Back
2002(1) Supreme 594
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Chennai High Court)
R.C. Lahoti and Brijesh Kumar, JJ.
J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. -Appellants
versus
M.R. Murali & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 3429-3432 of 1998
Decided on 8-2-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Govind Das, Sr. Advocate, Sujit Singh, Rajesh Dubey and S.B. Upadhyay, Advocates.
For the Respondents : M.N. Rao, Sr. Advocate, T. Madasamy and T. Raja, Advocates.
For the Intervenors : R. Mohan, Sr. Advocate, and V.G. Pragasam Advocate.
Held : For several reasons, we are of the opinion that a decree on the ground of denial of landlord s title by tenant and such denial being not bona fide could not have been a ground for directing eviction of tenant in the present case. Firstly, the application for eviction filed by the landlord does not plead such a cause of action, setting out material facts and as providing a ground for relief of eviction. The plea taken by the defendant-tenants in their additional counter does not by itself amount to denial of title so as to render them vulnerable to eviction by attracting applicability of Section 10(2)(vii) of the Act. The basic question was whether the landlords themselves treated the plea taken by the tenants in their additional counter as denial of their title and if that be so the landlords should have amended their application for eviction incorporating the averment that the said additional counter amounted to denial of title of the landlords and such denial was not bona fide. Thereupon the tenants would have had an opportunity of explaining the facts and circumstances in which the additional counter, alongwith the pleas raised therein, came to be filed and if that amounted to denial of landlords title then how did they propose to justify such denial as bona fide. Such pleas could have been subject matter of trial and evidence adduced by the parties followed by expression of opinion by the Controller as to whether a ground for eviction was made out or not. Before the Controller none of the parties were alive to the fact that alleged denial of title by tenants could possibly be clicked by the landlords as a ground for eviction. The Appellate Authority for the first time formulated a point at issue touching this ground during the course of its decision and yet held in favour of the tenants holding that such denial was bona fide. If at all the Appellate Authority was inclined to frame an issue then it ought to have been tried on the lines laid down in Order 41 Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court, as already stated, shifted the emphasis and treated the denial of title by tenant as primary ground for eviction and proceeded to decide the same. Thus what was not in issue before the trial Court at all became the core issue on which the High Court has founded its decision. This is not only violative of the established procedure for civil trials but also violative of principles of justice and fair play. The tenants have been certainly prejudiced in their defence and, therefore, availability of that ground for eviction of tenants in the present proceedings cannot be sustained. Secondly, what has been done by the Appellate Authority and the High Court does not also fit in the scheme of the Act in so far this ground is concerned. An application for eviction of tenant has to be filed before the Controller for a direction in that behalf. Eviction may be sought by the landlord on the singular ground of the tenant having denied the title of the landlord or coupled with other grounds. In such an application it is the Controller who will decide whether such denial or claim was bona fide or not. If the finding of the Controller is that the denial or claim by tenant was not bona fide, the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. However, if the Controller does not find the denial or claim to be not bona fide he shall deny the landlord s claim for eviction by making an order rejecting the application. Such finding and rejection of landlord s application would not debar the landlord from approaching the Civil Court for establishing his title. By having regard to second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act, the bar on the jurisdiction of Civil Court stands lifted and the landlord becomes entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court enabling such Civil Court to pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds on which the Controller could have directed eviction under Sections 10, 14 or 16, notwithstanding the opinion formed by the Civil Court whether the denial of title by the tenant had entailed forfeiture of the lease and notwithstanding the finding of the Civil Court that the claim of permanent tenancy was unfounded. This is how any conflict of jurisdiction between Civil Court and Controller can be avoided by construing Section 10(2)(vii) and Section 10(1) second proviso homogenously and as part of one scheme. The legislative intent appears to be that denial of title can be decided by the Controller for the limited purpose of finding out whether a ground of eviction is made out but the questions of title should be left to be determined by the Civil Court. Once a question of title has arisen between a landlord and a tenant and such dispute is bona fide, the doors of Civil Court are let open to the landlord and therein adjudication, on grounds of eviction otherwise within the domain of Controller, is also permitted so as to avoid multiplicity of suits and proceedings. All the disputes between landlord and tenant would be settled in one forum and the need for prosecuting to separate proceedings before two fora would be eliminated. On the pleadings and the material placed before us we cannot hold that the tenants had denied the title of their landlords and whatever they had stated in their additional counter was a denial not bona fide so as to render them liable for a direction to deliver possession to the landlords. In any case the present one is not a fit case where the landlords could have been allowed relief on this ground without making requisite averments by amendment in the plaint. We make it clear that this finding shall, however, be treated as confined to the facts of this case and would not preclude recourse to such remedy as may be available to the landlords under the law and shall also not inhibit a competent court seized with trial of such on issue to arrive at a different finding based on the pleadings and material brought before it.
(ii) Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960-Section 10(2)(1)-Eviction petition on ground of wilful default-Non-payment of rent for one or two months-May be simple non-payment but not wilful default-High Court granting decree-Whether correct? (No)-Certain directions issued. (Para 22)
Held : For the foregoing reasons no case for eviction of the tenants is made out either on the ground of denial of title not bona fide or on the ground of tenants having committed wilful default in payment of rent. Petitions for eviction are liable to be dismissed. (Para 23)
We are satisfied that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and the appeals have to be allowed, followed by certain directions to the tenants, which, in view of the prolonged litigation between the parties, this court must make so as to dispense substantial justice to the parties and protect their interests. (Para 7)
Key Points: - The judgment holds that eviction on the ground of denial of title by the tenant, if not bona fide, cannot be sustained and that such denial must be properly pleaded and tried with reference to bona fides. (!) (!) (!) - It explains that eviction petitions must be filed before the Controller, and that if denial of title is found not bona fide, the landlord may pursue eviction in civil court under second proviso, allowing unified resolution of disputes to avoid multiplicity of suits. (!) (!) - It establishes that wilful default requires a finding of wilful non-payment of rent; simple non-payment for short periods may not constitute wilful default, and petitions based on wilful default can be dismissed if not established. (!) (!) - It emphasizes the need for proper pleadings, trial on issues framed (e.g., denial of title as an issue must be properly pleaded and tried), and that subsequent evidence cannot by itself create a ground for eviction if not appropriately framed in the eviction petition. (!) (!) (!) - It directs that, to resolve rent disputes, interim and final rent determinations and arrears payments must be addressed in line with proceedings for fair rent, with interim deposits required until finality. (!) (!)
JUDGMENT
R.C. Lahoti, J.-The landlord-respondents initiated proceedings for eviction of the tenant-appellants from the suit premises described as Door No. 244 and 264, Walltax Road, Chennai on the ground available under clause (1) of sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter, the Act for short), by applying to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. It was alleged in the application for eviction filed on 6th April, 1989 that the tenants did not pay the rent of premises Door No. 264 for January and February, 1989 at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month and for premises Door No. 244 for the month of February, 1989 at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per month. The tenants, in their written statement, denied their being defaulters and submitted that there was dispute as to the rate at which the rent was payable and also as to the quantum of arrears, though, they were agreeable and always prepared to pay the rent at which it was previously paid but for the exaggerated and inflated demand of the landlords.
2. It appears that the suit premises are owned by the Municipal Corporation of Chennai and are held by the landlords as allottee of the Municipal Corporation. The landlords have further leased out the premises to the tenants (appellants before us). Thus, there are three persons associated with the suit premises-the Municipal Corporation, their allottees (i.e. the respondents), and further lessees inducted by the allottees i.e. the appellants. We are not concerned with any controversy between the Municipal Corporation and its allottees. The Municipal Corporation was never a party to the litigation and has sought for intervention at the hearing before this Court but the intervention is being denied for the reasons which we would be stating at the end of this judgment. We would, therefore, confine ourselves to the controversy arising for decision between the parties before us and for that purpose, in this judgment, the respondents shall be referred to as landlords and the appellants shall be referred to as tenants .
3. In the written statement, the tenants confined themselves to denying their being defaulters and raising dispute as to the rate of rent and quantum of arrears. However, an anxiety for protecting their possession over the suit premises and zeal for giving a rebuff to the landlords, impelled them to file an additional counter in September 1993, in addition to their counter filed by way of written statement in February, 1990. In the additional counter, it was submitted that the tenants had reliably learnt, on making enquiries from the Municipal Corporation of Madras, that long term lease was granted by the Corporation in favour of late M.B. Ramachandra Naidu, who expired in the month of March, 1982. With his death, the lease came to an end. Even the term of lease by Municipal Corporation in favour of the landlords had expired and the Corporation had taken steps to create a lease directly in favour of the actual occupants and the respondents had agreed to pay the rent to the Municipal Corporation w.e.f. 1.4.1982 and onwards. For these reasons, it was submitted that the proceedings for recovery of possession from the tenants were not maintainable. This additional counter, far from defending the tenants, has proved to be a potent troubleshooter for the tenants and the bone of contention in this litigation as will be noticed shortly hereinafter. We may hasten to add to the factual statement that sometime after the month of March 1993, one of the partners of the tenants was delivered a notice by the Municipal Corporation which reads as under:-
NOTICE
Corporation of Chennai
Land Revenue Department.
Ref.: 8/1737/93 Date:
In your letter dated 26.03.93 you have confirmed that you are occupying the premises No. 244, Walltax Road, (4110 sq.ft.) belonging to Corporation of Chennai from 1.4.82.
The lease period has already elapsed. More over you have agreed to pay
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
