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2002(1) Supreme 202
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Punjab & Haryana High Court)
R.C. Lahoti and Brijesh Kumar, JJ.
Om Prakash Gupta -Appellant
versus
Ranbir B. Goyal -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 5460 of 1999
Decided on 18-1-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Dinesh Kumar Garg, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Neeraj Kumar Jain, Aditya Kumar Chaudhary, Bharat Singh, Advocate for U.S. Prasad, Advocate/Advocates.
Held : A tenant inducted into possession of the tenancy premises is ordinarily bound to restore possession over the tenancy premises to the landlord on the tenancy coming to an end. Such obligation comes to an end either by actually fulfilling the obligation or by proving that the landlords title stands extinguished by the landlord s eviction by title paramount. The burden of proving eviction by title paramount lies on the party who sets up such defence. (Para 8)
Held further : For two reasons we do not think that the defendant-appellant is entitled to any relief and for setting aside of the decree for eviction. Firstly, there is neither any order of resumption and forfeiture within the meaning of Section 17 of the Act passed by HUDA against the respondent nor is there an allotment by HUDA directly in favour of the appellant. In view of the order of the Estate Officer having been set aside by the Appellate Authority under the Act the allotment made by HUDA in favour of the respondent continues to subsist. His title, under which he had inducted the appellant is possession of the suit premises, has not come to an end. The triple test, laid down by this court in Vashu Deo s case is not satisfied. Secondly, the appellant is placing reliance on an event happening after the institution of suit, i.e. a subsequent event and a case for taking notice of such subsequent event by court so as to impair the judgment under appeal is not made out. (Para 10)
For the foregoing reasons the appeal is held liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly with costs throughout. The appellant is allowed three months time to deliver vacant and peaceful possession to the plaintiff respondent subject to his filing usual undertaking and clearing all the arrears under the decree within 3 weeks. (Para 14)
The legal document discusses a dispute involving a tenant and landlord regarding eviction and possession of premises. The core issue revolves around whether the tenant is entitled to relief based on a subsequent event where the landlord's title was purportedly extinguished or superseded by a paramount title held by a public authority. The court emphasizes that, generally, a tenant's obligation to restore possession ends either when they fulfill their obligations or when their landlord's title is extinguished through lawful eviction by a paramount title holder.
However, the burden of proving such eviction by paramount title rests on the party asserting it. The court clarifies that mere subsequent events, such as proceedings initiated by a third party or a change in law, do not automatically entitle the tenant to relief unless these events are legally final and directly impact the landlord’s title and the tenant’s obligation. The court also notes that the rights of parties are typically fixed as of the date of the suit's initiation, but it retains the discretion to consider subsequent events if they are brought promptly and have a fundamental impact on the case, provided procedural fairness is maintained.
In this particular case, the court finds that there is no final legal resolution or order that conclusively extinguishes the landlord's title. The proceedings initiated by the public authority are not yet final or legally binding in a manner that would justify setting aside the eviction decree. Consequently, the court dismisses the appeal, affirming the eviction and possession order, and grants the tenant a limited period to vacate the premises, contingent upon the tenant fulfilling certain procedural undertakings and clearing arrears.
JUDGMENT
R.C. Lahoti, J.-The suit premises are described as booth no. 13. Sector 8, Panchkula. These premises were let out by the plaintiff-respondent to the defendant-appellant sometime in August, 1989 on a monthly rent of Rs.2650/-, excluding electricity charges. Since then the defendant- appellant has been running therein a shop of provision goods and general stores. He fell into arrears of rent and electricity charges with effect from 1st April, 1990. The plaintiff-respondent served on him a notice demanding payment of arrears and terminating his tenancy. On failure to comply with the notice a suit for eviction was filed in the Court of Civil Judge on 12.9.1990. The defendant-appellant contested the suit mainly on the ground of notice of ejectment being defective. The Trial Court, by its judgment dated 11th June, 1998, answered all the issues in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and directed the suit for eviction and recovery of arrears to be decreed. First and second appeals preferred by the defendant-appellant have been dismissed. This is an appeal filed by special leave.
2. It has been common case at the Bar that the suit premises are situated in the State of Haryana where the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable and the rights and obligations of the parties are to be worked out and governed under common law of the land. At the time of hearing it was conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that no fault can be found with the decree of the Trial Court as confirmed by the First Appellate Court and the High Court. However, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there has been a subsequent event having a material bearing on the judgment under appeal and the right of the respondent to decree. Such subsequent event is now the core of controversy, the relevant facts relating to which, are stated in the succeeding paragraphs.
3. It appears that the suit premises have been constructed by Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA, for short), governed by the provisions of The Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 (the Act, for short). The premises have been allotted by HUDA to the plaintiff-respondent and the latter is required to pay certain instalments to HUDA and a failure in payment of instalments renders the allotment liable to cancellation with recovery of arrears, imposition of penalty and resumption of possession under Section 17 of the Act. The High Court rendered its judgment in Second Appeal on 15.12.1998. The only contention dealt with by the High Court, in view of the singular submission made before it, was to allow the appellant three months time for vacating the premises subject to an undertaking for vacating the premises on expiry of three months. SLP was filed on 8.3.1999. On 30.3.1999 this Court directed a notice on SLP to be issued to the respondent and at the same time passed an interim order staying the operation of the decree appealed against. On 15.3.1999, the date on which the time appointed by the High Court for vacating the premises was coming to an end, the tenant-appellant moved an application before the High Court seeking one month s extension of time for compliance with the direction of the High Court on two grounds; firstly, that though the SLP was filed in this Court it was yet to be taken up for hearing; and secondly, HUDA had initiated proceedings for resumption of the suit premises against the plaintiff-respondent. It appears that the High Court extended the time for vacating the premises till 20.4.1999. In the meantime, as already stated, this Court granted interim relief to the appellant although the factum of extension of time granted by the High Court and the grounds therefor were not brought to the notice of this Court. All these facts were brought to the notice of this Court through an affidavit filed (by way of counter-affidavit to the special leave petition) on 11th May, 1999 by the plaintiff-respondent submitting th
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