proceeding with the complaint in accordance with law. It is submitted that the High Court of Calcutta has passed the impugned order in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure completely ignoring the mandate of law as settled by various pronouncements of this Court and other High Courts in the country.

3. The complainant claims to be a partner of M/s. Chandmal Gangabishan, a firm registered under the Partnership Act and carrying on business of Bhujia and other allied products with the trade mark HALDIRAM BHUJIAWALA. According to the averments made in the complaint, the partnership business was initially commenced in the year 1956 with four partners, namely, Ganga Bishan Agarwal, Moolchand Agarwal, Rameshwarlal Agarawal and Satidas Agarwal. Rameshwar Aggarwal retired from the firm in the year 1958. The firm was reconstituted by admitting Shri Shivkishan Aggarwal as partner in place of the retiring partner. They started using the brand name HALDIRAM BHUJIAWALA in the year 1965. The appellant was admitted as a partner of the said firm on 31st October, 1969. An application for registration of trademark of HALDIRAM BHUJIAWALA and Logo HRB was filed with the appropriate authority by all the partners on 29th December, 1972. The said application was advertised inviting objections. Opposition proceedings were commenced at the instance of one Madanlal on 12th January, 1976 which was rejected on 16.4.1980 and the trademark was registered on 27th January, 1981 in the name of the firm, of which the appellant was a partner. The appellant alleged that when in the first week of June, 1999 she went to Delhi to attend her ailing son Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, found him to be suffering from serious mental depression on account of serious nervous breakdown. After inquiries and persuasions her son told the appellant in July, 1999 that that he had suffered mental shock upon closure of his opened shop in the year 1991 at Delhi by reason of the order of injunction passed by the court of law. He disclosed that the said injunction had been granted against him on the ground that the partnership of which the appellant was also a partner stood dissolved on 16.11.1974. She informed her son of not having signed any deed of dissolution of the partnership. When Ashok Kumar Aggarwal handed over to the appellant a zerox copy of the deed of dissolution, she was shocked to know that her signatures had been forged. Upon scrutiny it appeared that the signatures, purporting to be of Gangabishan Aggarwal and Moolchand Aggarwal were also not genuine and had been forged besides her signatures. She alleged that Accused Nos.1 to 4 have brought into existence the setf-forged deed of dissolution for their personal gains and to the detriment of the partners of the firm of M/s. Chandmal Gangabishan. She referred to number of circumstances in her complaint to show that the forgery had been committed by the respondent-accused. In para 22 of the complaint, the appellant catalogued a number of instances allegedly showing the forgery by the respondents.

4 . The Trial Magistrate received the complaint on 21st January, 2000 and fixed the next date on 7th February, 2000 for examination of the complainant and her witnesses in terms of Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On request of the appellant, the case was adjourned to 10th March, 2000 when she appeared before the Magistrate along with her three witnesses out of whom one was hand-writing expert. After recording their statements, the case was adjourned an

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2001 Supreme(SC) 1456

IMPORTANT POINT High Court is not justified in quashing the proceeding initiated by the appellant against the respondent on the ground that as the Civil suit in pending in the High Court, the magistrate is not justified to proceed with the criminal case.

Cases Referred (10)

IMPORTANT POINT
High Court is not justified in quashing the proceeding initiated by the appellant against the respondent on the ground that as the Civil suit in pending in the High Court, the magistrate is not justified to proceed with the criminal case.