VERY IMPORTANT POINT
No specific time limit can be laid for right of speedy trial of criminal offences. The order of the High Court quashing criminal prosecution is not sustained under law.

Headnote:Constitution of India-Art. 21-Right to speedy trial of criminal offences-Official Secrets Act, 1923-Sections 3 and 5 read with Section 120B IPC-Conspiracy to leak out secrets relating to defence of the country-Respondent tried for-Agony of facing prosecution for 12 years-Cr.P.C. 1973-Section 482-Petition under to quash criminal proceedings on ground of inordinate delay in completing criminal trial-State through CBI explained reasons of delay viz. collection and production of numerous documents, about 100 witnesses to be examined spread all over India-Delhi High Court did not accept the same and quashed the proceeding-Appeal against to Supreme Court-Whether High Court was right in quashing the criminal trial of respondent No. 1 on ground of inordinate delay? (No)-Appeal allowed-Case law discussed.
       Held : While considering the question of delay the court has a duty to see whether the prolongation was on account of any delaying tactics adopted by the accused and other relevant aspects which contributed to the delay. Number of witnesses examined, volume of documents likely to be exhibited, nature and complexity of the offence which is under investigation or adjudication are some of the relevant factors. There can be no empirical formula of universal application in such matters. Each case has to be judged in its own background and special features if any. No generalization is possible and should be done. It has also to be borne in mind that the criminal courts exercise available powers such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of the Cr.P.C. to effectuate right to speedy trial. These aspects have not been considered by the High Court while quashing the proceedings. On that score the judgment under challenge is vitiated. Additionally while dealing with the question as to the proper provision applicable to the case, the Court has come to a definite finding about maximum sentence. Normally, these aspects are to be left to be decided by the trial court. In the case at hand we find that the High Court came to the conclusion about applicability of a particular provision. Mr. Ramamoorthy has rightly submitted that the court can, in a given case, where factual aspects and the law applicable are clear, come to the conclusion about the provision applicable to the facts. But for coming to such conclusion the factual position must be clear and no doubt should exist about the applicability of a particular provision to the factual scenario. The complex nature of the offence should be deterrent to the courts while going into the question of applicability of a provision. (Paras 9 & 10)
       Held finally : Accordingly the judgment of the High Court is quashed and the matter is remitted back to the High Court. The High Court shall hear the matter afresh, permit the parties to place materials which according to it will be relevant for the purpose of determination of the dispute before it, and take a fresh decision in accordance with law. As mentioned above, we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. (Paras 12 & 13)

JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.-Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court whereby the proceedings against the respondent No. 1 were quashed, primarily on ground that there was unnecessary delay in conclusion of the trial by court. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in "Common Cause" A registered Society through its Director vs. Union of India and Ors. [(1996) 4 SCC 33] as modified in "Common Cause" A registered Society through its Director vs. Union of India and Ors. [(1996) 6 SCC 775] to hold so. A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice.

3. According to the prosecution, respondent No.1 committed offences under Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act 1923 (in short Secrets Act ) and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short IPC ) read with the aforesaid provisions. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate by his order dated 16.8.1999 took cognizance and issued processes against the accused persons including the respondent No.1 herein. Respondent No.1 approached the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short Cr.P.C. ) for passing an order against the cognizance taken by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The High Court quashed the proceedings, inter alia, on the ground that there has been unnecessary delay in the proceedings. Stand of the prosecution before the High Court was that the case is of very serious nature and the respondent No.1, who at the relevant time, was Adviser in the Department of Electronics, Government of India parted with a copy of a sensitive secret document namely "User Evaluation Trial Report on RATAC-S Battle Field Surveillance Radar (BFSR) Phase-I", which was being evaluated by the Army Authorities with reference to certain specific parameter required by the Army Authorities and the same was dispatched to an expert in Paris, France through courier service, who brought it to the notice of the police. As such the case involved offences which relate to security of the State. A large number of documents were to be exhibited. There was no unusual delay. But the High Court did not accept the same. Placing reliance on a decision of this Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay and Ors. vs. R.S. Nayak and Anr. (1992) 1 SCC 225, it was held that the right of speedy trial has been infringed. It was noted that merely because about 100 witnesses spread all over the India were to be examined, that cannot be a relevant ground justifying the delay. Maximum punishment for the alleged offence is 3 years and the respondent No.1 has suffered custody of about 2 years in addition to agony of facing prosecution for about 12 years.

4. Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned Solicitor General submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. It cannot be said to be a rule of universal application that whenever there is delay, whatever be the justification for the same, the proceedings are to be quashed. Additionally there was no material before the High Court to come to the conclusion that the maximum sentence is 3 years and not 15 years. It was not the case of the respondent No.1 before the High Court that his case would fall under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Secrets Act. In any event that was a matter for trial to be determined on consideration of the materials which are to be placed.

5. Per contra Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted that the right to speedy trial is inbuilt in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the Constitution ) and, therefore, the High Court had committed no error in directing the proceedings to the quashed. According to him, it was specifically pleaded before the High Court as to how the alleged offence was covered by sub-section (3) of Section 5 of Secrets Act.

6. Recently a 7-Judges Bench of this Court in P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka JT 2002(4) SC 92 held as under:

"No person shall be deprived

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2002 Supreme(SC) 850

VERY IMPORTANT POINTNo specific time limit can be laid for right of speedy trial of criminal offences. The order of the High Court quashing criminal prosecution is not sustained under law.

Cases Referred (6)

VERY IMPORTANT POINT
No specific time limit can be laid for right of speedy trial of criminal offences. The order of the High Court quashing criminal prosecution is not sustained under law.