VERY IMPORTANT POINT
The amended Section 25-O of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not ultra vires the Constitution. The classification is reasonable and it is saved by Article 19(6) of the Constitution.

JUDGMENT

S.N. Variava, J.-In these Appeals and Writ Petitions the question for consideration, by this Bench, is the constitutional validity of Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 25-O, as it now stands, was incorporated by the Amendment Act 46 of 1982. (for sake of convenience the said Section will hereinafter be referred to as the amended Section 25-O). In some of these matters the constitutional validity of Section 6-W of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act is in question. Section 6-W is identical to amended Section 25-O. Even though in this Judgment reference is made only to Section 25-O, what is set out herein will equally apply to Section 6-W. For considering the constitutional validity of these Sections it is not necessary to note the facts in each case. Therefore the facts are not being set out.

2. In the case of Excel Wear Etc. v. Union of India & Ors. [1979(1) SCR 1009] a Constitution Bench struck down Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act (as it then stood). Thereafter the constitutional validity of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act (as it then stood) was considered by a Constitution Bench in the case of Workmen v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. [(1992) 3 SCC 336]. In Meenakshi Mills case this Court, after referring to Excel Wear s case, upheld the constitutional validity of Section 25-N. These Appeals and Writ Petitions have been referred to a Constitution Bench with the following observation:

"The common question that arises for consideration relates to the constitutional validity of Section 25(O) of the Industrial Disputes Act as introduced by Central Act No. 46 of 1982 and Section 25(O) as applicable in the State of MP by virtue of M.P. Act No. 32 of 1983 as well as Section 6(W) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The earlier provision contained in Section 25(O) was struck down by this Court in Excel Wear Etc. vs. Union of India & Ors., 1979(1) SCR 1009. The learned counsel for the employers in support of their submissions assailing the validity of the said provisions have placed reliance on various observations in the judgment in Excel Wear s case. On behalf of the workmen reliance has been placed on the decision of the Constitution Bench in Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. & Ors. vs. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. & Anr., 1992(3) SCC 336. Since the questions raised involve interpretation of the various observations in the judgment in Excel Wear s case as well as in Meenakshi Mills case, we consider it appropriate that these matters are heard by a Constitution Bench. It is, therefore, directed that all these matters be placed before Hon ble the Chief Justice of India for suitable directions.

3. It must be mentioned that even amongst the High Courts there is a conflict of opinion. Some of the High Courts have held that the amended Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act and/or Section 6-W of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act still suffers from the substantial vice pointed out in Excel Wear s case and is therefore unconstitutional. Some other High Court have, relying on Meenakshi Mills case, upheld the validity of amended Section 25-O and/or Section 6-W.

4. At this stage a submission made by Ms. Jaising needs to be set out. Ms. Jaising submitted that in Meenakshi Mills case a Constitution Bench of this Court has extracted the reasons why in Excel Wear s case Section 25-O was struck down. It was submitted that that decision would be binding on this Court. It was submitted that this Court should not itself go into Excel Wear s case to find out the reasons why Section 25-O was struck down. We are unable to accept this submission. As has been held by this Court, in the case of P.A. Shah v. State of Gujarat reported in (1985) Supp. 3 SCR 1025, it is the duty of the Constitution Court to form its own opinion about a given case and to consider the effect of a precedent by reading it over again, instead of relying upon the gloss placed on that precedent by some other decision. In