IMPORTANT POINT
Bars of limitation introduced in Common Cause and Raj Deo Sharma case cannot be sustained and view that dictum of Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay s case continues to hold the field.

JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.-State of Rajasthan questions legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur holding that the trial against the respondent for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304(A) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the IPC ), could not be continued indefinitely. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gulabpura, Bhilwara, Rajasthan directed acquittal of the respondent who was facing trial for alleged commission of aforesaid offences. The alleged incident took place on 28th March, 1995. The trial court closed the evidence in the light of the decision of this Court in Raj Deo Sharma vs. State of Bihar (1998(7) SCC 507).

2. The High Court as noted above, observed that the trial cannot proceed indefinitely and the trial had not come to an end for a period of six years, and, therefore, learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was justified in closing the evidence and directing acquittal.

3. The correctness of the decisions in two Raj Deo Sharma s cases i.e. Raj Deo Sharma vs. State of Bihar (1998(7) SCC 507) and (1999(7) SCC 604) and that of "Common Cause" a Registered Society vs. Union of India and Ors. (1996(6) SCC 775) and (1996(4) SCC 33) was considered by seven-judge Bench in P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka (2002(4) SCC 578). In the said case after considering the various decisions it was held as follows :

"For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in Common Cause case (I) - (1996(4) SCC 33 : 1996 SC (Cri.) 589) [as modified in Common Cause (II) - (1996(6) SCC 775 : 1997 SC (Cri) 42) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) - (1998(7) SCC 507 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1692 and (II) - (1999(7) SCC 604 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1324) the Court could not have prescribed periods of limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case or a criminal proceeding cannot continue and must mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or discharging the accused. In conclusion we hold :

(1) The dictum in A.R. Antulay case (1992(1) SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93) is correct and still holds the field.

(2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A.R. Antulay case (supra) adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold and reaffirm the said propositions.

(3) The guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made.

(4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II). At the most the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay case and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharg