IMPORTANT POINT
The expression detention in jail during trial as mentioned in second part of Section 40(1) of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, should be interpreted as detention in jail during the process of trial and the detention of the President or Vice President in any time shall attract second part of Section 40(1) of the Act.

Headnote:Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963-Section 40(1)-Suspension of President or Vice President of a municipality-Expression detained in prison during trial , meaning-Word trial , interpretation of-It should not be given a restricted meaning-Appellant detained in judicial custody for offences under Sections 307, 143, 147, 148 and 149 Indian Penal Code read with Section 25(c) of Arms Act and under Section 135 Bombay Police Act-Detention took place during process of trial-High Court rightly held that expression detention in jail during trial will include detention in judicial custody during pre-trial as also post trial.
       Held : Majority Opinion [ S. Rajendra Babu and AR. Lakshmanan, JJ.]
       S. Rajendra Babu, J.
       The word trial in Section 40 of the Act cannot be supplanted with a straight jacket meaning so as to cover all situations. No doubt, the word "trial" used in part II of sub-Section 40(1) is capable of two interpretations in the context of the present case. One is the restricted interpretation so as to cover only the period after framing of the charge. This view is what the appellant advances. The second possibility is to assign a liberal meaning so as to cover detention at any stage of the case . (Para 47)
       Since the purpose of the Section 40 is to ensure the proper functioning of the Office of the President or Vice-President of the Municipalities by keeping the public confidence , the concentration is on the expression "detention in prison". For obvious reasons a person who is detained in prison cannot effectively function as a President or Vice-President of a Municipality. So any person detained in prison cannot be allowed to hold the office. This is the purpose of part II in Section 40(1). The words "during trial" is used so as to exclude the situations like preventive detention or detention in police custody. If the words employed in a provision are capable of two meanings or casts doubts as to the actual meaning, then it has to be interpreted in the light of the object of the legislation. Word by word interpretation is not a welcome method of interpretation. Words, vehicles of legislative intentions, take colour from the context in which it is used. Hence the interpretation of the words during trial will have to promote the purpose of Section 40. As already pointed out, object of this Section is to keep shady characters away from local bodies and to pave way to persons with high integrity and good moral conduct to hold public offices. This large interest could only be promoted if the word trial is given a broad meaning. This intention is vividly displayed by choosing the expression "under the provisions of any law for the time being in force" in part II of Section 40(1). Which means the provision is designed to cover any detention in prison under provisions of any law. Only by this interpretation, the textual meaning of during trial matches the contextual spirit of Section 40 that aims to ensure the smooth functioning of the office and to keep confidence of people in the institution. In result, the word trial should not be given a restricted meaning so as to include only proceedings after the accused is actually arraigned before the competent court for framing and facing of charges. Thus, detention in the present case took place during the process of trial, it served as a step in aid for trial. (Paras 48 & 49)
       AR. Lakshmanan, J. [Concurring Opinion]
       The High Court has rightly held that the "detention in jail during trial as mentioned in second part of Section 40(1) of the Act should be interpreted as detention in jail during the process of trial" which period shall include from the date of filing of the FIR till the end of the trial and the detention of the President or Vice President in any time during the period in jail shall attract second part of Section 40(1) of the Act and the authority is competent to take a decision whether such President or Vice President who has been detained in connection with the alleged criminal offence should be suspended or not. The High Court, in my opinion, has not committed any error of law in the interpretation of the word "trial" used in Section 40(1) of the Act and the word trial" has been interpreted by the High Court in common parlance. The word "trial" should be interpreted to achieve the object of the Act. (Para 56)
       I, therefore, agree with the interpretation of Section 40 of the Act given by my learned Brother S. Rajendra Babu. The learned Judge has also pointed out that the meaning of the words should be in perfect tune with the spirit of Section 40 of Act, otherwise, the purpose of Section 40 of the Act will be defeated and the word "trial" used in the expression "detained in prison during trial" cannot be singled out and cannot be accorded with a restricted meaning and that the meaning will have to promote the reason and spirit of Section 40 of the Act. (Para 58)
       S.B. Sinha, J. [Minority Opinion]
       Section 40 of the Act provides for a disqualification to hold an elected office. Had the intention of the legislature been that mere institution of a criminal case against the holder of an electorate office may lead to an order of suspension, it could have stated so in clear terms. The legislature, in fact, has stated so in such terms in respect of an offences specified therein in the first part of Section 40. A strict construction of the second part of Section 40 in the aforementioned situation is, therefore, called for, having regard to the fact that the act of suspension from holding an office would be quasi-criminal in nature. It is trite that a law leading to disqualification to hold an office should be clear and unambiguous like a penal law. In the event a statute is not clear, recourse to strict interpretation must be made for construction thereof. (Paras 28 & 29)
       It is relevant to note that Service Rules also provide for suspension of a holder of a post and therein it is ordinarily mentioned that holder may be placed under suspension if he is detained in custody either during investigation or trial. Thus, whenever the legislature thinks fit to provide for suspension of a holder of a post when he is in custody, the stages of the case is specifically mentioned. While providing for different standards in the matter of issuance of order of suspension, the legislature must have in mind the impact of institution of cases which, in its opinion, would amount to moral turpitude and other offences. So far as offences under the statutes other than specified in the first part of the statute are concerned, the legislature did not evidently intend that an order of suspension be issued automatically without making an investigation in relation thereto. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. (Paras 36, 37 & 38)

JUDGMENT

S.B. Sinha, J.-[Minority Judgment]

Leave granted.

2. A short but an interesting question as regard interpretation of the provisions of Section 40 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity) falls for consideration in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 24.12.2001 passed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 900 of 2001 in Special Civil Application No.4932 of 2001 affirming a judgment and order dated 28.8.2001 of a learned Single Judge of the said High Court in Special Civil Application No. 4832 of 2001.

3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.

The appellant herein was elected as a President of Anand Municipality. His term of office was to expire on 30.6.2002. The 6th respondent herein lodged two First Information Reports before the Anand Town Police Station which were marked as C.R. No. 257 of 2001 and C.R. No. 254 of 2001 for commission of alleged offences under Sections 307, 143, 147, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 25(C) of the Arms Act and under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act.

4. In connection with investigation of said matters, the Appellant herein was arrested and detained in judicial custody from 13.6.2001 to 6.7.2001. The Director of Municipalities purported to act as an authorised officer in exercise of the power conferred upon him under Section 40 of the Act, directed that the petitioner be placed under suspension from his office in view of pendency of the said cases by an Order dated 21.6.2001 whereagainst an appeal was preferred by him. Before the Appellate Authority a contention was raised by the appellant to the effect that as no charge sheet was submitted in the said case, the question of pendency of any trial thereof would not arise and in that view of the matter the 3rd respondent herein must be held to have acted illegally and without jurisdiction in passing the said order of suspension. The Appellate Authority, however, dismissed the said appeal by an Order dated 30.6.2001. Questioning the legality or validity of the said order, a writ petition was filed by the appellant herein in the High Court of Gujarat. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was marked as Special Civil Application No. 4832 of 2001. Dismissing the said writ petition, the learned Single Judge inter alia held that the expression "detention in jail during trial" will include detention in judicial custody during pre trial as also post trial. It was further held that the said expression must be interpreted as "detention in jail during the process of trial . On an appeal preferred by the appellant thereagainst, the Division Bench held:

"So far as the detention in judicial custody is concerned, in our opinion, the word "trial" which is not expressly defined in Cr.P.C. should not be given a restricted meaning to include only proceedings after the accused is actually arraigned before the competent court for framing and facing the charge.

Detention in judicial custody is a step or prelude to criminal trial and there is no reason why this detention cannot be held to be covered within the expression detained in prison during trial . We do not find ourselves in complete agreement with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge that the expression detained in prison during trial would include even pre-trial detention. But we find sufficient force in the reasoning of the learned Single Judge that the expression detention in prison during trial should include any detention during the process of trial meaning thereby that if before committing the case to the Sessions Court for trial an accused is in judicial custody, the said period of detention would also be in the process of trial and therefore would be held to be "during trial . This contextual meaning has to be given to the expression detention in Jail during trial to fulfill the object of the provision to keep under suspension hold

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2003 Supreme(SC) 456

Cases Referred (6)